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ABSTRACT
The problem of intrusion detection in wireless mesh networks (WMN) is challeng-
ing, primarily because of lack of single vantage points where trac can be analyzed
and the limited resources available to participating nodes. Although the problem
has received some attention from the research community, little is known about the
tradeos among dierent objectives, such as high network performance, low energy
consumption, and high security eectiveness. In this research, we show how accurate
intrusion detection can be achieved in such resource constrained environments. The
major challenges that hinder the performance of intrusion detection systems (IDS) in
WMN are resources (e.g., energy, processing, and storage capabilities) accompanied
by the adhoc-dynamic communication ows.
In light of these challenges, we classify the proposed solutions into four classes:
1) Resourceless Trac Aware (RL-TW) IDS, 2) Resourceless Trac Agnostic (RL-
TG) IDS, 3) Resourceful Trac Agnostic (RF-TG) IDS, and 4) Resourceful Trac
Aware (RF-TW) IDS. To achieve a desirable level of intrusion detection in WMN,
we propose a research program encompassing ve thrusts. First we show how trac-
awareness helps IDS solutions achieving high detection rates in resource-constrained
WMN. Next, we propose two RL-TG (i.e., cooperative and non-cooperative) IDS
solutions that can optimally monitor the entire WMN trac without relying on
WMN trac information. The third (RF-TG) and fourth (RF-TW) IDS solutions
propose energy-ecient monitoring mechanisms for intrusion detection in battery-
powered WMN for trac-agnostic and trac-aware scenarios, respectively. We then
investigate the Attack and Fault Tolerance of our proposed solutions and nally
enumerate potential improvements and future works for our proposed solutions.
ii
To My Beloved and Supportive Family:
My Parents,
My Wife,
My Brothers and Sister.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to thank my very supportive advisor Dr. Radu Stoleru, without whom
this work would have been an unrealized dream. His methods of intuitive thinking,
research methodology and outlook on life will be something I will treasure and learn
from in the years to come. I would like to thank him for accepting me into the
LENSS lab, which provided me with the necessary exposure to the eld of wireless
networks security.
I would like to thank Zhaoyan (Brooks) Xu, Ala Altaweel, Dr. Michalis Poly-
chronakis and Dr. Guofei Gu for their collaborations in this research. I would also
like to thank Dr. Riccardo Bettati, Dr. Anxiao (Andrew) Jiang and Dr. I-Hong
Hou for being part of my committee and their positive and helpful feedback. I also
wish to thank all the (former and current) members of the Laboratory for Embedded
and Networked Sensor Systems (LENSS) for their support and companionship dur-
ing the course of my study. This work would not have been possible without their
constructive criticism.
I wish to thank my parents, wife, brothers and sister for their constant love,
support and encouragement. Last, but not the least, I would like to acknowledge my
compatriot friends for making my stay in College Station memorable and fun-lled.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Dissertation Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Main Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2. STATE OF THE ART . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Decentralized Intrusion Detection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Optimal Monitoring Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Cooperative IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5 Trac Awareness in Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.6 Attack and Fault Tolerant IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.7 Optimization Techniques in WMN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3. SYSTEM AND SECURITY MODELS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1.1 WMN Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 Intrusion Detection Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3 Attacker Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4. RESOURCELESS AND TRAFFIC-AWARE IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.1 Motivation and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.2 Preliminaries and Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2.1 IDS Function Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2.2 Optimal IDS Function Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
v
4.3 PRIDE: Challenges and Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3.1 Memory Consumption Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.3.2 Rule Files Modularization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3.3 PRIDE Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.4 System Implementation and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.4.1 Intrusion Detection Evaluation Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4.2 Snort Rule Sets and Modularizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4.3 Proof-of-Concept Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.4.4 Eects of Memory Threshold and Path Length . . . . . . . . . 58
4.4.5 PRIDE-aware Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5. RESOURCELESS AND TRAFFIC-AGNOSTIC IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.1 Non-Cooperative IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.1.1 Goals and Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.1.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.1.3 Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.1.4 RAPID Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.1.5 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.2 Cooperative IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.2.1 Cooperative IDS Architecture and Problem Formulation . . . 95
5.2.2 Models for Single Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.2.3 Solutions for Optimal Monitoring in Cooperative IDS . . . . . 106
5.2.4 Evolutionary Algorithms for MOO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.2.5 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.2.6 System Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.2.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6. RESOURCEFUL AND TRAFFIC-AGNOSTIC IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.1 Validation of Duty-Cycled Operation in WMN . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.2 Problem Formulation and its NP-Hardness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.3 Proposed Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.3.1 Greedy Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.3.2 Integer Linear Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.3.3 Distributed Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.3.4 Solution Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.4 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.4.1 Link Coverage vs. Node Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.4.2 Comparison of Dierent EEMON Algorithms . . . . . . . . . 151
6.4.3 Impact of Duty-Cycling on WMN Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . 155
7. RESOURCEFUL AND TRAFFIC-AWARE IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.1 Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.1.1 Optimal Monitoring Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.2 TRAIN Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
vi
7.3 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
7.3.1 Performance Evaluation of TRAIN Algorithms . . . . . . . . . 163
7.3.2 Energy Consumption of EEMON vs. TRAIN . . . . . . . . . 166
7.3.3 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
8. ATTACK AND FAULT TOLERANT WIRELESS IDS . . . . . . . . . . . 176
8.1 AFT Mechanisms Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
8.1.1 Prevention Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
8.1.2 Detection Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
8.1.3 Response Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
8.2 AFT-Design for WMN IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
8.2.1 Resourceful IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
8.2.2 Resourceless IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
8.2.3 Solutions for AFT-Design of IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
8.3 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
8.3.1 Resourceful IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
8.3.2 Resourceless IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
9.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
9.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
9.2.1 Intelligent Routing for Trac-Aware IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
9.2.2 Intrusion Detection in Resource-Constrained and Dynamic Net-
works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
9.2.3 Load-Awareness in IDS Role Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
9.2.4 Intrusion Detection in Resource-Constrained IoT . . . . . . . 200
9.2.5 Cyber Physical Systems Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE Page
3.1 A typical mesh network with internal and external trac ows. . . . 24
3.2 An example of selective forwarding attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.1 The eect of Snort conguration on memory consumption. . . . . . . 34
4.2 The eect of Snort conguration and trac rates on CPU utilization. 36
4.3 An example graph for a mesh network, consisting of 9 nodes and 8
links. As shown, two paths p1 and p2 are present. The nodes run
dierent congurations of Snort, e.g., node v5 runs Snort functions f3,
f4 and f5, which require preprocessors c1 and c2. . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.4 Linearity of memory consumption in dierent search algorithms as the
number of activated rules increases: a) AC-bnfa-nq; b) Lowmem. . . . 47
4.5 ILP execution time for dierent modularizations. . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.6 Our department-wide wireless mesh network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.7 6-module conguration: eect of  and PL on a) Intrusion detection
rate, and b) Average estimated memory load. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.8 12-module conguration: eect of  and PL on a) Intrusion detection
rate, and b) Average estimated memory load. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.9 The dierence between estimated and actual average memory load: a)
6-Module conguration, and b) 12-Module conguration. . . . . . . . 62
4.10 ILP solver execution time for dierent parameters. . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.11 Distributed approach based on random module selection: eect of 
and PL on the intrusion detection rates in a) 6-Module Conguration,
and b) 12-Module Conguration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.12 Average detection rate for PRIDE-aware attacks: a) 6-Module cong-
uration, and b) 12-Module conguration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
viii
5.1 A WMN graph, consisting of 10 nodes and 16 links. As shown, a 6-
module conguration is used in this WMN where Snort preprocessors
are also grouped in three sets of preprocessors [38]. The nodes run
dierent Snort congurations, e.g., node v1 runs detection modules f1
and f4, which require preprocessors c1, c2 and c3. . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.2 The matrix X for the 10-node mesh network shown in Figure 5.1 is
encoded as a chromosome. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.3 The eect of  on the average link coverage in: (a) 6-Module cong-
uration; (b) 12-Module conguration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.4 The eect of  on the average memory load in: (a) 6-Module cong-
uration; (b) 12-Module conguration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.5 The eect of  on the detection rate of single-hop (local) attacks in:
(a) 6-Module conguration; (b) 12-Module conguration. . . . . . . . 85
5.6 The eect of  on the detection rate of multi-hop attacks in: (a)
6-Module conguration; (b) 12-Module conguration. . . . . . . . . . 85
5.7 The eect of  on the detection rate of compromised node attacks in:
(a) 6-Module conguration; (b) 12-Module conguration. . . . . . . . 87
5.8 The eect of  on the detection rate of unauthorized client (outsider)
attacks: (a) against nodes in 6-Module conguration; (b) against
nodes in 12-Module conguration; (c) against links in 6-Module con-
guration; (d) against links in 12-Module conguration. . . . . . . . . 88
5.9 The eect of  and network density on the average link coverage in: (a)
6-Module conguration of distributed RAPID; (b) 12-Module congu-
ration of distributed RAPID; (c) 6-Module conguration of centralized
RAPID; (d) 12-Module conguration of centralized RAPID. . . . . . 89
5.10 The eect of  and network density on the detection rate of multi-hop
attacks in: (a) 6-Module conguration of distributed RAPID; (b) 12-
Module conguration of distributed RAPID; (c) 6-Module congura-
tion of centralized RAPID; (d) 12-Module conguration of centralized
RAPID. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.11 The eect of  and network density on the detection rate of com-
promised node attacks in: (a) 6-Module conguration of distributed
RAPID; (b) 12-Module conguration of distributed RAPID; (c) 6-
Module conguration of centralized RAPID; (d) 12-Module congu-
ration of centralized RAPID. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
ix
5.12 The eect of  and network density on the detection rate of unautho-
rized client (outsider) attacks against nodes in: (a) 6-Module cong-
uration of distributed approach; (b) 12-Module conguration of dis-
tributed approach; (c) 6-Module conguration of centralized approach;
(d) 12-Module conguration of centralized approach. . . . . . . . . . 93
5.13 The eect of  and network density on the detection rate of unautho-
rized client (outsider) attacks against links in: (a) 6-Module cong-
uration of distributed approach; (b) 12-Module conguration of dis-
tributed approach; (c) 6-Module conguration of centralized approach;
(d) 12-Module conguration of centralized approach. . . . . . . . . . 94
5.14 (a) Example of a network with a cooperative IDS (nodes responsi-
bilities vary). (b) A generic architecture for nodes in a cooperative
IDS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.15 The connectivity graph is encoded as a string suitable for GA. All
feasible solutions can be derived from graph connectivity string. . . . 111
5.16 Convergence of penalized objective value using dierent combinations
of genetic operations for: (a) 49-node Random network; (b) 49-node
Grid network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.17 Convergence of penalized objective value using dierent initial pop-
ulation and same genetic operations. (a) 49-node Random network.
(b) 49-node Grid network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.18 Convergence of SOO and MOO objective values in 49-node networks:
(a) Random; (b) Grid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.19 Eects of constraints on the output of the optimization problem: (a)
SOO of Information in 49-node Random. (b) Penalized MOO of In-
formation in 49-node Random. (c) SOO of Information in 49-node
Grid. (d) Penalized MOO of Information in 49-node Grid. . . . . . . 126
5.20 A Pareto diagram emphasizes the relationship among objective func-
tions. The high degree of correlation is evidenced by the narrow sur-
face displayed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.21 Cluster trees obtained by HA from the same networks as Figure 5.19:
(a) SOO of Information in a 49-node Random. (b) Penalized MOO of
Information in a 49-node Random. (c) SOO of Information in 49-node
Grid. (d) Penalized MOO of Information in 49-node Grid. . . . . . . 128
x
5.22 Comparison between the execution time and optimality of the solu-
tions both GA and Hybrid solutions for dierent network sizes. (a)(b)
Random Network. (c)(d) Grid Network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.23 Probability mass function for delay in reporting attacks to the nearest
leader for dierent cluster trees of a 50-node network produced by GA
and HA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.24 (a) Connectivity graph of adhoc network and random attacker loca-
tions. (b) Random solution. (c) SOO solution. (d) MOO solution. . . 134
6.1 (a) Experimental setup. (b) Battery consumption for dierent on/o
intervals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.2 Examples of monitor nodes M and corresponding covering sets C. . . 143
6.3 (a) Average number of monitor and uncovered nodes for dierent K
values in Max Coverage of 50-node network. (b) Link coverage per-
cent. (c) Average number of monitors in dierent algorithms. (d)
Percentage of nodes selected as monitor in link coverage and node
coverage approaches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.4 Average residual battery charge of (a) Nodes selected as monitoring
nodes. (b) Nodes NOT selected as monitoring nodes. Average com-
munication load of (c) nodes selected as monitoring nodes. (d) Nodes
NOT selected as monitoring nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.5 (a) Bth Minimum Charge among selected nodes. (b) Average Execu-
tion Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
6.6 The distribution of ILP EEMON execution time. . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.7 Five-node mesh network topology and dierent monitoring solutions. 156
7.1 (a) Average number of monitors. (b) Percentage of nodes selected as
monitors. (c) Average link coverage in the entire network. (d) Average
battery charge of selected nodes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
7.2 (a) Bth Minimum Charge among selected nodes. (b) Average Execu-
tion Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.3 The distribution of ILP TRAIN execution time for jP j = 0:5N . . . 166
7.4 Duty cycling at ratios of 50% and 80% uptime in a 40s period. . . . . 167
xi
7.5 EEMON Energy Consumption (a) duty cycle 50%. (b) duty cycle
80%. TRAIN Energy Consumption (c) duty cycle 50%. (d) duty
cycle 80%. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
7.6 EEMON average Detection rate for (a) Severe Single-hop attacks. (b)
All combinations of Normal/Severe and Single-hop/Multi-hop attacks.
(c) EEMON-Aware attacks. (d) Jamming attack . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
7.7 TRAIN average Detection rate for (a) Severe Single-hop attacks, (b)
All combinations of Normal/Severe and Single-hop/Multi-hop attacks. 172
7.8 TRAIN average Detection rate for (a) TRAIN-Aware attacks, (b)
Jamming attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
8.1 A multi-phase process for designing an AFT IDS mechanism. . . . . . 178
8.2 Average number of monitoring nodes for dierent  in: (a) EEMON;
(b) TRAIN 50% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
8.3 [Bth - Minimum Charge] among selected nodes for dierent  in: (a)
EEMON; (b) TRAIN 50%. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
8.4 Average residual energy charge of selected nodes for dierent  in: (a)
EEMON; (b) TRAIN 50%; Average communication load of selected
nodes for dierent  in: (c) EEMON; (d) TRAIN 50%. . . . . . . . . 188
8.5 Average link coverage for dierent  in TRAIN 50%. . . . . . . . . . 190
8.6 Average intrusion detection rate of all 40N random Normal/Severe
and Single-hop/Multi-hop attacks in: (a) EEMON; (b) TRAIN 50%. 190
8.7 Average intrusion detection rate of EEMON/TRAIN aware attacks
for dierent  in: (a) EEMON; (b) TRAIN 50%. Average execution
time of the ILP solver for dierent  in: (c) EEMON; (d) TRAIN 50%.191
8.8 Average energy consumption of 50% duty cycling for dierent  in: (a)
EEMON; (b) TRAIN 50%. The ratio of number of selected monitors
to the expected number of monitors for dierent  in: (c) EEMON;
(d) TRAIN 50%. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
8.9 The average IDS functions per link for dierent memory threshold
() and network densities in: (a) 6-Module Conguration; (b) 12-
Module Conguration RAPID. The average IDS functions per path
for dierent memory threshold () and path lengths (PL) in: (c) 6-
Module Conguration; (d) 12-Module Conguration PRIDE. . . . . . 195
xii
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE Page
1.1 Taxonomy for Trac and Resource Aware Intrusion Detection in WMN 9
3.1 Attacker models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 Detectability of dierent attacks in our proposed solutions. . . . . . . 29
4.1 Dierent paths considered in the system evaluation . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2 Snort rule sets and modularizations used in our experiments and eval-
uations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.3 Load of detection modules in dierent modularizations . . . . . . . . 56
4.4 List of Snort rule les used by the R2A tool for generating exploit
against each detection module and the number of generated alarms
by each module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.1 GA Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.2 Optimal objective value of penalized function achieved by dierent
genetic operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.3 Optimal objective value of penalized function when combination 211
is applied on dierent initial populations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.4 RMSE value for number of cluster trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7.1 Objective functions and constraints in all formulations. . . . . . . . . 160
7.2 Dierent attack scenarios and the corresponding attack paths. . . . . 170
xiii
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMN) are self-managing networks that provide Inter-
net, intranet, and other services to mobile and xed clients using a multi-hop multi-
path wireless infrastructure consisting of mesh nodes [2,4,40]. The number of deploy-
ments of cost-eective mesh networks is continuously increasing as they are suitable
for many application domains such as disaster response [5,16{18,25,28,63,80], rural
IT services [1,6,10,44,45], environmental monitoring [27,92,93] and many others, as
surveyed in [2].
Because of the intrinsic sharing of the wireless medium and the emerging infor-
mation security threats, security has become one of the most critical issues WMN
deployments face today. Although Intrusion prevention methodologies, e.g., cryp-
tography, are known as the rst line of defense in wireless networking, this may not
be enough in mission critical scenarios that require strictly secure communication.
It has been argued [97] that regardless of the number of intrusion prevention strate-
gies used in a network, some vulnerabilities can always be found to allow intruders
passing the rst line of defense. To address the issues of intrusion prevention, one of
the most eective ideas proposed was to add layers of additional security tools, e,g.,
intrusion detection systems (IDS), that take appropriate actions when the network
is perceived to be under attack.
Simply adopting IDS from wired networks is challenging because WMN lack:
 Single Vantage Points where trac can be analyzed, which is typical in
wired networks (e.g., a gateway or router in a corporate network).
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 Hardware Resources available to wired networks, e,g., processing power,
storage and practically unlimited energy for powering WMN devices.
Due to the lack of concentration points in WMN where network trac can
be analyzed, research community has proposed decentralized monitoring mecha-
nisms [42, 62, 69, 75] for intrusion detection in WMN. Decentralized (also known
as distributed) solutions have been investigated mainly in the context of MANET
and sensor networks [21,47,67,84,85,98]. There, IDS were completely decentralized,
and an intrusion detection agent was placed on each node [97]. These solutions were
very inecient since nodes in the network would execute intrusion detection in a
redundant manner (e.g., a multi-hop stream was analyzed multiple times) thus con-
suming both hardware resources (that could be allocated to other network functions)
and energy. Additionally, the research [42, 58] has recently shown that the number
of attacks detectable by an intrusion detection agent placed on each node is limited
by the amount of resources available on the node (resulting in high false negative
rates). Therefore, a signicant number of intrusion detection mechanisms proposed
for WMN have only considered a specic type of service/attack in a particular WMN
application (e.g., Wormhole and Grayhole attacks) and proposed a detection tech-
nique/rule for it with respect to resource limitations [22, 29, 48, 60, 62, 69, 73, 74, 90].
The other few eorts in intrusion detection for WMN, regardless of attack types,
aim at nding an optimal monitoring mechanism (e.g., IDS node placement or IDS
rule assignment) that is practical based on WMN characteristics [30,42,58,75]. Our
motivating scenario for this research is the second group of IDS solutions and their
design and implementation challenges.
Among the research eorts on the optimal monitoring mechanisms for intrusion
detection in WMN, OpenLIDS [42] proposes a Lightweight detection engine that im-
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poses less computational load than o-the-shelf IDS (e.g., Snort [78] and Bro [65])
when executing on WMN nodes. This solutions is a distributed solution that re-
quires every WMN node to run the proposed lightweight IDS to monitor the entire
network. However, when compared to o-the-shelf IDS, OpenLIDS has even higher
false negative rates because fewer IDS functions are implemented in the detection
engine to conserve more processing and storage resources. Hence, we believe with
ever increasing security threats against such networks, lightweight IDS solutions are
not suitable for intrusion detection in WMN.
The identied ineciencies have triggered signicant research on optimal moni-
toring for intrusion detection in WMN [19,30,46,75,76,83]. The optimal monitoring
has been typically solved by selecting a few nodes (called monitoring nodes) that
execute the same set of IDS rules/functions but each of them is responsible for a
distinct part of the network. The research has shown that these solutions are only
suitable for resourceful mesh networks in which WMN nodes have sucient resources
for executing a complete set of IDS functions. Otherwise, the IDS will suer from
high false negative rates because the hardware resources does not allow node to
perform a full IDS [42, 58]. We believe that state-of-the-art solutions proposed for
optimal monitoring in WMN do not consider:
1. Detecting link-based attacks since they are formulated to cover WMN nodes
which is shown [37] to leave some communication links uncovered and conse-
quently some link-based attacks undetected.
2. Energy eciency in battery-powered WMN [7, 16, 57] where executing IDS
tools imposes higher energy consumption rates to WMN devices [37].
These two ineciencies in optimal monitoring solutions are our motivating scenarios
in some of research thrusts in this dissertation.
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Recently, in order to decrease the number of nodes responsible for monitoring
network trac and consequently to reduce the total resource consumption for intru-
sion detection purposes, it was proposed that knowledge about network trac (i.e.,
trac-awareness [59]) be used for optimal monitoring for intrusion detection [30,70].
The trac awareness is particularly helpful in networks with signicant constraints
on hardware resources (designated herein as resourceless). Some WMN may fall in
this category and can benet from such solutions while other WMN have wireless
nodes with more hardware capabilities (designated herein as resourceful), that can
be dedicated to performing full IDS functions [16, 75, 92]. In this research, we show
that trac-aware IDS solutions proposed for wired network [70] are infeasible for
resource-constrained WMN, however, inspired by the idea proposed in [70], we show
how the idea can be modied and practically used in real-world resource-constrained
WMN. We hypothesize that trac awareness can also be helpful for resourceful
WMN. More precisely, we are motivated by the facts that trac-awareness can be
applied to:
1. Resourceless WMN where nodes are not able to perform a complete set of
IDS functions, but distributing IDS functions eciently along trac paths will
increase intrusion detection rates while ensuring that nodes are not overloaded
by IDS function [39].
2. Resourceful WMN where number of monitoring nodes, being able to perform
full IDS, decreases because only few trac paths (consequently few communi-
cation links) have to be monitored [31].
Applying trac-aware mechanisms to the state-of-the-art IDS solutions in WMN is
another motivating scenario in this research.
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Research has shown [14,16,64] that even static WMN topology and routing paths
are subject to change due to: a) link-quality variations, especially in outdoor deploy-
ments, caused by weather, noise and other radio signals, etc.; b) mobility of clients
and their requested services that result in changes of WMN routing paths; c) node
failure (e.g., running out of power) or node replacement (e.g., administrative rea-
sons) during network lifetime. Thus, trac-awareness might be a strong assumption
for many WMN applications where trac paths change very often and consequently
degrade the performance of the IDS solution. Therefore, the trac knowledge has
to be very accurate and up-to-date in trac-aware solutions, which is not always
feasible. In fact, a trac-agnostic IDS solution that monitors all communication
links instead of only few paths is more reliable and also applicable to all types of
WMN, at the price, however, of putting IDS load on all WMN nodes and consuming
more resources for intrusion detection.
As a trac-agnostic solution for resource-constrained networks, cooperative IDS
have been investigated mainly in the context of ad hoc and sensor networks [41,
49, 50, 52, 54, 62, 81, 84]. In these solutions every node is assigned a few IDS func-
tions to detect attacks based on local observation. A cooperative IDS engine is then
employed for detecting more attacks, based on neighbor information [62,94]. Cooper-
ative mechanisms incur high communication overhead, caused by message exchange
required for intrusion detection, and high detection latency since some of decisions
are made only after receiving other nodes' reports. Therefore, although cooperative
IDS have proven viable for low-trac networks, e.g., sensor networks, they are not
practical (i.e., degrades the network performance and delays intrusion response) in
most of WMN applications [1,2,23,59]. Although cooperative IDS has received some
attention from the research community, little is known about the tradeos among
dierent objectives, such as high detection rate, low resource consumption and detec-
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tion latency. Motivated by the fact that cooperative IDS are not practical solutions
for most of WMN applications, another research thrust in this dissertation concen-
trates on proposing non-cooperative IDS where each node, depending on its available
resources, is assigned a subset of IDS functions, i.e., a customized IDS conguration,
and investigates the entire network trac on the set of communication links it can
monitor (i.e., in its coverage area). This solution does not require message exchange
in order to make intrusion detection decision and eliminates communication overhead
and detection delay.
Finally, although intrusion detection mechanism in WMN have received consid-
erable focus, little attention has been paid to attacks-and-failures against/of IDS
nodes. Undoubtedly, when an IDS node is compromised or faulty, it is unable to
participate in intrusion detection process, thus, the intrusion detection rate will de-
crease and some malicious activities will remain undetected (i.e., high false negative
rates). Therefore, as the last research truth in this dissertation, we investigates the
attack-and-fault tolerance of IDS solutions we propose.
1.2 Dissertation Statement
Intrusion detection in WMN is challenging because a set of requirements and
constraints that need to be considered when proposing an optimal monitoring mech-
anism for IDS. Since the network characteristics vary from one to another WMN
application, an IDS designed for a particular WMN has to consider all WMN char-
acteristics:
 processing power and storage of the nodes
 energy constraints in WMN
 networking services provided by the WMN
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 administrative knowledge (e.g., user trac patterns)
 vulnerabilities and potential threats
Taking into consideration that each of these characteristics has a signicant im-
pact on both regular networking functionality and intrusion detection performance,
it is our belief that the all IDS design and implementation requirements related to
the characteristics above have to be met in optimal monitoring mechanisms proposed
for intrusion detection in WMN.
Our thesis is that the following goals can be achieved by an intrusion detection
system in WMN:
 Practical: An intrusion detection mechanism designed for a specic WMN
application should consider the amount of available resources and also the im-
portance of networking services currently available in the WMN. It is shown in
recent research that most of the proposed IDS solutions cannot be practically
employed by mesh networks due to resource limitations (e.g., mesh node runs
out of memory and crashes after running IDS). Additionally, a desired IDS al-
ways considers all active services and their potential threats instead of focusing
on few specic attacks (i.e., leaved many types of attacks undetected resulting
in high false negative rates). Finally, since WMN is known as a cost-eective
easy-to-deploy networking solution, a practical IDS solution for WMN must
also be an easy-to-deploy mechanism (e.g., no need for extra hardware).
 Ecient: Similar to other processes, intrusion detection process impose mem-
ory and CPU loads to WMN nodes. In addition, research has shown that
some WMN hardware consume more electrical current (energy) as CPU load
increases. Thus, an ecient intrusion detection imposes minimum amount of
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memory and CPU loads (consequently minimum energy consumption) to WMN
nodes.
 Accurate: The most important evaluation metrics for intrusion detection sys-
tems are detection rates and false alarm rates. When designing an IDS for a
WMN application, the attacker model and detection rules must be accurately
dened and evaluated to achieve maximum detection rate and reduce false
alarms.
 Scalable: Some IDS mechanisms perform complex optimization algorithms
to solve the optimal monitoring problem and optimal IDS rule assignment.
Due to limited amount of processing resources on WMN nodes, these solutions
require a central and computationally powerful node (e.g., base station) to
execute complex algorithms. In addition, in order to nd optimal solutions for
a given network, the central nodes needs to collect nodes' information. The
communication overhead imposed by the message exchange between WMN
nodes and the central node increases as network size increases. Hence, it is
very important to propose solutions that impose less communication overheads
or can be implemented in a distributed mode.
 Reliable: A severe and challenging attack against a WMN network could
be an attack against IDS nodes or an attack in which the attacker is already
aware of the intrusion detection mechanism. Unlike the considerable eort in
designing IDS solutions for WMN from the research community, little eort
has been dedicated to the attack-and-fault tolerance of IDS themselves.
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Table 1.1: Taxonomy for Trac and Resource Aware Intrusion Detection in WMN
Hardware Resources
Resourceless Resourceful
Trac Awareness
Trac Agnostic [33, 34], RAPID [36] EEMON [31,37]
Trac Aware PRIDE [38,39] TRAIN [31]
1.3 Main Contributions
In light of the aforementioned objectives, the contributions of this dissertation
are the following (as listed in Table 1.1):
 PRIDE: Trac Aware and Resourceless IDS [38, 39]: The fact that
WMN are resource constrained poses signicant challenges for intrusion detec-
tion. The main idea in PRIDE is to use the knowledge a security administrator
has about the WMN trac to distribute IDS functions more eciently. More
precisely, a security administrator, knowing the routing paths of the trac in
the WMN, would employ a trac-aware framework that optimally places IDS
functions on the nodes along the routing paths. The information about the
busiest and most frequently used paths in the WMN is obtained from rout-
ing algorithms (e.g., OLSR) and network monitoring tools (e.g., tcpdump).
PRIDE has no detection latency in making the intrusion detection decision. In
this solution, each node along a routing path, runs a distinct and customized
IDS. This customized IDS (technically a subset of IDS functions) allows re-
source conservation. The combination of distinct IDS along the path allows for
a complete set of IDS functions to be applied to the entire network trac.
 RAPID: Trac Agnostic and Resourceless IDS [36]: This research
thrust is motivated by the fact that in many WMN applications trac paths
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change very often, which consequently degrades the performance of trac-
aware IDS solutions. For example, routing paths in large scale WMN that
provide networking services for mobile clients are subject to change due to
client mobility. Additionally, WMN topology, especially in outdoor deploy-
ments, may change due to node failures or drastic link-quality changes. Hence,
the trac knowledge has to be very accurate and up-to-date in trac-aware so-
lutions, which is not always feasible. In RAPID, we propose a trac-agnostic
intrusion detection mechanism for resource-constrained WMN that monitors
all communication links, instead of only few paths. Each node, depending on
its available resources, is assigned a subset of IDS functions and investigates
the entire network trac on the set of communication links it can monitor
(i.e., in its coverage area). This customized IDS allows resource conservation
on resource-constrained WMN nodes and also increases the probability of mon-
itoring a WMN link with multiple distinct IDS functions activated on all WMN
nodes that can monitor the link. It is worth mentioning that for a given net-
work size, the complexity of trac-agnostic solution is larger than trac-aware
solution as it needs to nd optimal IDS function distribution for all nodes.
 Cooperative IDS: An Optimal Monitoring Mechanism for Coopera-
tive IDS [33, 34]: When WMN nodes are extremely resource-constrained and
the network density is low, RAPID intrusion detection rate degrades because
nodes can only execute few IDS functions and communication links are poorly
covered. Cooperative solutions propose information exchange among WMN
nodes (e.g., their local observation) in order to achieve higher detection rates.
This solution is practical for low trac WMN where the communication over-
head caused by intrusion detection message exchange does not inuence the
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network performance. In this research thrust, we propose a cooperative solu-
tion in which a base station which has knowledge about network (e.g., node
resources, locations, etc.) and security requirements (e.g., maximum permis-
sible delay in reporting an event, minimum network coverage), computes the
optimal distribution of roles specic to cooperative IDS. Our proposed solution
allows execution of sophisticated algorithms that optimize multiple objectives
related to network performance and security eectiveness.
 EEMON: Energy Ecient Trac Agnostic and Resourceful IDS [31,
37]: This research considers battery-powered WMN where resourceful nodes
are able to perform full IDS congurations. Thus, the optimal monitoring
mechanism for intrusion detection is to select a few monitoring nodes that
can monitor the entire network trac. However, despite the attention energy
ecient operation in WMN has received there is no provision in the 802.11s
standard for power saving mode operation. This led to the absence of mesh
node hardware that operates in a power saving mode. Given the urgent need
for energy saving, most of the solutions propose duty-cycling which has ad-
verse eects on the IDS operation where monitoring nodes are required to be
on/awake at all times. Consequently, the research challenge/problem we ad-
dress in this work is how to reconcile energy ecient operation, which requires
nodes to be asleep as much as possible, with an eective intrusion detection,
which requires nodes to be awake, to monitor trac.
 TRAIN: Trac Aware and Resourceful IDS [31]: As the last class of
IDS we investigate in this research, TRAIN proposes a trac-aware monitoring
mechanism for battery-powered mesh networks where nodes are resourceful and
able to execute full IDS. In fact, TRAIN studies the eect of trac-awareness
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on EEMON in which, instead of monitoring all communication links, the mon-
itoring mechanism has to monitor only a few links in the WMN (i.e., those
located on trac paths).
 AFT-IDS: Attack and Fault Tolerant IDS: Although the design and im-
plementation of specic intrusion detection mechanisms have received consider-
able attention, little eort has been dedicated to the attack-and-fault tolerance
of IDS themselves. In this research thrust, we investigate the attack-and-fault
tolerance of our all intrusion detection systems we have designed and imple-
mented for wireless mesh networks (as listed in Table 1.1). We rst survey a
series of administrative mechanisms for attack-and-fault tolerant (AFT) IDS
design and proposes a classication for all AFT mechanisms and then concen-
trates on preventive solutions. These solutions use redundant IDS nodes to
maintain high IDS availability ratio after IDS compromise/failure times. Fi-
nally, we propose redesigned IDS solutions that are attack and fault tolerant
and then show that these mechanisms, at the price of higher resource consump-
tion, increase the attack/fault tolerance level.
1.4 Organization
This dissertation is organized in nine sections. The current section motivates our
work and states the contributions of the research. In Section 2 we review state-of-the-
art solutions and investigate their practicality and eectiveness in dierent WMN
applications. Section 3 presents the system and security (attacker) models considered
in the entire research for dierent intrusion detection mechanisms. From Section 4
to Section 7, we introduce the four classes of IDS proposed for dierent WMN appli-
cations. In Section 4, we present PRIDE, a trac-aware and resourceless intrusion
detection proposed for resource-constrained WMN. Section 5 introduces RAPID, a
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trac-agnostic and resourceless intrusion detection inspired by the fact that PRIDE
performance degrades when WMN topology varies frequently and trac-awareness is
not a realistic assumption. We also present a cooperative IDS for extremely resource-
constrained WMN where a multi-objective optimization algorithm is used to pro-
duce an optimal cooperation model for intrusion detection mechanism. In Section
6, we present EEMON, an energy-ecient intrusion detection proposed for battery-
powered WMN that benets from memory-rich nodes. EEMON is a trac-agnostic
and resourceful IDS. Section 7 studies the eect of trac-awareness on resourceful
class of IDS, e.g., EEMON. Section 8 investigates the attack and fault tolerance of all
of our intrusion detection mechanisms and proposes attack-and-fault tolerant (AFT)
design for each of our proposed IDS.
Finally, in Section 9, we summarize this research, discuss the possibilities of
applying the proposed intrusion detection systems to other networking areas, discuss
future works and conclude the dissertation.
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2. STATE OF THE ART
In this section, we rst present background material on wireless mesh network
and their applications. Next, we present related work in the area of intrusion de-
tection systems for dierent wireless networks (e.g., mesh, sensor and mobile ad hoc
networks) and emphasize the practicality and eectiveness of each solution. It has
been more than a decade from the time rst intrusion detection system for wireless ad
hoc networks [97] was published. Since then, a signicant amount of research papers
have been presented in the area of intrusion detection in dierent infrastructure-less
networks. We mainly focus on the solutions proposed for optimal monitoring for
intrusion detection of these networks and do not cover the eorts in proposing intru-
sion detection engines (e.g., detection rules) for a specic type of attack in wireless
networks. Additionally, we survey a series of administrative mechanisms for attack-
and-fault tolerant (AFT) IDS design in dierent networking areas and show how they
can be applied to AFT-design IDS in WMN. Aside from related work on intrusion
detection, we also review energy ecient mechanisms and evolutionary algorithms
that have been previously applied to wireless mesh network as we will use them as
our optimization tools in designing dierent class of IDS in this research.
2.1 Background
As the rst step towards providing dynamic and cost eective network services in
environments with no network infrastructure, wireless mesh networks are becoming
more popular. As an instance of real WMN implementations the rural wireless
mesh network project in Zambia [6] provides telephony and internet access in some
remote physical areas. Moreover, the lack of cellular network in disaster areas has
convinced researchers [5, 16] to propose mesh networks as a cost-ecient and easy-
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to-deploy solution in order to provide networking services in disaster situations. In
addition to these applications, mesh networks have been deployed in academic and
research centres as test-bed for developing and evaluating networking protocols for
WMN [4,87].
As wireless mesh networks become a popular choice for oering wireless ser-
vices, security challenges grow in importance [9]. The problem of intrusion detection
in wireless mesh networks has received some attention from the research commu-
nity. Some existing solutions address specic attacks (e.g., Man-in-the-Middle and
Wormhole Attacks [29], Selective forwarding [73] and Grayhole attack [74], selsh
routing [90] and scheduling in WMN [48]). Other solutions are general IDS solutions
for mesh networks, which consider memory, processing [42,58], and energy [37] con-
straints. In [58], a set of technical challenges associated with IDS solutions in mesh
networks are presented. The authors provide interesting evaluation results on the
CPU utilization of a Netgear WG302 router and propose an initial design of a mod-
ular IDS but do not evaluate their solution. Performance evaluations of the Netgear
WG302 mesh router, when running o-the-shelf IDS have also been reported [42].
2.2 Decentralized Intrusion Detection Systems
Adopting traditional intrusion detection mechanisms from wired networks is not
practical because: a) WMN lack single vantage points (e.g., gateways in wired net-
works) where network trac can be inspected; b) WMN hardware has limited re-
sources (e.g., CPU and RAM) to run resource-demanding intrusion detection systems
(IDS). The lack of concentration points where network trac can be analyzed has
been investigated mainly in the context of MANET and sensor networks. There, IDS
were completely decentralized, and an intrusion detection agent was placed on each
node [97]. These solutions were very inecient since nodes in the network would
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execute intrusion detection in a redundant manner (e.g., a multi-hop stream was
analyzed multiple times) thus consuming both hardware resources (that could be
allocated to other network functions) and energy.
A recent work [42] investigates challenges in applying o-the-shelf IDS (Snort [78]
and Bro [65]) on mesh devices and proposes a lightweight (i.e., customized) IDS for
WMN. The proposed lightweight IDS requires less memory and decreases the packet
drop rate, when compared to o-the-shelf IDS. These achievements, however, are
at the price of detecting fewer types of network attacks (smaller detection coverage
and higher false negative rates), since most IDS functions are not implemented. In
addition, although deploying same lightweight intrusion detection agent on every
single WMN node may decrease the IDS loads on the nodes, it is still suer from
inecient redundant monitoring for multi-hop trac.
2.3 Optimal Monitoring Mechanisms
The identied ineciencies in section 2.2 have triggered signicant research on
optimal monitoring for intrusion detection. In a optimal monitoring solution, a min-
imum subset of nodes are strategically selected to perform intrusion detection to
monitor the entire network. More recently, several methods have been proposed
for selecting nodes that run intrusion detection functions. While these nodes are
primarily selected based on connectivity in wired networks, in resource constrained
wireless networks the selection criteria is much more complicated. The proposed
methods fall largely in two categories: distributed algorithms and centralized algo-
rithms. Nodes selected by either distributed or centralized methods are referenced
in dierent papers as: monitoring nodes, cooperators, aggregators, or cluster heads.
In a distributed solution each node decides individually which neighbor is the best
monitor for it. Some distributed solutions use the concept of local elections and vot-
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ing for monitoring node selection (and the cluster of nodes each monitoring is respon-
sible for) [13, 15, 54, 89]. Nodes may either use, as selection criteria, their neighbors'
capability, e.g., residual battery charge [47, 79] or degree of connectivity [46]. Other
solutions employ simple random selection as an election protocol [41,95]. The prob-
lem with this type of algorithms is that the best possible clustering is only optimal
at the local level due to lack of global information. Centralized solutions guaran-
tee that the decision will be made based on more complete information about the
nodes and the network. For this, a powerful central node is required to run more
complicated algorithms. There are several centralized algorithms for selecting the
location of monitoring nodes that run in polynomial time [19, 75, 83]. These algo-
rithms, however, consider only node coverage as an optimization objective. Taking
into account other issues, e.g., amount of information collected by the nodes, total
power consumption, and delay in detection process, may signicantly aect the role
assignment. The tradeos that centralized and distributed solutions have, and how
these tradeos aect network performance and intrusion detection rate will be ex-
plored in this research. Centralized algorithms produce near optimal solutions since
more information is used by the selection algorithm. Distributed algorithms, with
lower time and message complexities, produce locally optimal solutions.
Recently, an optimized solution for selecting monitoring nodes in a multi-radio
multi-channel wireless mesh network is proposed [76]. The problem is formulated as
an ILP and solved with rounding techniques. We will propose an energy ecient
monitoring technique for intrusion detection in battery powered WMN. Since the
number of IDS functions running on the monitoring node is limited by the amount
of available resources, these solutions, in resource-constrained WMN, only detect a
limited number of attacks even though all communication links and network trac
are monitored. Since the number of services provided byWMN is expected to increase
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(e.g., delay tolerant services [16], VoIP services [1]), fewer resources will be available
for intrusion detection. Consequently, the intrusion detection rate is expected to
degrade if the WMN nodes are not resourceful. In order to achieve higher detection
rates, some solutions [75,76,83] assume that monitoring nodes are resourceful devices
and are able to perform a complete IDS conguration. Thus, a monitoring node in
a resourceful class of IDS solutions investigates its local data with all IDS functions,
i.e., no need for cooperation. Most of the state-of-art monitoring node solutions [42,
75, 76, 83] assign the same set of IDS functions to monitoring nodes (where each
monitoring node is responsible for a distinct part of the network).
2.4 Cooperative IDS
When considering resource-constrained WMN where nodes are not able to per-
form full IDS, optimal monitoring solutions cause high false negative rates as most
of IDS functions have to be deactivated due to memory limitations. Another class
of IDS solutions proposed for resource-constrained networks relies on cooperation
mechanisms between resourceless nodes. Cooperative IDS solutions (e.g., hierarchi-
cal [33,54,69,84], group-based [49,50,52], or zone-based [81], or neighbor-assisted [67,
94] cooperation) distribute IDS agents [97] on wireless nodes. IDS agents consist of
a local detection engine (to detect attacks based on local observation) and also a
cooperative detection engine (to detect attacks based on local data and neighbors'
reports [62,94]).
The main reasons for using cooperative detection engine are: 1) to achieve higher
detection rates through nodes collaboration [33,34,41,81]; and 2) to reduce the IDS
load on the resource constrained ad hoc nodes [42,58] by distributing IDS functions
to multiple nodes. Cooperative mechanisms, however, incur high communication
overhead since nodes have to exchange their local observations with others run-
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ning dierent IDS functions. Moreover, waiting to receive neighbors' data and then
making the decision imposes high latency in cooperative intrusion detection systems.
Therefore, although cooperative IDS have proven viable for low-trac networks, e.g.,
sensor networks, they are not practical (i.e., degrades the network performance and
delays intrusion response) in WMN with signicant trac [1, 2, 23, 38, 59] caused by
mesh clients and external hosts.
2.5 Trac Awareness in Intrusion Detection
The fact that neither monitoring node solutions nor cooperative IDS techniques
can practically solve the intrusion detection problem in resource-constraint WMN
motivates researchers to propose non-cooperative IDS solutions for these WMN net-
works. As a trac-aware approach to overcome resource constraints and increase
the detection rate, TRAM [30] uses mesh routers to monitor multi-channel WMN.
Another research, in wired networks [70], proposed a scheme where each node along
a network path executes a full Bro IDS. To save resources (processing and memory
that would be allocated based on trac), each node investigates only a portion of
the network trac. Although we will show that this method cannot be directly ap-
plied to resource-constrained WMN since it assumes that each node performs all IDS
functions, we use the trac-aware IDS rule distribution in the RL-TW class of IDS.
Trac-aware solutions considers static resource-constrained WMN where network
topology does not change often (compared to other ad hoc networks). In fact, they
assumes that network information periodically collected by central node reects the
most recent network topology. However, research has shown [14, 16, 64] that even
static WMN topology and routing paths are subject to change due to link-quality
variations, mobility of clients and their requested services , and node failure (e.g.,
running out of power) during the network lifetime. Hence, trac awareness might
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be a strong assumption for many WMN applications. Motivated by this fact, trac-
agnostic IDS solutions are of paramount importance for many WMN applications.
2.6 Attack and Fault Tolerant IDS
Although intrusion detection mechanism in WMN have received considerable
focus, little attention has been paid to attacks-and-failures against/of IDS nodes.
Undoubtedly, when an IDS node is compromised or faulty, it is unable to participate
in intrusion detection process, thus, the intrusion detection rate will decrease and
some malicious activities will remain undetected (i.e., high false negative rates). The
IDS attack/failure problem has received some attention in other computer network-
ing areas [11, 55, 56, 61, 96]. Some of the proposed solutions use redundant/backup
nodes [55] to increase the network/service availability after node compromise/failure
while others concentrate on camouaging mechanisms [61, 96] to make monitor-
ing/IDS nodes localization [11] very hard for the attacker. Furthermore, few other
solutions propose fast and ecient fault detection mechanisms to detect compromised
or faulty nodes [56] and recover the network from that situation [55,61].
2.7 Optimization Techniques in WMN
This research proposes ve dierent intrusion detection mechanisms that all of
them aim at providing optimal monitoring mechanisms -each for a specic WMN
application (e.g., battery-powered, resource-constrained, etc.) We have used dierent
optimization tools (e.g., integer linear programming, evolutionary algorithms, and
combinatorial optimization) throughout this dissertation. Moreover, the energy-
ecient monitoring solution presented in Section 6 in motivated by other research in
battery-powered WMN. Thus, this section reviews energy-ecient and evolutionary
algorithms previously used by research community.
Energy-ecient intrusion detection in wireless networks has received some atten-
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tion [47, 71, 82]. As in the case of other eorts in power-constrained WMN, some
power-aware algorithms have been proposed for solar-powered WMN [7,24,57]. Re-
ducing the load on battery was proposed for giving battery recovery time [24, 57].
An on/o controller was proposed theoretically for battery recovery [66]. The idea of
reducing the battery load is proposed to give the battery a recovery time to prolong
its total lifetime. This idea led us to apply a duty-cycling method to WMN nodes
(similar to the on/o controller proposed in [24]) to recover the battery residual
charge [66].
Our proposed cooperative IDS solution, presented in Section 5, is inuenced by
recent developments in applying evolutionary algorithms to intrusion detection and
cluster formation in wireless networks. In [72] a grammatical evolution is proposed for
creating an intrusion detection engine in wireless nodes. The authors have extended
their work in [71] to make optimal tradeos between the detection rate of intrusion
detection programs and the amount of power they consume. [43] suggests using a ge-
netic algorithm (GA) to form intelligent, energy-ecient clusters in wireless sensor
networks (WSN). A similar approach for data aggregation in wireless sensor network
is presented in [3]. The authors propose a genetic algorithm to nd an optimal grid-
based routing with minimum energy dissipation and latency in WSN. Other eorts
in data aggregation and event detection in wireless sensor network employ neural
network to nd more ecient aggregation paths and to predict sensor outputs accu-
rately. In [68] the authors employ a neural network function to predict the changes in
sensor outputs. Such a signal change detection, as authors claim, could improve data
compression and consequently enhance the network reliability and security. In order
to eliminate redundant data and improve the aggregation accuracy, [86] proposes a
neural network-based method for data aggregation in wireless sensor network. The
authors show how distributing input layer and hidden layer neurons to cluster mem-
21
bers and cluster heads, respectively, would improve data aggregation and reduce the
energy consumed for event reporting to the base station.
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3. SYSTEM AND SECURITY MODELS
This section presents the system and security (attacker) models for all solutions
proposed in this research and highlight their similarities and dierences. Depending
on the WMN application we consider, the system model, the amount of available
resources, trac patterns, client accessibility, etc. would change. Moreover, the
attacker model in each class of IDS solutions depends on the WMN application and
also the system model. This section uses \mesh router" and \node" interchangeably
and refers to a \WMN client" as \client."
3.1 System Model
The WMN system we consider in this research is as specied by the IEEE 802.11s
WLAN Mesh Standard [40]. The system, as shown in Figure 3.1, consists of: i)
mesh access points (MAP) that connect WMN clients to the mesh network and
external hosts (i.e., Internet); ii) a wireless mesh backbone consisting of relay nodes,
also known as mesh points (MP); and iii) gateways that connect the mesh network
(internal hosts) to the Internet (external hosts). The network trac, as shown in
Figure 3.1, is either between WMN clients and external hosts (i.e., external trac)
or between two internal hosts (clients or local servers) inside the mesh network (i.e.,
internal trac). The system proposed for PRIDE [38] and RAPID [36] considers
resourceless AC-powered nodes. EEMON [37] and TRAIN [31], on the other hand,
assume resourceful battery-powered nodes. All of these systems, however, assume
that the WMN is connected to the Internet through more powerful gateway routers
that do not have energy constraints (AC powered). Some nodes in the WMN operate
in a duty-cycled manner to save energy.
Each router in a WMN has some local information (e.g., its communication load
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Figure 3.1: A typical mesh network with internal and external trac ows.
and its residual energy, processing/memory loads, connectivity and trac informa-
tion) and periodically sends it, via a middleware and secure communication links,
to the base station. For both EEMON and TRAIN, used in battery-powered WMN
applications, each node sends its communication load and residual energy to the
base station. In TRAIN (i.e., a trac-aware solutions), however, trac information
is also sent to the base station. WMN nodes in PRIDE and RAPID send their
processing/memory loads and connectivity, however, the trac information also has
to be sent to the base station in PRIDE. Based on the collected information, the
base station assigns intrusion detection tasks to the nodes. The role of each node
(i.e., performing what IDS functions) is securely broadcast to the network using the
energy-ecient ooding protocol presented in [35].
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3.1.1 WMN Topology
Throughout this research, we evaluate our proposed intrusion detection systems
using real-world WMN and simulations. In both scenarios, WMN topologies are
based on IEEE 802,11s WLAN Mesh Standard [40] and consist of at least one MAP,
one Gateway, and one MP. More precisely, every random topology that is generated
in simulations is rst investigated for following the aforementioned standard rules,
if veried, it will be considered as a valid WMN topology and used for performance
evaluations. For example, a disconnected graph created randomly will not be consid-
ered as a valid WMN topology in our simulation. Moreover, the radio range, network
density, and number of paths in each WMN are chosen carefully and based on our
real-world experiments. More details about number of random topologies for each
experiment and their characteristics for each proposed IDS mechanism are explained
in details in each section of this dissertation.
3.2 Intrusion Detection Engine
The IDS we consider in this research (i.e., for PRIDE, RAPID, EEMON, and
TRAIN) is Snort [78]. We chose Snort because it is a mainstream o-the-shelf IDS
that consumes less resources than other IDS, e.g., Bro (as was recently shown [42]).
Moreover, Snort is readily available for mesh hardware, as part of the OpenWrt (i.e.,
a Linux distribution for embedded networking devices) development tree. Snort can
be congured for dierent levels of intrusion detection. More complex actions per-
formed by the detection engine (e.g., number of active rule sets) require more system
resources. Therefore, the conguration of the detection engine provides opportunities
to trade o intrusion detection rate for resource availability.
Resourceful IDS solutions, EEMON and TRAIN, use two congurations for the
detection engine: complete (CP-DS) and lightweight (LW-DS). IN CP-DS congu-
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ration, all Snort detection rules are activated (same as Snort default conguration),
while a few of them are activated in LW-DS conguration. The detection rules in
CP-DS are congured to investigate all trac ows, while LW-DS detection engine
investigate only local clients' trac ows. EEMON and TRAIN assign monitoring
or non-monitoring roles to nodes. A monitoring node runs a complete IDS congu-
ration (CP-DS), while a non-monitoring node runs a lightweight IDS conguration
(LW-DS). In fact, non-monitoring nodes only monitor their clients' activities and
do not monitor WMN backbone trac. A monitoring node is always awake, while
a non-monitoring node executes with a duty-cycle. The gateway is always a mon-
itoring node. Nodes in resourceless IDS, PRIDE and RAPID, use customized IDS
conguration (i.e., customized to perform a few IDS functions to no function at all)
for the detection engine.
From detection engine perspective, intrusion detection systems can be catego-
rized in three classes; a) anomaly-based IDS, b) misuse-based IDS, and c) hybrid
IDS, which is a combination of the former two. The proposed intrusion detection
system might seem to detect only known attacks since Snort is a signature-based
detection engine. However, unknown attacks are also detected if the intrusion de-
tection engine employs anomaly-based inspection (as claimed on the Snort Website
\http://ww.snort.org"). Another example of an anomaly-based engine employed
by an o-the-shelf IDS is Bro [65], also ported to OpenWrt in [42]. Bro is able to
discern trac anomalies and to detect unknown attacks. Thus, our proposed solu-
tions are not limited to detecting only known attacks, but also stealth attack with
appropriate detection engine. We also emphasize here that our contribution in this
research is not to propose a new intrusion detection rule, but to propose optimal
approaches of applying proposed intrusion detection rules and engines to dierent
WMN applications.
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Table 3.1: Attacker models
Attacker Target
Insider¶ Outsider Single-hop Multi-hop
Trac Agnostic
Resourceless RAPID X X X X
Resourceful EEMON X X X X
Trac Aware
Resourceless PRIDE X ·  X
Resourceful TRAIN X ·  X
¶ A malicious client or a compromised router.
· Only external hosts, as a type of outsider attackers, are considered.
Unauthorized clients are not considered.
3.3 Attacker Models
Table 3.1 summarizes the types of attacks considered in our IDS solutions. An
Insider attacker is either a malicious client connected to a MAP or a compromised
router. As shown in Table 3.1, all four IDS classes address insider attackers. An
Outsider attacker is either an external host (connected to WMN through gateways)
or an unauthorized client not connected to WMN. For example, a malicious external
host communicating with a mesh client is considered as an outsider attacker. Fur-
thermore, a malicious unauthorized wireless node physically located in the WMN
coverage area, but not associated to a WMN MAP, is also considered as an outsider
attacker. As depicted in Table 3.1, PRIDE and TRAIN do not consider unauthorized
clients. When evaluating the performance of these IDS solutions, we will show how
this type of attack impacts the performance (i.e., intrusion detection rates) of these
trac-aware solutions.
Depending on the attacker type, i.e., insider or outsider, the target can be either
single-hop or multi-hop. When considering single-hop targets, the attack can be
either a node-based attack (targeting a WMN router or a host) or a link-based attack
(targeting a communication link). A multi-hop attack, however, is always against
hosts. An insider attacker, a malicious client or a compromised router can launch
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attack against both single-hop or multi-hop targets. When considering outsider
attackers, external hosts can only launch multi-hop attacks (against an internal host)
while unauthorized nodes can only launch attacks against single-hop nodes or links.
As shown in Table 3.1, TRAIN and PRIDE, as two trac-aware solutions that
monitor trac paths, do not consider single-hop attacks. However, EEMON and
RAPID, as two RF-TG solutions, consider both multi-hop and single-hop (i.e., node-
based and link-based) attacks.
In order to detect both node-based and link-based attacks, EEMON and RAPID's
novel approach for monitoring node selection is to monitor \wireless links" and not
\nodes," as existing solutions [75, 83]. The link coverage detects attacks that aect
functionality of communication links (e.g., jamming, wormhole, selective forwarding,
etc.). Consider a linear topology of four nodes (as shown in Figure 3.2). They are in
order ABCD and each node is connected to nodes that are physically adjacent. State
of art solutions that monitor nodes (i.e., node coverage approach), may select nodes
A and D as monitors (which cover all the nodes). However, this monitoring solution
cannot cover the communication link between B and C. For example, if node C in
Figure 3.2 is compromised and randomly drops some packets traveling from B to D
(a single-hop link-based attack), node C will never be detected by monitors at A and
D, unless there is a cooperation mechanism between them through another path. The
link coverage approach can also improve the performance of trac-aware solutions
(e.g., TRAIN and PRIDE), in addition to trac-agnostic solutions performance. For
example, when selecting nodes to monitor a trac path, the monitoring node can be
chosen from nodes not necessarily located on the path but also those able to cover
at least one link on the path. Therefore, we propose the link coverage approach for
RAPID, EEMON and TRAIN and expect to achieve higher intrusion detection rate
than node coverage approaches.
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Figure 3.2: An example of selective forwarding attack.
Table 3.2: Detectability of dierent attacks in our proposed solutions.
Trac Agnostic Trac Aware
Resourceless Resourcefuls Resourceless Resourceful
Single-hop
Severe if covered by Only at Monitors single-hop attacks Only at Monitors
Normal detecting modules Detectable are not considered Detectable
Multi-hop
Severe if covered by
Detectable
if covered by
Detectable
Normal detecting modules detecting modules
Since the detection engine used by EEMON/TRAIN has two dierent congura-
tions, the attacks can be categorized into two dierent severity levels: one detectable
by the LW-DS detection engine (i.e., Normal attack), and one by the CP-DS detec-
tion engine (i.e., Severe attack). Table 3.2 summarizes the detectability of these types
of attacks in state-of-the-art solutions and the expected detectability in EEMON and
TRAIN. Resourceless solutions, e.g., RAPID and PRIDE, that use customized IDS
conguration can detect an attack only if its corresponding detection module is acti-
vated in the customized IDS. Hence, regardless of the attack's severity level, there is
no certainty as to whether the attack will be detected by the resourceless solutions
or not. Resourceful solutions (e.g., EEMON and TRAIN), on the other hand, are
expected to detect Normal attacks since they are detectable by LW-DS detection
engines performed by non-monitors. Obviously, CP-DS detection engines performed
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by monitoring nodes can also detect Normal attacks. Severe attacks can be only de-
tected by monitoring nodes running CP-DS engines. Hence, as depicted in Table 3.2,
we expect Single-hop Severe attacks to be detectable if launched in the coverage area
of a monitoring node. Multi-hop Severe attacks are expected to be detectable by
resourceful solutions due to the fact that at least one monitoring node on each path
performs CP-DS detection engine.
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4. RESOURCELESS AND TRAFFIC-AWARE IDS
In this section, we propose PRIDE, a PRactical Intrusion DEtection system for
resource constrained WMN. The main idea in this section is to use the knowledge a
security administrator has about the WMN trac to distribute IDS functions more
eciently. More precisely, a security administrator, knowing the routing paths of
the trac in the WMN, would employ a trac-aware framework that optimally
places IDS functions on the nodes along the routing paths. For example, the idea of
interference-load aware routing metric [59] in WMN, aims to route the mesh trac
through congestion free areas and provides a trac-aware framework for the security
administrator. The information about the busiest and most frequently used paths in
the WMN is obtained from routing algorithms (e.g., OLSR) and network monitoring
tools (e.g., tcpdump).
A related idea for trac-aware IDS deployments in wired networks was recently
proposed [70], where dierent IDS responsibilities (i.e., dierent portions of network
trac) are assigned to each node along the trac paths while ensuring that no node
is overloaded. However, as we will show in Section 4.1, [70] cannot be directly ap-
plied to WMN since it assumes that each node performs all IDS functions - infeasible
for resource constrained mesh devices. Our proposed solution has no communication
overhead (message exchange for cooperative decision making), has no detection la-
tency (i.e., it provides real-time intrusion detection, in contrast to cooperative IDS)
and it has a higher detection rate, when compared with traditional monitoring node
Parts of this section are reprinted with permission from \PRIDE: Practical Intrusion Detection
in Resource Constrained Wireless Mesh Networks" by Amin Hassanzadeh, Zhaoyan Xu, Radu
Stoleru, Guofei Gu, and Michalis Polychronakis, In Proceedings of 15th International Conference on
Information and Communications Security (ICICS), pages 213-228, Beijing, China, 2013, Copyright
2013 by Springer.
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solutions. In our proposed solution, each node along a routing path, runs a distinct
and customized IDS. This customized IDS (technically a subset of IDS functions)
allows resource conservation. The combination of distinct IDS along the path allows
for a complete set of IDS functions to be applied to the entire network trac.
4.1 Motivation and Background
The research presented in this section is motivated by the challenges we faced
when we attempted to deploy a common o-the-shelf IDS with a full conguration
(i.e., congured to detect the largest set of attacks) on existing WMN router hard-
ware. When loading Snort [78] with its full conguration on a Netgear WNDR3700
router, the router crashes because the RAM is not suciently large. In the remain-
ing part of this section we describe in detail the hardware capabilities of our mesh
routers, background information on Snort, and experimental results that illustrate
how dierent Snort congurations of increasing complexity and detection capabilities
impact the memory load of the router.
The Netgear WNDR3700 router has an Atheros AR7161 processor running at
680MHz, 64MB RAM, 8MB ash memory. It has two wireless cards with Atheros
AR9223-bgn and Atheros AR9220-an chipsets, working on 2.4GHz and 5GHz, respec-
tively. The operating system on the router is the most recent release of OpenWrt
(i.e., Backre 10.03.1), a Linux distribution for embedded networking devices, with
kernel version 2.6.32.10. We emphasize that our mesh hardware is more powerful
(in terms of processing and memory resources) than devices used in some existing
real world deployments [1, 4, 6]. Although in this research we focus mainly on Net-
gear WNDR3700 router hardware, later in this section we present our experience
and results with more sophisticated and expensive mesh hardware, e.g., Meshlium
Xtreme [53] which has a 500MHz CPU, 256MB RAM, 8/16/32GB disk memory and
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WiFi, Zigbee, and GPRS wireless interfaces.
The router runs Snort [78], an o-the-shelf intrusion detection system. Snort's
detection engine is based on thousands of detection rules (categorized in multiple
rule les, corresponding to known network threats) and several preprocessors. All
les are listed in \snort.conf", a global conguration le. Upon activating each rule
le in \snort.conf" and running Snort, all detection rules present in the rule le are
loaded in memory and are used for packet investigation. A full Snort conguration
activates all preprocessors and rule les. A customized conguration activates only
some preprocessors and rule les (i.e., IDS functions), thus, the network trac is
analyzed by fewer detection functions.
The intrusion detection in Snort is performed by packet-level rule matching.
Each packet is preprocessed, following preprocessing directives for extracting pos-
sible plain-text content. The preprocessed packet is then inspected by Snort detec-
tion rules, to expose whether it is an intrusion attempt or not. Preprocessors parse
network packets and provide abstract data for some high-level detection rules in the
rule les. It is important to note that a rule le that contains high-level detection
rules has preprocessor dependency. This dependency means that the rule le cannot
be activated (i.e., Snort generates an error message and stops) unless all the prepro-
cessors required by its rules (usually one or two preprocessors) are also activated.
From here on, we refer to a Snort rule le as an \IDS function."
To understand how dierent Snort congurations impact the memory load on
the Netgear WNDR3700 and Meshlium Xtreme, we performed several experiments.
Running Snort causes two types of memory loads to the router: 1) static, the initial
load imposed by packet capturing modules, preprocessors, detection rules, etc. when
Snort is loaded; 2) dynamic, the variable load imposed by stateful preprocessors (e.g.,
Stream5 ) which is a function of the trac load and some conguration parameters.
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Figure 4.1: The eect of Snort conguration on memory consumption.
We rst investigate the static memory load of Snort on the routers when no net-
work trac is applied. We have observed that a typical memory load on a Netgear
WNDR3700 router is s30% and on the Meshlium Xtreme router it is s60%. This
accounts for OS rmware and various services (OLSR routing, DHCP, etc.). With-
out preprocessors or rule les active, loading Snort on Netgear WNDR3700 increases
memory load to 43% (\Snort(S)" in Figure 4.1). Memory load increases to 46% if
preprocessor Stream5 is activated (\S+str5" in Figure 4.1), and to 48% if preproces-
sors http-inspect, smtp and ftp-telnet are also activated (\S+4Pre" in Figure 4.1).
The memory load of a rule le is a function of the number of detection rules
in it and the pattern matching algorithm Snort uses (e.g., Aho-Corasick). We
note here that in this research, we use the default search method of Snort, i.e.,
ac-bnfa-nq, as we experimentally observed that it consumes the minimum memory
among all low memory search methods, e.g., lowmem. For example, using ac-bnfa-nq
search method, \dos.rules" which has 20 detection rules and requires the Stream5
preprocessor, increases memory load to 47% (\S+dos" in Figure 4.1). A very large
le such as \spyware-put" (\SpyConf" in Figure 4.1) which contains s1,000 rule
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les increases the RAM load to 70%. The memory load caused by activating a set
of rule les also depends on their sizes. For example, activating 20 small rule les
(i.e., 10 rules per le on average) and the Stream5 preprocessor (which the rules
require) increases memory load to 49%. Activating two large rule les, \spyware-
put.rules" and \backdoor.rules" (\SpyBack" in Figure 4.1) increases memory load
to 98%. We have experimentally veried that adding a few small rule les on top
of \spyware-put.rules" and \backdoor.rules" causes the router to crash. We have
observed a similarly overloaded operation for the Meshlium Xtreme router, where a
full conguration Snort increases the memory load to 98.5%, leaving almost no room
for processes/services beyond stock deployment. We also emphasize here the rapid
increase in the number of Snort rule les (i.e., currently about 70 les) and their
sizes as functions of the number of threats. Some rules might not be needed in a
particular setting, but conversely, that setting might require many more rules of some
other kind (e.g., custom signatures for suspicious or blacklisted domains, which can
increase signicantly).
Dynamic memory load, imposed by Stream5 when tracking trac sessions, is the
other considerable type of Snort memory load since almost all rule les require this
preprocessor. Two conguration parameters of Stream5, max tcp and memcap, spec-
ify the maximum simultaneous TCP sessions it tracks (similarly, max udp, max icmp,
and max ip) and the maximum buer size for TCP packet storage, respectively. We
have experimentally observed that the value of max tcp aects both dynamic and
static memory loads. When using the Snort version available on the OpenWrt devel-
opment tree, the default conguration has max tcp=8192. Choosing max tcp=100,000,
imposes s10% more static load than default \S+Str5" to the routers. Moreover, this
value allows more simultaneous TCP sessions to be inspected which also imposes
more dynamic load and may cause the router to crash at high trac rates (note: we
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Figure 4.2: The eect of Snort conguration and trac rates on CPU utilization.
observed that for max tcp150,000 the router crashes if a simple HTTP request is
sent using the Linux wget tool). Throughout this research, we use the default setting,
i.e., max tcp=8192, and consider the maximum dynamic load this setting imposes
on the router. Hence, from here on, the total memory load of Stream5 is assumed to
be its static load plus its maximum allowable dynamic load. It is worth mentioning
that although hardware improves, also transmission speeds get faster, the amount of
trac that needs to be inspected grows, and the complexity of the applied processing
increases. Hence, the fundamental challenge for a resource-limited node to handle
ever-increasing trac still remains.
In addition to RAM, processing power (CPU) is also limited on current mesh
hardware. Consequently, investigating the impact of Snort IDS on this limited re-
source might seem worthwhile. Experimentally we have found that network trac,
actually, has a much larger inuence on CPU utilization than executing Snort IDS
functions. Our experimental results are depicted in Figure 4.2 where we enabled
tcp track and icmp track in Stream5 and used hping3 to generate TCP and ICMP
trac. As shown, for an extremely high trac rate, both lightweight and heavy Snort
congurations impose more than 95% CPU utilization. Similar with our result, it
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was shown [42] that even a lightweight IDS exhausted the CPU when trac rate
was extremely high. However, as shown in Figure 4.2, \S+dos", a lightweight IDS
conguration, imposes less processing load than \SpyBack", a heavyweight IDS con-
guration, when the trac rate is not high. Consequently, our main concern in this
research is the reduction of RAM utilization as we have experimentally observed that
it also improves the CPU utilization in regular trac rates (as shown in Figure 4.2).
4.2 Preliminaries and Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the optimal distribution of IDS functions as an
optimization problem and we propose a method to solve it. Although Snort is our
target IDS (and present a problem formulation that uses Snort terminology), we
believe that other IDS can be analyzed similarly, if their internals and functionality
are publicly available. For example, in Di-Sec [88], a security framework recently
proposed for wireless sensor networks, the sub-components of M-Core can be modeled
as Snort preprocessors while the detection and defense modules play the same roles
as Snort rule les.
4.2.1 IDS Function Distribution
We denote the number of nodes and number of links in the wireless mesh network
by N and Q, respectively. Considering the information collected from the nodes, we
denote the number of nodes and links actively contributing in trac routing by n
(n  N) and q (q  Q), respectively. Thus, we model the wireless mesh network
(i.e., after removing idle nodes/links) as a reduced graph G = fV;Eg, where V is the
set of nodes fv1; v2;    ; vng, and E is the set of links fe1; e2;    ; eqg. An example
of a reduced graph, in Figure 4.3, V = fv1; v2; :::; v9g and E = fe1; e2; :::; e8g.
We denote the set of routing paths for the network trac by P = fp1; p2;    ; plg,
where set Pi = fvj j vj is located in pig and Pi  V . In Figure 4.3 two paths are
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present: p1 and p2. Additionally, we denote by matrix Tln the mapping between
nodes and paths, i.e., tij = 1 i node j is located on path i. For the example shown
in Figure 4.3, the matrix T is as follows:
T =
2641 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
375 :
We denote the set of all IDS functions by F = ffk j fk is a set of detection rulesg
with size K (i.e., jFj = K). We denote the set of IDS preprocessors by C =
fcr j9 fk 2 F that requires crg of size R (i.e., jCj = R). For the example in Fig-
ure 4.3, F = ff1; f2; :::; f7g and C = fc1; c2g. The dependency between IDS functions
and preprocessors is stored in matrix DKR where dkr = 1 means that activation of
function fk requires the activation of preprocessor cr. For the example shown in
Figure 4.3, the matrix DT is as follows:
DT =
2641 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1
375 :
Let w : fF ; Cg  ! [0; 1] be a cost function that assigns memory load wfk and
wcr to IDS function fk and IDS preprocessor cr, respectively. Consequently, vectors
W f = [wf1 ; w
f
2 ;    ; wfK ] and W c = [wc1; wc2;    ; wcR] represent memory loads for the
IDS functions in F and for the IDS preprocessors in C, respectively (we remark
that wcStream5 is the summation of its static load and its maximum dynamic load).
We denote by B = [b1; b2; :::; bn] the base memory load (i.e., without IDS functions
loaded) of all nodes.
Finally, we use vector  = [1; 2;    ; n] (also called Memory Threshold) to rep-
resent the maximum allowable memory load after IDS functions are loaded. Memory
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Figure 4.3: An example graph for a mesh network, consisting of 9 nodes and 8 links.
As shown, two paths p1 and p2 are present. The nodes run dierent congurations of
Snort, e.g., node v5 runs Snort functions f3, f4 and f5, which require preprocessors
c1 and c2.
threshold is an important parameter. It is typically set by a network administrator
based on the number of active services in the mesh network and the memory space
they require.
Denition 1 An IDS Function Distribution, A = f(vj;Fj; Cj)j vj 2 V; Fj 
F ; and Cj  Cg, is a distribution of IDS functions in the network, such that node vj
only executes IDS functions Fj and their corresponding preprocessors Cj.
For example, the IDS Function Distribution in Figure 4.3 is:
A = f(v1; ff2; f7g; fc1; c2g); (v2; ff6g; fc2g); :::; (v9; ff6; f7g; fc2g)g:
We represent an IDS Function Distribution by matrices XnK and ZnR, corre-
sponding to IDS functions and preprocessors active on each node, respectively. For
X, xjk = 1 i IDS function fk is activated on node vj. For Z, zjr = 1 i preprocessor
cr is activated on node vj. Matrices X and Z for the network in Figure 4.3 are:
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X =
26666666666666666666666664
0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1
37777777777777777777777775
; Z =
26666666666666666666666664
1 1
0 1
1 0
0 0
1 1
1 0
1 0
1 1
0 1
37777777777777777777777775
:
Considering the above mathematical formalism, the dependencies between IDS
functions and preprocessors can now be represented more compactly as:
zjr =
8><>: 1 if (X  D)jr  10 if (X  D)jr = 0 (4.1)
Equation 4.1 indicates that preprocessor cr must be activated on node vj if there
exists at least an IDS function fk requiring cr, assigned to it. It is important to note
that zjr = minf1;Kk=1xjkdkrg and zjr 2 f0; 1g.
After the IDS Function Distribution, the total memory load for node vj becomes
Lj = bj + cr2Cjw
c
r + fk2Fjw
f
k where w
c
r 2 W c and wfk 2 W f . It is important to
mention that an IDS Function Distribution in which Lj > j, i.e., the load Lj is
greater than threshold j, for any node vj, is deemed infeasible.
From a network security administrator point of view, we aim for an IDS Function
Distribution where all IDS functions are activated on each path. This means that
the entire network trac will be investigated by all IDS functions (albeit at dierent
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times), eliminating the possibility of false negatives.
Denition 2 For a given path pi and its corresponding set of nodes Pi, Coverage
Ratio (CR) is dened as CRi = jUij=K, where Ui =
S
vj2Pi Fj is the set of IDS
functions assigned to nodes along the path. Path pi is called covered if CRi = 1
(Ui = F), i.e., for 8fk 2 F ; 9 vj assigned by Fj such that fk 2 Fj.
Considering the eect of IDS Function Distribution on the memory load of each
node and the desired distribution of IDS functions to the nodes, in order to achieve
higher intrusion detection rate, we dene Path Coverage Problem (PCP) as follows:
Denition 3 Path Coverage Problem (PCP)
Given G = fV;Eg, a set of paths P in WMN, the dependency matrix D, and vectors
W f and W c, nd a distribution A = f(vj;Fj; Cj)j vj 2 V and Fj  Fand Cj  Cg,
such that 1
l
P
pi2P CRi is maximized and Lj  j 8vj 2 V .
PCP is an optimization problem which has the objective of maximizing the av-
erage coverage ratio, while guaranteeing that memory loads on nodes are below a
memory threshold. Although a lower memory threshold j allows more additional
processes to execute on the mesh router, it makes solving PCP much more dicult.
4.2.2 Optimal IDS Function Distribution
We formulate PCP as an Integer Linear Program (ILP) that can be solved by an
ILP solver. The objective function is maximizing the average coverage ratio of all
paths. Additionally, preprocessor dependency and memory threshold are considered
as ILP constraints. More specically, the ILP formulation is as follows:
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maximize
1
l
(1T  T)(X  1) (4.2)
subject to: BT + Z W cT + X W f T  T (4.3)
(T  X)ik  1 ; 8i; k (4.4)
zjr  (X  D)jr
K
;8j; r (4.5)
zjr  (X  D)jr ; 8j; r (4.6)
xjk; zjr 2 f0; 1g ; 8j; k; r (4.7)
To better understand the mathematical formulation of the objective function,
one can expand it as 1
l
li=1
n
j=1
K
k=1tijxjk where tij = 1 means node vj is located on
path pi and xjk = 1 means node vj is assigned by function fk. In other words, the
average CR has to be maximized.
Constraint 4.3 limits the memory load on every node vj, i.e., 
R
r=1zjrw
c
r+
K
k=1xjkw
f
k ,
to be less than its memory threshold j. Most importantly, (to ensure that we can
formulate PCP as a linear program), this constraint computes the total memory load
as the sum of individual memory loads of preprocessors and rule les. Obviously,
one needs to investigate if this linearity assumption always holds (we will discuss
this in the next section). Constraint 4.4 ensures that only one copy of each function
is assigned to the nodes along each path. Constraints 4.5 and 4.6 ensure that if an
IDS function is assigned to a node, its required preprocessors are also assigned to
the node. As presented in Equation 4.1, zjr = 1 if at least one of the IDS func-
tions assigned to node vj requires preprocessor cr, otherwise zjr = 0. The maximum
number of functions that require a specic preprocessor is at most K. Hence, Con-
straint 4.5 ensures that 0 < zjr  1 if there is a function assigned to node vj that
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requires preprocessor cr. On the other hand, if none of the functions assigned to
node vj requires preprocessor cr, then Constraint 4.6 enforces zjr to be zero. Taking
into account Constraint 4.7, i.e., zjr has to be either 0 or 1, Constraint 4.5 enforces
zjr = 1 if preprocessor r is required on node j, otherwise, Constraint 4.6 enforces
zjr = 0.
4.3 PRIDE: Challenges and Solutions
Considering the aforementioned ILP formulation for PCP, we investigated two
major challenges that impact the accuracy and time complexity of a solution. First,
we experimentally observed that the total memory load of multiple Snort rule les
is generally linear (i.e., it is equal to the sum of their individual memory loads), but
not always (e.g., for some small rule les and certain rule types). This inuences the
accuracy of our proposed model for calculating the total memory load on each node
(i.e., Challenge 1). Next, one can observe that the complexity of ILP depends on
the number of paths in the network, the path lengths, the number of IDS functions,
the number of preprocessors, and the memory threshold. For example, considering
the number of Snort preprocessors (i.e., more than 20) and the number of Snort
rule les (i.e., more than 60), for single path pi, the number of ILP constraints
grows to more than 1400 jPij, where jPij is the path length. Additionally, a lower
memory threshold j increases the number of infeasible solutions, thus requiring
more iterations for the ILP solver. Hence, the ILP performance degrades as network
size increases or memory threshold decreases (i.e., Challenge 2). In this section,
we investigate the aforementioned challenges and propose techniques to overcome
them. Finally, we present PRIDE protocol that distributes IDS functions to the
nodes accurately and fast (i.e., practical).
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4.3.1 Memory Consumption Modeling
Experimentally, we observed that when activating multiple small rule les (i.e.,
containing at most 50 detection rules), Snort memory load is much less than the
sum of individual memory loads. However, we observed that when multiple large
rule les (i.e., containing more than 250 detection rules) were activated, the memory
load is closer to the sum of the rule le's individual memory loads. When a rule le is
activated, depending on: 1) the number of detection rules it has; 2) the preprocessors
it activates (if already not activated); and 3) the Snort search method, a dierent
amount of memory load will be imposed to the node. In this subsection we investigate
how the aforementioned three factors impact our assumption about memory load
linearity (i.e., Constraint 4.3).
Every Snort detection rule has the following structure:
[alert_type] [protocol] [src][src_port] ->
[dst][dst_port]:[Options][ContentMetaData][Operations].
The string patterns of each rule are organized in an automaton, which has a
tree-like structure, thus, we expect a sub-linear behavior when activating new rules.
Besides the strings, Snort keeps additional information per rule in its internal data
structures, and this increases linearly with the number of rules. The metadata for
each rule usually consumes more memory than the strings contained in the rule
(most strings are small, and many rules do not even have string patterns). In order
to investigate the linearity of memory load, we put all detection rules in a single rule
le and then measured the memory load for dierent number of detection rules being
enabled. Since in addition to preprocessor dependency, there exists a dependency
between detection rules of each Snort rule le, we had to remove all dependencies
(i.e., dependency relaxation) so that we could arbitrarily add/delete rules and change
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the size of the le. For this, we removed all keywords that appear in the options.
Algorithm 1 presents how the dependency relaxation is implemented.
Algorithm 1 Dependency Relaxation
1: Pr = fset of all preproc. directivesg
2: Rr = fset of all Snort detection rulesg
3: while 9pr 2 Pr do
4: Kr  GET KEY S(pr)
5: end while
6: for 8r 2 Rr do
7: Hr  GET KEY S(r)
8: for 8h 2 Hr do
9: if h 2 Kr then
10: RLX(r; h)
11: for 9r0 6= r and r0 B r do
12: RLX(r; h; r0)
13: end for
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
Given the set of Snort preprocessing directives and Snort detection rules, Algo-
rithm 1 rst creates two sets Pr and Rr (Lines 1, 2). Next, for each preprocessing di-
rective in Pr, the Algorithm extracts a set of keys that are keywords dependent to the
preprocessing directive (Lines 3-5). The extraction is based on our intimate/expert
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knowledge about preprocessing directives. Next, for each rule in Rr it extracts all
keywords seen in the rule (Line 7). Since one rule may depend on several preprocess-
ing directives, the Algorithm examines each extracted keyword (Line 8) and checks
whether it exists in set Kr or not. If it exists, the Algorithm removes the keyword
from the rule (Lines 9, 10). The Algorithm also examines if any of the other rules
have a dependency on the current rule r and its keyword h (Line 11). If so, the
keyword will be also removed from rule r0 (Line 12).
After all dependencies are removed, we can arbitrarily enable/disable each de-
tection rule in the single large le. We group the rules in two ways: i) by simply
concatenating their les ("regular" case) and ii) by shuing them into the single
le ("shued" case) and plot Snort's memory consumption as we increase the num-
ber of loaded rules in each case. We performed the experiment for the ac-bnfa-nq
and lowmem search methods. Figures 4.4(a) and 4.4(b) depict the results for the
ac-bnfa-nq and lowmem search methods, respectively. Thus, irrespective of rule or-
der and search method, we observe a linear behavior (consistent to our intuition, as
explained above) when adding blocks of 250 rules to the set of active rules. Although
the string patterns from all rules are organized in a single automaton for fast string
searching (which alone would result to a sub-linear memory consumption pattern)
the observed linear behavior is due to other dominant rule-specic data that increase
with the number of rules. Such data includes the descriptive message to be printed
in the alert, reference numbers and identication codes, numerous other keywords
like rawbytes, byte test, and pcre, as well as other rule metadata. We use these
ndings to address the non-linearity of memory load for the variable-size rule les in
the following subsection.
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Figure 4.4: Linearity of memory consumption in dierent search algorithms as the
number of activated rules increases: a) AC-bnfa-nq; b) Lowmem.
4.3.2 Rule Files Modularization
To reduce the complexity of the problem the ILP solver faces (i.e., Challenge
2), we propose to reduce the number of individual preprocessors and IDS functions,
which would result in a decrease in the number of constraints in ILP. Our proposal
is to group multiple IDS functions together and consider them as a single function.
From here on, we refer to each group of rule les as a \detection module" and use
the term \group" for a group of preprocessors. If a detection module is assigned to
a node, all rule les in that module will be activated. We experimentally observed
that grouping rule les not only reduces the problem complexity (Challenge 2), but
also decreases the variance in memory load estimation (Challenge 1). When several
small rule les are grouped in a single detection module, it acts as a larger rule le
(same as a block of 250 rules), and the estimated memory load is more accurate.
In addition, considering the preprocessor dependency mentioned in Section 4.2, an
ecient rule le grouping reduces the number of preprocessor dependencies. For
example, if two rule les require the same preprocessor(s), they can be grouped in
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the same detection module. Similarly, multiple preprocessors required for the same
rule les, can be grouped together. Hence, when activating a new detection module,
the load imposed by rules' data structure dominates the load imposed by the new
activated preprocessor (that can be ignored). This is very similar to the behavior
observed in Figures 4.4(a) and 4.4(b) in the absence of preprocessors.
Grouping rule les together, however, has a disadvantage when the memory
threshold set by the system administrator is very low. For low memory thresholds,
we cannot assign larger modules to nodes, which results in low coverage/detection
ratio. Consequently, despite the positive aspects of grouping small rule les together,
memory threshold forces us to avoid large detection modules. Unfortunately, there
already exist large detection modules. For example, the memory space required by
the \backdoor" rule le is twice the memory space required by a detection module
with 25 small rule les. This illustrates the need to also split extremely large rule
les into some smaller ones (i.e., creating several detection modules out of a large
rule le).
We thus dene \modularization" as the procedure that, for a given set of IDS
functions (e.g., Snort rule les), i) groups small IDS functions together in order
to reduce the problem complexity and load estimation error, and ii) splits large
IDS functions into several smaller functions so that they can be activated with low
memory thresholds.
4.3.2.1 Rule File Splitting
When splitting a rule le, we consider the dependency between detection rules
and the dependency between preprocessors and detection rules. This is to ensure
that two dependent rules along with all of their essential preprocessing directives
are included in the same split rule le. In order to split a rule le into several
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detection modules, we rst pre-parse each detection rule and specify its preprocessing
dependency in advance. For example, a detection rule using TCP trac match
(i.e., protocol:TCP) requires the Stream5 preprocessor directive, which enforces all
HTTP-relevant rule les to also contain same directive. We summarize all these
preprocessing dependencies before splitting the rule les.
In addition, rule dependency is expressed by the options' keywords, e.g., \ow-
bits." To meet the rule dependency requirements, we parse each detection rule and
specify whether the rule contains such keywords or not, if it does, it must be rele-
vant. For example, the \owbits" options can help us maintain the stateful check in
a set of Snort detection rules. When some keys are set by \owbits" in a detection
rule, every other detection rule which does not set the \owbits," is dependent on
that detection rule. Similarly, the keyword \rev:VALUE" in a detection rule, that
identies revisions of Snort rules, denotes that it is related to a detection rule whose
\sid" is \VALUE." Thus, using these two types of dependency, we split large rule
les properly.
4.3.2.2 Proposed Modularizations
We propose three modularizations with dierent numbers of detection modules
and dierent sizes. We then compare the execution time of the solver, i.e., Matlab
ILP solver, for each modularization.
In the rst modularization, the entire set of Snort rule les is classied into 23
detection modules where 6 dierent groups of preprocessors are required. The aver-
age memory load of the 23 detection modules is 3:98% and the standard deviation
is 1:68%. The second modularization consists of 12 detection modules of average
memory load 6:76% and standard deviation 2:31%, while the third modularization
has only 6 detection modules of average memory load 15:06% and standard deviation
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Figure 4.5: ILP execution time for dierent modularizations.
1:88%. The second and the third modularizations require three groups of preproces-
sors. Figure 4.5 shows the execution time of the ILP solver when solving the problem
for dierent lengths of a single path. As depicted in Figure 4.5, 12-module and 6-
module congurations are much faster than 23-module conguration, especially for
longer paths (i.e., more complex problems). With these two modularizations, the
ILP solver nds the optimal solution in less than 2 sec, which is very fast, thus prac-
tical in real deployments. The longer execution time for the 6-module conguration,
comparing to the 12-module conguration, is because of its larger detection mod-
ules that increase the number of infeasible solutions for a given memory threshold
(increasing the solver's execution time). Details about each modularization, e.g.,
the rule les in each module, are provided in Section 4.4. We use 6-module and
12-module congurations in our system evaluations.
4.3.3 PRIDE Protocol
Given a modularization chosen for the IDS conguration, PRIDE periodically
collects the local information from the nodes, removes idle nodes from the network,
i.e., those not contributing in the trac routing, and optimally distributes IDS func-
50
tions to the nodes along trac paths. If the reduced graph is disconnected, each
graph component is considered as a sub-problem and solved separately. Algorithm 2
presents PRIDE protocol.
Algorithm 2 PRIDE Protocol
1: Data Collection(V;E;N;Q)
2: Relaxation(V;E; n; q)
3: Path Extract(V;E; P )
4: P = P
5: g = 0
6: while 9 pi 2 P do
7: g ++
8: Sg = fpig
9: P = Pnfpig
10: while 9 pj 2 Q and
S
pk2Sg
(Pj \ Pk) 6= ? do
11: Sg = Sg [ fpjg
12: P = Pnfpjg
13: end while
14: end while
15: for 8Sg do
16: Vg = fvjjvj 2 Pi and pi 2 Sgg
17: for 8Vg do ILP(Vg; P )
Given the set of nodes, the protocol rst collects information from nodes and then
produces the reduced sets V and E by removing idle nodes/links (Lines 1, 2). Next,
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the set of active routing paths P is extracted in Line 3. Given P , the Algorithm
creates the set P of unvisited paths (Line 4), and then denes variable g as the
number of sub-problems (Line 5). For every unvisited path pi in set P (Line 6), the
Algorithm rst creates a new sub-problem Sg (Lines 7, 8) and marks it as a visited
path (Line 9). The Algorithm then searches P to nd any unvisited path pj which is
connected (Two paths are connected if they are in the same component of the reduced
graph) to at least one path in the current Sg (Line 10). If so, the corresponding path
pj will be added to the current sub-problem Sg and removed from P (Lines 11, 12).
When no more paths in P can be added to the current Sg, the Algorithm increases g
and creates a new sub-problem. This process repeats until there is no unvisited path
in P . Next, for every sub-problem Sg, the Algorithm creates the corresponding set
Vg as the set of nodes located on the paths of component Sg (Lines 15, 16). Finally,
the Algorithm runs ILP on the nodes and paths of each sub-problem Sg (Line 17).
4.4 System Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of PRIDE in a department-wide
mesh network. Our mesh network (as shown in Figure 4.6) consists of 10 Netgear
WNDR3700 routers deployed in a 5030m2 rectangular area (Note: comparing with
other testbeds, DistressNet 8 nodes [16], SMesh 14 nodes [4], and QuRiNet (a large-
scale research platform) 30 nodes [92], PRIDE uses an average size testbed.). The
presence of the walls in this area makes it a suitable environment for a multi-hop mesh
network. Additionally, the \tx-power" parameter in the network conguration le of
OpenWrt is used to adjust the communication range of the routers. The routers use
OLSR as the routing protocol and provide mesh connections on their 5GHz wireless
interfaces. In Figure 4.6, each node is labeled with its local subnet IP address.
We will refer to the nodes using the third number in the subnet IP address, e.g.,
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192.168.3.0
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Figure 4.6: Our department-wide wireless mesh network.
192.168.5.0 is node 5. Some routers work as Mesh Access Points (MAP), e.g., node
3, and provide network access for the clients on the 2.4GHz wireless interface. Node
9 is the network gateway that connects WMN to the Internet. PRIDE periodically
(i.e., 5 minutes in the current implementation) collects nodes/trac information
and runs ILP. This interval can be optimally chosen by administrator in dynamic
networks.
We evaluate the intrusion detection rate (coverage ratio) and average memory
load of nodes. The parameters that we vary are the Path Lengths (PL) and mem-
ory threshold (). In all our experiments, the memory thresholds of all nodes are
equal and some of the preprocessors (e.g., perfmonitor) are not used as they are
not activated by default or not required by rule les. Since the maximum path
length in our mesh network is 4 hops, we consider 2-hop, 3-hop and 4-hop paths
(PL = 2; 3; and 4). We consider two dierent paths for each given PL (six paths in
total) in our evaluation. As listed in Table 4.1, for example, in the 2-hop scenario
(PL = 2), P1 = f5; 10g and P2 = f9; 10g, and in the 3-hop scenario, P1 = f5; 10; 8g
and P2 = f9; 10; 8g. The initial memory load on the routers is s 30% (as caused
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Table 4.1: Dierent paths considered in the system evaluation
Path Length Nodes
2 hops p1: 5, 10 p2: 9 ,10
3 hops p1: 5, 10, 8 p2: 9 ,10, 8
4 hops p1: 5, 10, 8, 6 p2: 9 ,10, 8, 3
by DHCP, OLSR, and other services). We vary the Snort memory threshold from
30% to 60% (i.e., 60%    90%). Since implementing the related trac-aware
solution [70] on the mesh devices is infeasible (as shown in Section 4.1), we compare
PRIDE with monitoring node solutions ( [37,76]). We implement a monitoring node
solution [37] to which we refer as \MonSol". A monitoring node loads detection
modules up to a given memory threshold based on the indices of detection modules
presented in Section 4.4.2. If a monitoring node monitores at least one link of a given
path, the entire path is considered as monitored.
4.4.1 Intrusion Detection Evaluation Tool
We dene the intrusion detection rate as the ratio between the number of detected
attacks and the number of detectable attacks by all modules. For example, for the
12-module conguration, we ran 12 distinct attacks for each path where each attack
can be detected by only one of the detection modules (i.e., because the corresponding
detection rule is put in that module), and then measure the number of detected ones.
To generate attack trac, we modify an open source Snort test framework - the Rule
to Attack (R2A) tool. R2A is a rule-based tool which parses each Snort detection
rule and generates an exploitation packet targeting that rule. We modify the R2A's
source code to generate real-time exploits for a given set of detection rules. The
exploits are launched against the multi-hop remote target through wireless mesh
links. If the module that can detect the attack is assigned to the nodes along the
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path, then the attack is detected and relevant alerts are generated.
Table 4.2: Snort rule sets and modularizations used in our experiments and evalua-
tions
Rule File Size M6 M12 M23 Rule File Size M6 M12 M23
community-nntp 1 1 1 2 shellcode 25 1 2 3
community-oracle 1 1 1 2 ddos 30 1 2 3
x11 2 1 1 2 pop3 35 1 2 3
pop2 2 1 1 2 specic-threats 36 2 4 8
community-icmp 2 1 1 2 web-frontpage 38 2 4 9
comm.-inapproprate 3 1 1 2 chat 42 1 2 3
other-ids 3 1 1 2 web-coldfusion 44 2 5 9
community-web-iis 4 2 4 8 community-bot 45 1 2 3
community-policy 4 2 4 8 voip 45 1 2 3
community-exploit 5 1 1 2 imap 60 1 1 3
comm.-web-attacks 5 2 4 8 misc 62 2 4 8
multimedia 5 2 4 9 policy 74 1 2 4
community-game 5 2 4 9 ftp 76 1 3 7
community-dos 6 1 1 2 sql 87 1 3 4
community-smtp 6 1 3 5 icmp-info 93 1 1 1
bad-trac 6 1 1 2 smtp 94 1 3 5
community-sip 7 1 1 1 web-iis 95 2 5 9
community-web-client 8 2 4 9 web-client 135 2 5 9
community-imap 8 1 1 2 web-php 142 2 5 9
comm.-sql-injection 9 2 4 9 rpc 168 1 3 4
community-virus 10 2 4 9 comm.-web-misc 190 2 5 10
info 10 1 1 2 exploit 208 2 5 10
scan 12 1 1 2 oracle 310 2 6 11
nger 13 1 1 2 web-cgi 357 2 6 11
rservices 13 1 1 2 web-misc 370 3 6 12
comm.-web-cgi 13 2 4 9 netbios 430 3 7 13
nntp 13 1 1 2 comm.-web-php 463 3 7 12
tftp 16 1 3 7 web-activex 587 3 8 14
snmp 16 1 1 2 backdoor-frag1 172 6 8 15
attack-response 17 1 1 2 backdoor-frag2 172 4 9 16
telnet 19 1 3 6 backdoor-frag3 172 4 9 17
dos 20 1 1 2 backdoor-frag4 171 6 10 18
porn 21 1 1 2 spyware-put-frag1 196 4 10 19
dns 22 1 1 2 spyware-put-frag2 196 5 11 20
mysql 22 1 1 2 spyware-put-frag3 195 5 11 21
icmp 22 1 1 1 spyware-put-frag4 195 5 12 22
p2p 23 2 4 8 spyware-put-frag5 195 6 12 23
community-misc 24 2 4 8
4.4.2 Snort Rule Sets and Modularizations
The Snort rule les we used in our experiments and evaluations are shown in
Table 4.2. The second column, namely \Size", species the number of detection
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rules in each rule le. Columns \M6", \M12", and \M23" specify the index of
the detection module that each le belongs to, when that modularization is used.
For example, in the 6-module conguration, \community-nntp", \shellcode", and
\community-smtp" rule les are put in the rst detection module, however, in the
12-module conguration, \community-nntp" belongs to the rst detection module,
\shelcode" belongs to the second one, and \community-smtp" belongs to the third
detection module. As depicted in Table 4.2, \backdoor" and \spyware-put", as
two very large rule les, are split into 4 and 5 smaller les, respectively. The 23-
module conguration uses less rule les in each detection module. For example,
only \community-sip", \icmp", and \icmp-info" rule les belong to the rst module
in 23-module conguration. Similarly, for large rule les such as \backdoor" and
\spyware-put" which are split two nine detection modules, we can see that each rule
le fragmentation is considered as an individual detection module in the 23-module
conguration.
Table 4.3: Load of detection modules in dierent modularizations
Cong. ID Mem.(%) ID Mem.(%)
6-Module
M1 13.32 M4 17.33
M2 14.66 M5 14.66
M3 13.04 M6 17.33
12-Module
M1 3.4 M7 6.99
M2 5.14 M8 9.57
M3 3.75 M9 9.03
M4 4.52 M10 9.53
M5 5.49 M11 8.77
M6 6.13 M12 8.81
Our modularizations are based on the size of the rules les and also preprocessor
dependencies, such that the memory loads of detection modules are roughly same
and the rule les in each detection module require the same preprocessors. The
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amount of memory load caused by each detection module in 6-module and 12-module
congurations are shown in Table 4.3. As depicted, the average memory load of
detection modules in the 6-module conguration is much higher than the 12-module
conguration. We omit the details about memory loads in the 23-conguration here,
due to space constraint.
Table 4.4: List of Snort rule les used by the R2A tool for generating exploit against
each detection module and the number of generated alarms by each module
Mod. ID Rule File #Alarms Mod. ID Rule File #Alarms
M1
other-ids 3
M7
community-web-php 2
dns 17 netbios 15
M2
ddos 16 M8 backdoor-frag1 33
chat 33
M9
backdoor-frag2 51
M3
rpc 9 backdoor-frag3 36
telnet 4
M10
backdoor-frag4 31
M4
p2p 18 spyware-put-frag1 30
misc 26
M11
spyware-put-frag2 32
M5 exploit 10 spyware-put-frag3 31
M6
oracle 4
M12
spyware-put-frag4 44
web-cgi 3 spyware-put-frag5 29
Depending on the rule les and modularizations we use, the attacks chosen for
intrusion detection evaluation may change. In order to evaluate the detection rate
of PRIDE, we choose one or two rule les from each detection module and give them
to the R2A tool as the input le. We also provide the IP address of multi-hop tar-
gets for R2A so that the attack exploits (malicious trac) will be sent to the target
through a multi-hop network path. Upon running each attack, the detection mod-
ules distributed along the path generate corresponding intrusion detection alarms.
Table 4.4 species the rule les chosen from each detection module of the 12-module
conguration and also the number of alarms generated by the corresponding detec-
tion module. It is worth mentioning that the same les are used for the 6-module
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conguration. For example, in order to generate exploit(s) against module 1 in the
6-module conguration, all rule les in module 1 and module 2 of Table 4.4 are used,
as they are all grouped in the module 1 of the 6-module conguration (according to
Table 4.2).
4.4.3 Proof-of-Concept Experiment
When assigning IDS functions to multiple nodes on a path, each node can detect
only a subset of attacks depending on the detection modules it executes. As a
proof-of-concept experiment, we show that distributing two IDS functions to two
nodes generates exactly the same alerts as if both detection modules were assigned
to a single node (e.g., MonSol). For that purpose, we used two routers and one
laptop connected wireless to each router (one laptop was the attacker and the other
was the target). We ran a customized Snort on each router (monitoring the mesh
trac) ensuring that every Snort rule le is activated on at least one of the routers.
We then generated two R2A exploits such that their corresponding rule les, e.g.,
\dos.rules" and \exploit.rules", were activated on routers 1 and 2, respectively. When
running attacks, the Snort on node 1 generated 4 alerts, while the one on node 2
generated 10 alerts (real-time detection, unlike cooperative IDS). We repeated the
experiment where only node 1 was running Snort and both rule les were activated
on node 1 (many other rule les were deactivated due to memory constraint). In this
experiment, node 1 generated exactly the same 14 alerts upon launching the same
exploits. Hence, we have shown that PRIDE can distribute IDS functions to nodes
along a path such that network packets are inspected by all IDS functions.
4.4.4 Eects of Memory Threshold and Path Length
Given the network paths in our test-bed mesh network, we evaluate the intrusion
detection rate of PRIDE and the average memory load on nodes, using 6-module
58
and 12-module congurations. For each modularization, we change  and PL as our
evaluation parameters to see their eects on PRIDE performance. Given a memory
threshold, we show PRIDE can achieve higher detection rate than MonSol.
Figure 4.7 shows the eect of memory threshold and path length on intrusion
detection rate and average memory load on the nodes when using the 6-module
conguration. As depicted in Figure 4.7(a), maximum detection rate for MonSol is
50% which occurs when  = 90%. However, PRIDE can achieve 100% detection
rate even in a lower memory threshold (e.g., at  = 80% for PL = 4 and PL = 3).
This is because more than one node is assigned with IDS functions and packets are
inspected by more detection modules. In this modularization, for a low memory
threshold (e.g.,  = 60%), only module 3 can be activated on the nodes, and thus,
PRIDE cannot achieve a higher detection rate than MonSol. Figure 4.7(b) depicts
the average estimated memory load on the nodes for dierent memory thresholds.
It can be observed that PRIDE usually impose less memory load than MonSol,
especially for the longer paths, since the modules are distributed to multiple nodes.
The results for the same evaluations performed on the 12-module conguration
are shown in Figure 4.8. As depicted in Figure 4.8(a), the intrusion detection rate
for the 12-module conguration is higher than the detection rate for the 6-module
conguration (for the same memory threshold). This is because the size of the
detection modules in the 12-module conguration is smaller than for the 6-module
conguration, which allows more modules to t in the small free memory spaces.
In contrast with the 6-module conguration, where at low memory thresholds the
detection rate was similar to MonSol, in the 12-module conguration the detection
rate at 60% (a low memory threshold) is higher than for MonSol. This is because
more modules are activated on the nodes even at this low memory threshold. The
average estimated memory loads for this modularization are shown in Figure 4.8(b).
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Figure 4.7: 6-module conguration: eect of  and PL on a) Intrusion detection
rate, and b) Average estimated memory load.
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Figure 4.8: 12-module conguration: eect of  and PL on a) Intrusion detection
rate, and b) Average estimated memory load.
Similar to the 6-module conguration, it is observed that the 12-module conguration
usually impose less memory load than MonSol solution for the longer paths.
When considering PRIDE and MonSol, one can observe that for an adversary it
will be signicantly harder to compromise multiple IDS nodes (as in PRIDE), than a
single monitoring node (as in MonSol). A compromised IDS node in PRIDE implies
the loss of few IDS functions while, in MonSol, it means the loss of the entire set
of activated functions on the monitoring node (i.e., higher vulnerability). Hence,
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in addition to achieving higher detection rates and lower memory loads, PRIDE
provides a higher degree of IDS attack tolerance than MonSol.
We also compare the estimated memory loads and the actual memory loads of
the two congurations in all of the experiments, i.e., dierent memory thresholds
and path lengths. Figures 4.9(a) and 4.9(b) show the dierence between estimated
memory load and actual load measured on the routers when using 6-module and 12-
module congurations, respectively. One can see that the dierence is below 5%,
thus giving condence in our ILP formulation and memory consumption modelling.
It is also worth mentioning that the estimated values for the 12-module conguration
are closer to the real values than the 6-module conguration because the modules
are roughly the same size as 250-rule blocks.
Figure 4.10 shows the ILP solver execution time for PL = 3 and PL = 4, and for
each modularization. As depicted, the execution time of the algorithm ranges from a
few seconds to tens of seconds, thus making it practical for real world deployments.
As shown, the lower the memory threshold is, the longer the execution time is.
This is because lower memory thresholds increase the number of infeasible solutions
and the solver requires more iterations to obtain feasible and optimal solutions. As
shown in Figure 4.10, the execution time increases with the path length as well. As
mentioned in Section 4.3, this is because the number of ILP constraints (i.e., the
problem complexity) is a direct function of path length.
Although we showed that PRIDE can achieve high detection rates by solving
an ILP in less than a minute, one may argue about the communication overhead
caused by the message exchange between nodes and the base station. For example,
a question that arises here would be \Is it possible for the nodes along each path to
randomly choose an IDS conguration and still achieve reasonable intrusion detec-
tion (path coverage) rates for WMN paths?" It is obvious that such a distributed
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Figure 4.9: The dierence between estimated and actual average memory load: a)
6-Module conguration, and b) 12-Module conguration.
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Figure 4.10: ILP solver execution time for dierent parameters.
approach will provide a locally optimal solution since the decision is made based on
the local information available on each node, however, centralized approaches (e.g.,
PRIDE) make decision based on global information about WMN routing paths that
results in optimal solutions. In order to compare PRIDE with an ad-hoc IDS Func-
tion Distribution mechanism, we implemented a distributed mechanism where each
active node, based on its memory threshold, randomly chooses the set of IDS func-
tions (i.e., detection modules) it can perform. The average path coverage rates for
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100 random solutions produced for the WMN topology and its corresponding paths
shown in Figure 4.6 are depicted in Figure 4.11. The results show that PRIDE out-
performs distributed approach in most of situations, especially when there is enough
memory for activating multiple detection modules. It is worth mentioning that al-
though PRIDE achieves higher detection rates at the price of higher communication
overhead, it is very important to achieve 100% detection rates (at higher prices)
in mission critical scenarios and a sub-optimal solution will not be accepted as an
applicable solutions.
4.4.5 PRIDE-aware Attacks
This section evaluates PRIDE's performance for PRIDE-aware attacks. We cat-
egorize PRIDE-aware attacks in two levels of severity: 1) the attacker is aware of
PRIDE in the WMN but cannot compromise the secure communication between
nodes and the base station (Level 1); 2) the attacker is aware of PRIDE and also the
content of secure information exchanged between nodes and the base station (Level
2). Obviously, the later type of attack is more severe and very dicult to defend. In
fact, the second attack type assumes that the attacker has broken the secure commu-
nication link between the base station and all routers and has access to all information
(i.e., memory loads and trac paths) and the IDS distributions. Unlike our attacker
model presented considered for PRIDE, we assume that a PRIDE-aware attacker can
launch an attack against an intermediate node in a trac path (not necessarily the
multi-hop destination on the path). This type of attack sounds reasonable because a
PRIDE-aware attacker aims to compromise some intermediate nodes running specic
detection modules, and nally attack the destination.
We concentrate on Level-1 attack because the possibility of running Level-2 at-
tack in WMN depends on the robustness of key distribution and also encryption
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Figure 4.11: Distributed approach based on random module selection: eect of  and
PL on the intrusion detection rates in a) 6-Module Conguration, and b) 12-Module
Conguration.
mechanisms used in wireless networks, which is out of our scope in this research.
In Level-1 attack, the attacker can not produce the same IDS distribution (to nd
the most benecial node to be compromised) as the base station produces. This is
because the ILP solutions depend on nodes information (securely sent to the base
station) and the initial random solutions. Thus, we consider an attacker that knows
WMN nodes are assigned some IDS functions but does not know which node is
running which module. The attacker rst connects to an AP, then chooses a node
(destination or an intermediate) as the target and a random type of attack (i.e., an
attack among those detectable by 6 or 12 modules), and nally lunches the attack.
It is obvious that the average detection rate for the PRIDE-aware attacks against
destination nodes is always equal to the PRIDE coverage ratio (i.e., as shown in
Figures 4.7(a) and 4.8(a)). Hence, we only consider attacks against intermediate
nodes.
We perform an experiment to evaluate the PRIDE performance (detection rate)
when a PRIDE-aware attacker at Level 1 runs attacks against intermediate nodes.
Considering the IDS distributions produced for our real-world WMN, with the detec-
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Figure 4.12: Average detection rate for PRIDE-aware attacks: a) 6-Module congu-
ration, and b) 12-Module conguration.
tion rates shown in Figures 4.7(a) and 4.8(a), we ran 1000 random attacks for each
modularization. In each of 1000 attacks, the attacker chooses a random intermediate
node and a random attack (among those detectable by 6 or 12 modules). If the cor-
responding detection module is not activated on the nodes along the path (starting
from the attacker AP towards the intermediate node) the attack cannot be detected,
otherwise it is detectable. Figures 4.12(a) and 4.12(b) show the average detection
rate for Level-1 PRIDE-aware attacks against intermediate nodes, for 6-module and
12-module congurations, respectively. As depicted, the detection rate increases as
the  increases. We observe that the 12-module conguration has a higher detection
rate than the 6-module conguration (for the same reason we explained about aver-
age detection rate in PRIDE). One may argue about the detection rate for (PL=4)
in the 6-module conguration that decreases at higher memory thresholds. This is
because we perform all 1000 random attacks against a specic IDS distribution used
in our real test. In that experiment, for higher thresholds, most of the IDS modules
were assigned to the destination, thus, intermediate nodes ran less IDS modules and
were unable to detect attacks. Same argument applies for (PL=3) in the 12-module
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conguration.
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5. RESOURCELESS AND TRAFFIC-AGNOSTIC IDS
The research presented in this section is motivated by the fact that in many
WMN applications trac paths change very often, which consequently degrades the
performance of trac-aware IDS solutions. For example, routing paths in large scale
WMN that provide networking services for mobile clients are subject to change due
to client mobility. Additionally, WMN topology, especially in outdoor deployments,
may change due to node failures or drastic link-quality changes. Hence, the trac
knowledge has to be very accurate and up-to-date in trac-aware solutions, which
is not always feasible. In this section, we propose two trac-agnostic intrusion
detection mechanisms for resource-constrained WMN that monitor all communica-
tion links, instead of only few paths. Such an approach in WMN IDS is trac-
independent, but requires more mesh nodes to participate in detection mechanism.
5.1 Non-Cooperative IDS
This section introduces RAPID, an IDS based on trac-agnostic and link-coverage
approaches that irrespective to the changes in WMN trac paths, is able to monitor
the entire WMN trac, at the price, however, of putting IDS load on all WMN nodes
instead of those located only along routing paths. In RAPID, each node, depending
on its available resources, is assigned a subset of IDS functions, i.e., a customized IDS
conguration, and investigates the entire network trac on the set of communication
links it can monitor (i.e., in its coverage area). This customized IDS allows resource
conservation on resource-constrained WMN nodes and also increases the probabil-
Parts of this section are reprinted with permission from \On the optimality of cooperative
intrusion detection for resource constrained wireless networks" by Amin Hassanzadeh and Radu
Stoleru, Computers & Security (Elsevier), Volume 34, pages 16 - 35, 2013, Copyright 2013 by
Elsevier.
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ity of monitoring a WMN link with multiple distinct IDS functions activated on all
WMN nodes that can monitor the link. It is worth mentioning that for a given
network size, the complexity of trac-agnostic solution is larger than trac-aware
solution as it needs to nd optimal IDS function distribution for all nodes. Hence,
RAPID has to be fast and scalable.
5.1.1 Goals and Features
PRIDE considers static resource-constrained WMN where network topology does
not change often (compared to other ad hoc networks). It assumes that network
information periodically collected by the base station reects the most recent network
topology. However, research has shown [14, 16, 64] that even static WMN topology
and routing paths are subject to change due to: a) link-quality variations caused by
weather, noise and other radio signals, etc.; b) mobility of clients and their requested
services that result in changes of WMN routing paths; c) node failure (e.g., running
out of power) or node replacement (e.g., administrative reasons) during network
lifetime. Hence, trac awareness might be a strong assumption for many WMN
applications. Motivated by this fact, we propose a trac-agnostic IDS solution.
PRIDE is not a scalable solution because its execution time (i.e., to nd opti-
mal IDS function distribution for WMN nodes) signicantly increases when network
size, number of paths, and number of IDS functions increase, or when the memory
threshold on the nodes decreases. The results shown in [39] are for a 10-node WMN
for only 2 paths (for each given path length). When applied to a larger network
(e.g., 30 nodes and 15 paths), however, it takes more than an hour to obtain the
optimal IDS function distribution. Thus, a practical IDS solution must be able to
quickly produce optimal results when used for large scale WMN. We note here that
the trac-agnostic solution, proposed here, has to solve a more complex problem
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because all WMN nodes perform IDS operations. Therefore, we need to develop an
algorithm that can produce optimal IDS function distribution for a large WMN in a
short period of time.
PRIDE only considersmulti-hop attacks which means the attack trac (malicious
packets(s)) is routed across multiple nodes (i.e., at least one WMN backbone link).
In addition, the experimental results [39] show that the longer the path is, the higher
the detection rate will be. We aim to design an IDS that can detect both single-
hop attacks (i.e., both attacker and target are clients connected to same router) and
multi-hop attacks, routed through short paths (e.g., 2 hops).
PRIDE proposes a centralized algorithm that requires periodic data collection
from WMN nodes and a computationally powerful base station to produce the opti-
mal IDS function distribution. In this research, we propose an IDS solution that can
also be implemented in a distributed manner where WMN routers independently
choose the optimal set of IDS function to perform. The distributed approach is
based on random IDS function selection by the nodes that incur no communication
overhead (caused by data exchanges between nodes and the base station). It also
no longer requires a computationally powerful base station. We show that random
IDS function selection surprisingly achieves near optimal network coverage ratios
especially for high density WMN.
PRIDE uses a node-coverage approach, which means that only nodes along each
routing path participate in trac monitoring. However, RAPID uses link-coverage
approach to achieve a higher link/path coverage ratio in WMN. Hence, in addition
to the nodes located on each routing path, other nodes can also participate in trac
monitoring if they can monitor at least one link of that path. We use a link-coverage
approach in our proposed IDS and show how it increases the link/path coverage
ratio.
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Figure 5.1: AWMN graph, consisting of 10 nodes and 16 links. As shown, a 6-module
conguration is used in this WMN where Snort preprocessors are also grouped in
three sets of preprocessors [38]. The nodes run dierent Snort congurations, e.g.,
node v1 runs detection modules f1 and f4, which require preprocessors c1, c2 and c3.
5.1.2 Preliminaries
Given a wireless mesh network, we denote the number of its nodes and number
of its links by n and q, respectively. We model the wireless mesh network as a graph
G = fV;Eg, where V is the set of mesh nodes (routers) fv1; v2;    ; vng, and E is
the set of backbone links fe1; e2;    ; eqg. An example of such a graph, is shown in
Figure 5.1 where V = fv1; v2; :::; v10g and E = fe1; e2; :::; e16g. Figure 5.1, represents
the network graph a real-world WMN deployed over the oor of a building. We
denote by matrix Mqn the mapping between nodes and links, i.e., mij = 1 i node
vj can monitor link ei. Based on the link-coverage denition [37], vj can monitor ei if
ei is incident to vj or vj is connected to the two end points of ei. The set of all links
that can be monitored by node vj is called Covering Set of node vj represented by
CSj [37]. Accordingly, we denote by MSi the set of all nodes that can monitor link
ei, i.e., Monitoring Set of link ei. For the example shown in Figure 5.1, the matrix
M is as follows:
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M1610 =
2666666666666664
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
...
...    ...
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
3777777777777775
:
We denote the set of all IDS functions (detection modules) by F = ffk j fk is
a set of detection rules g with size K (i.e., jFj = K) where K = 6 in 6-module
conguration and K = 12 in 12-module conguration. We also denote the set of IDS
preprocessors (as in Snort) by C = fcr j9 fk 2 F that requires crg of size R (i.e., jCj =
R) where R = 3 in both 6-module and 12-module congurations. For the example
presented in Figure 5.1, F = ff1; f2; :::; f6g, i.e., 6-Module conguration is used, and
C = fc1; c2; and c3g. The dependency between IDS functions and preprocessors is
stored in matrix DKR where dkr = 1 means that activation of module fk requires
the activation of preprocessor cr. For the example shown in Figure 5.1, the matrix
DT is as follows:
DT36 =
266664
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1
377775 :
Let w : fF ; Cg  ! [0; 1] be a cost function that assigns memory load wfk and
wcr to detection module fk and preprocessor cr, respectively. Consequently, vec-
tors W f = [wf1 ; w
f
2 ;    ; wfK ] and W c = [wc1; wc2;    ; wcR] represent memory loads for
the detection modules in F and for the preprocessors in C, respectively. Consider-
ing the 6-module conguration in PRIDE, for the conguration used in Figure 5.1,
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W f = [13:3%; 14:6%; 13%; 17:4%; 14:6%; 17:3%] and W c = [15:6%; 1:1%; 1%]. It is
worth mentioning that wc1 = 15:6% is the total load caused by Snort base line,
stream5 (both static and dynamic loads as explained in PRIDE), and frag3 - the
most common and required Snort preprocessors for all detection modules [38]. We
denote by B = [b1; b2; :::; bn] the base memory load (i.e., before performing IDS) of all
nodes. Finally, the maximum allowable memory load (after detection modules and
preprocessors are loaded) is represented by vector  = [1; 2;    ; n], (also called
Memory Threshold). Vector  depends on the memory space required by active
services in WMN, and it is typically set by the security administrator.
5.1.3 Problem Formulation
The main objective of our proposed IDS is to monitor all WMN links using the
maximum allowable number of detection modules that can be performed on WMN
nodes (i.e., activated and executed by Snort on nodes). A higher number of detection
modules executed by node vj means more attack trac can be detected on the links
in CSj. Thus, our IDS solution aims at assigning Snort detection modules on the
WMN nodes, such that all of WMN links are monitored by the maximum number of
modules and none of the nodes is overloaded. In order to mathematically formulate
this problem, we rst introduce several denitions.
Denition 4 IDS Function Distribution,
represented by T = f(vj;Fj; Cj)j vj 2 V; Fj  F ; and Cj  Cg, is a distribution of
detection modules and preprocessors in the WMN, such that modules Fj and their
corresponding preprocessors Cj are assigned to node vj (i.e., they will be activated on
the customized Snort executed on vj).
After the IDS Function Distribution, the set of detection modules and preproces-
sors assigned to WMN nodes are represented by binary matrices XnK and ZnR,
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respectively. Accordingly, xjk = 1 means module fk is activated on node vj and
zjr = 1 implies that preprocessor cr is activated on node vj (i.e., there is at least
one module assigned to node vj that requires preprocessor cr). For example, the IDS
Function Distribution, and matrices X and Z for the example given in Figure 5.1 are:
T = f(v1; ff1; f4g; fc1; c2; c3g); (v2; ff4; f5g; fc1; c3g); :::; (v10; ff2; f6g; fc1; c3g)g;
X106 =
266666666666666664
1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1
...
...    ...
0 1 0 0 0 1
377777777777777775
; Z103 =
266666666666666664
1 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
...
1 0 1
377777777777777775
:
The total memory load of node vj, after the IDS Function Distribution, becomes
Lj = bj + cr2Cjw
c
r + fk2Fjw
f
k . Obviously, an IDS Function Distribution in which
there is at least one vj such that Lj > j is deemed infeasible because the load Lj is
not allowed to exceed the threshold j.
Denition 5 For a given link ei and its corresponding monitoring set MSi, Link
Coverage Ratio (LCR) is dened as LCRi = jUij=K, where Ui =
S
vj2MSi Fj is
the set of detection modules assigned to nodes that can monitor the link.
Denition 6 Link ei is called Fully Covered if LCRi = 1 (Ui = F), i.e., for
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8fk 2 F ; 9 vj 2MSi assigned with Fj such that fk 2 Fj.
Denition 7 Link Coverage Problem (LCP)
Given G = fV;Eg, vectors W f and W c, and matrix D, nd a distribution T =
f(vj;Fj; Cj)j vj 2 V and Fj  Fand Cj  Cg, such that 1q
P
ei2E LCRi is maximized
and Lj  j, 8vj 2 V .
LCP aims at maximizing the average link coverage ratio while ensuring that
memory loads on nodes are below their memory thresholds.
Given matrices M and X, we denote by matrix Y =M  X the mapping between
links and the modules activated on the monitoring set of the links, i.e., yik is in the
range [0; n]. For example, yik = 0 means that module k is not activated on any of
nodes in MSi while yik > 0 implies that there is at least one node in MSi running
module k. According to the LCR (union of all Fj for 8vj 2MSi), yik > 0 is equivalent
to yik = 1 since both of them mean link ei is monitored by detection module fk
(redundant modules do not count). Thus, we dene function BN : fYg  ! f0; 1g
that converts yik to a binary value, i.e., if yik = 0, BN(yik) = 0, otherwise BN(yik) =
1. For the example shown in Figure 5.1, matrices Y166 andBN(Y166) are as follows:
Y166 =
266666666666666664
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 2 1
1 1 1 0 1 1
...
...    ...
1 1 1 1 0 1
377777777777777775
; BN(Y166) =
266666666666666664
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 1
...
...    ...
1 1 1 1 0 1
377777777777777775
:
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The objective function of LCP is non-linear. This is because the link-coverage
requires the non-linear function BN. Thus, unlike PRIDE, LCP cannot be formulated
as an ILP. In addition to non-linearity, LCP is more complex than path coverage
problem (as dened in PRIDE) for a given network. This is because the number
of paths to be covered is usually less than the number of communication links in
WMN [39]. Moreover, we aim for a scalable IDS solution that can be applied to
large WMN (i.e., more links have to be monitored). Thus, we need to develop a
technique to reduce the complexity of link coverage problem when compared to path
coverage problem.
One can observe that matrix D, for both 6-module and 12-module congura-
tions [38], can be summarized as: i) every detection module requires the rst group
of preprocessors of size 15.6%; ii) every detection module requires either the second
group of preprocessors (1.1% load) or the third group of preprocessors (1% load). We
propose a dependency relaxation to run all three groups of preprocessors on every sin-
gle node at the price of at most 1.1% extra load. Accordingly, the total memory load
of node vj, after the IDS Function Distribution, becomes Lj = bj+17:7%+fk2Fjw
f
k .
However, it reduces the complexity of LCP when compared to path coverage problem
in PRIDE.
Thus, LCP can be formulated as a non-linear optimization problem with integer
(binary) variables as follows:
maximize
1
q
(1T  BN(M  X)  1) (5.1)
subject to: BT + (17:7)1T + X W f T  T (5.2)
xjk 2 f0; 1g ;8j; k (5.3)
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where the objective function is to maximize the average link coverage ratio in the
network; constraint 2 limits the memory load on every node vj to be less than its
memory threshold j; and constraint 3 forces xjk to be either 1 or 0 meaning node
vj is either running module fk or not.
5.1.4 RAPID Protocol
In this section, we propose RAPID, a protocol to solve LCP in centralized and
distributed manners. The centralized approach requires a base station that periodi-
cally collects nodes' information (e.g., network connectivity and memory utilization),
solves LCP, and nally broadcasts IDS function distributions to the nodes. The dis-
tributed solution does not need the base station (i.e., nodes locally decide which
detection modules they should run).
5.1.4.1 Centralized Solution
Given a modularization chosen by the security administrator for the IDS congu-
ration (e.g., the 12-module conguration imposes higher execution time to the solver
but is suitable for low memory thresholds [39]), the centralized RAPID periodically
collects the local information from nodes, decides on an optimal set of detection
modules to be executed by each node, and distributes them to the nodes. Since
LCP has a non-linear objective function, linear constraints, and integer variables,
we cannot use integer linear programming. Thus, we propose a Genetic Algorithm
(GA), a popular and eective type of evolutionary algorithms.
GA starts with a set of random solutions and then derives better solutions using
the Darwinian process of \survival of the ttest." The survival of the ttest process
is iterative, and uses genetic operations, such as Selection, Crossover, and Mutation
on the current set of solutions (from here on we will use \set of solutions" and
\population" interchangeably). Selection gives the most t solutions the chance
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Figure 5.2: The matrix X for the 10-node mesh network shown in Figure 5.1 is
encoded as a chromosome.
to survive. Crossover combines solutions in each generation to produce osprings
(i.e., new solutions) of the next generation, and mutation is used to maintain genetic
diversity in two consecutive generations. GA solutions are encoded as bitstrings (i.e.,
chromosomes) of specic length and tested for tness. In our formulation, matrix
X is a solution that can be encoded as a chromosome of length n  K. Figure 5.2
depicts the chromosome corresponding to the IDS function distribution (i.e., the
solution represented by matrix X) of the WMN shown in Figure 5.1. The tness
(objective) value of each solution is the average LCR in the network. The genetic
operations used in this RAPID are based on operations explained in [34].
The centralized RAPID protocol is presented in Algorithm 3 as performed on the
base station. Given the set of WMN nodes, the base station rst collects information
from nodes and then produces matrix M (Lines 1 and 2). Moreover, matrix X,
number of initial solutions (POP SIZE ) and number of generations (GEN SIZE )
are initialized in Line 2. Next, the base station generates a set of POP SIZE random
solutions called SX (Line 3). Starting from the rst population, the Algorithm then
iteratively performs genetic operations and creates another population for the next
generation (Lines 4-9). The Algorithm stops generating a new population if either
the number of generations exceeds GEN SIZE (Line 5) or the stopping criteria holds
(Lines 10-12), i.e., no improvement in the recent  optimal values has been observed,
where  is set by the network administrator. Algorithm 3 then extracts matrix X
from the best solution in SX of last generation (Line 15) and securely broadcasts the
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Algorithm 3 Centralized RAPID
1: Data Collection(V;E; n; q)
2: Initialization(M;X; POP SIZE;GEN SIZE)
3: Initial Solutions(POP SIZE; SX)
4: g = 1
5: while g  GEN SIZE do
6: Elitism(POP SIZE; SX)
7: Selection(POP SIZE; SX)
8: Crossover(POP SIZE; SX)
9: Mutation(POP SIZE; SX)
10: if Stopping holds() then
11: break
12: end if
13: g ++
14: end while
15: X = Best Sol(SX)
16: Sec BRDCST (X)
IDS functions to the WMN nodes (Line 16).
5.1.4.2 Distributed Approach
The main purpose of a distributed approach for RAPID is to remove the commu-
nication overhead caused by message exchange between nodes/base station and the
computation overhead of running GA for large networks. Additionally, this approach
is adaptive to frequent path and topology changes where the base station might not
have the most recent routing information (unless the nodes' information is collected
frequently, which might incur very high communication and computation overhead).
Hence, in the distributed RAPID (presented in Algorithm 4), each node, depending
on its memory threshold, chooses a set of random detection modules to perform.
As shown in Algorithm 4, Line 1, each node requires some preliminary infor-
mation such as the set of modules and their corresponding memory weights, set of
preprocessors, and memory threshold  which are assumed to be already set on the
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Algorithm 4 Distributed RAPID
1: Mod Setting(F ; C; K;R;W f ;W c; b; )
2: L = b+
PR
r=1w
c
r //
PR
r=1w
c
r = 17:7%
3: Rand Perm(F 0;F)
4: for f = 1 to K do
5: Mod = F 0(f)
6: if L+ wfMod   then
7: Activate(F ;Mod)
8: L = L+ wfMod
9: end if
10: end for
device by the security administrator. The base memory load b is obtained from sys-
tem logs (Line 1) and added to the total memory load imposed by all preprocessors
(Line 2). The algorithm then creates a new set of detection modules in a random
order denoted by F 0 in Line 3. Next, detection modules in F 0 are iteratively checked
(Lines 4-6) if they can be activated on the Snort conguration (depending on their
memory weight and threshold ). If so, the module will be activated and the total
memory load L will be updated (Lines 7-8).
We will show that this approach works very well (produces near optimal solutions)
and its performance surprisingly increases (i.e., achieves the centralized performance)
in high memory thresholds or high network density. It is worth emphasizing that
such a good performance is achieved without any communication overhead and with
a very simple algorithm when compared to the centralized RAPID.
5.1.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we rst demonstrate, through a proof of concept experiment
using WMN hardware, that the ideas of link-coverage and multi-interface Snort are
practical. Next, through extensive simulations, based on real data obtained from real-
world WMN deployment and memory measurements, we evaluate the performance
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of our proposed centralized and distributed RAPID solutions. The main reason we
use simulation is to be able to evaluate RAPID's performance for large networks and
for dierent network densities, which are extremely dicult to be evaluated in a real
testbed.
5.1.5.1 Proof of Concept Experiment
Multi-interface Snort: A common way for running Snort and other similar
passive network monitoring applications on multiple network interfaces is to bridge all
interfaces into a single virtual network interface (a process also known as \bonding"),
and run a single instance of the IDS on that virtual interface. On a mesh router,
however, this solution is not possible because in Linux the bonded interfaces cannot
be congured with routable IP addresses, and consequently the router cannot perform
its main task of routing packets. Another option would be to run two Snort instances,
one for each interface. Snort includes support for running multiple instances, but
due to its single-threaded design, each instance is a dierent process, with separate
copies of all buers and data structures. Although this approach works well for
typical multi-core IDS sensors with ample RAM, it is not practical for a mesh router
with very limited CPU and memory resources [39].
To be able to run a single Snort instance that receives trac from both network
interfaces without altering the network conguration of each interface, we followed an
alternative approach and modied Snort to capture packets concurrently through two
Libpcap handles. This is possible by opening two Libpcap packet capture handles,
one for each interface, and then asynchronously retrieving packets from either handle
through select(), whenever packets are available. A Libpcap handle can be put into
\non-blocking" mode using pcap setnonblock(), and then a le descriptor that can
be monitored using select() can be obtained through pcap get selectable fd().
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This design allows us to: i) avoid the overhead of running a second Snort instance
(context switches, duplicate data structures); ii) capture trac from both local and
upstream network interfaces concurrently; and iii) preserve the routing conguration
of both interfaces. We experimentally observed that our multi-interface Snort im-
poses only  4% extra memory load (compared to the original Snort) when running
on a Netgear WNDR3700 router used in the PRIDE testbed.
Experimental Verication: We performed an experiment in a small-size in-
door WMN to validate link-coverage monitoring and multi-interface monitoring. We
note here that the idea of intrusion detection using a set of detection modules dis-
tributed on multiple WMN nodes was previously demonstrated and evaluated in
PRIDE.
In our experiment, we used three Netgear WNDR 3700 routers (e.g., nodes A, B,
and C) connected to each other creating a triangle WMN topology. Each router was
congured to run a multi-interface Snort instance, monitoring network trac on both
2.4 GHz (local trac among its clients) and 5 GHz (WMN backbone trac) wireless
interfaces. Each of routers A and B had one client, while two clients (laptops) were
connected to router C. Using the Rule to Attack (R2A) tool [38], we launched two
dierent types of attacks: i) A's client targeting B's client (multi-hop attack); ii) a C's
client targeting another C's client (single-hop attack). The corresponding detection
modules for each attack were activated on multi-interface Snort running on node C.
The alerts generated by the multi-interface Snort on router C proved the detection of
both single-hop and multi-hop attacks simultaneously. Therefore, our proposed link-
coverage (i.e., monitoring WMN backbone trac on A-B link) and multi-interface
Snort (i.e., monitoring both local and upstream interfaces concurrently) was shown
to be practical for WMN.
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5.1.5.2 Simulation Results
We performed a thorough set of simulations to evaluate the performance of cen-
tralized and distributed RAPID in covering WMN links and detecting dierent types
of attack. We compare our simulation results with PRIDE and monitoring node so-
lutions as two state-of-the-art solutions. We implemented a monitoring node solution
(Mon.Sol.) based on the formulation presented in [37]. The objective function, how-
ever, was changed to select nodes with higher total memory so that more detection
modules can be run on monitoring nodes, thus having a fair comparison with RAPID.
All algorithms are implemented in MATLAB and run for dierent network sizes
and densities. More precisely, our evaluation metrics are Average LCR in WMN,
Average Memory Load on WMN nodes, and Average Intrusion Detection Rates for
dierent types of attack with respect to two tuning parameters, Memory Threshold
 and Network Density. The average base line memory of the nodes (vector B) was
20%. Our simulation results are based on 6-module and 12-module congurations.
5.1.5.3 Average LCR and Memory Consumption
To evaluate the average LCR and average memory load, we created 100 random
networks of size 30 (Note: PRIDE performance is evaluated on a 10-node WMN.)
The average LCR and its standard deviation obtained from centralized RAPID,
distributed RAPID and monitoring node solution are depicted in Figure 5.3. Fig-
ure 5.3(a) shows the average LCR for 6-module conguration while Figure 5.3(b)
depicts the average LCR for 12-module conguration.
As shown, the average LCR increases as  increases which means more detection
modules are executed on the nodes. The monitoring solution (consistent to the re-
sults shown for path coverage in) has the minimum coverage ratio since the selected
monitoring nodes are resource-constrained and cannot perform all detection mod-
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Figure 5.3: The eect of  on the average link coverage in: (a) 6-Module congura-
tion; (b) 12-Module conguration.
ules and do not help each other to achieve higher coverage ratios. Obviously, the
average LCR in centralized RAPID is higher than that of distributed RAPID as the
centralized approach uses global information and produces optimal IDS distribution.
The distributed RAPID, however, achieves an almost similar LCR to the centralized
RAPID for large .
These results are comparable to the path coverage ratio obtained for 2-hop paths
in PRIDE. We note here that the execution time for the centralized RAPID is at most
 5 seconds (for 30-node WMN) while it was more than 1 minute for the 10-node
WMN in PRIDE (using ILP solver) and more than 1 hour for 30-node WMN. More-
over, when considering the average LCR, both centralized and distributed RAPID
outperform PRIDE because RAPID uses the link-coverage approach, which allows
more nodes to participate in trac monitoring. As expected, the average LCR is
slightly higher in 12-module conguration especially for small . This is because the
size of detection modules are smaller than those in 6-module conguration, which
allows more modules to t in the small free memory spaces. It is worth mentioning
that such a better performance obtained from 12-module conguration is at the price
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Figure 5.4: The eect of  on the average memory load in: (a) 6-Module congura-
tion; (b) 12-Module conguration.
of slightly longer execution time in RAPID, PRIDE, and Mon.Sol.
The average memory load on WMN nodes and its standard deviation of all three
IDS solutions for the 6-module and 12-module congurations are depicted in Fig-
ures 5.4(a) and 5.4(b), respectively. It is important to note that the average memory
load for the RAPID solution (both centralized and distributed) is always higher than
that of monitoring node solution, i.e., consistent with results shown in PRIDE. This
is because in monitoring node solution, only monitoring nodes are assigned with
detection modules and the non-monitoring nodes are not loaded with any detection
modules. Therefore, only few selected nodes will have high memory load as opposed
to RAPID where all WMN nodes are loaded with the maximum number of detec-
tion modules that can t. The large standard deviation of average memory load in
Mon.Sol. indicates the dierence between total memory load on monitoring nodes
and non-monitoring nodes.
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Figure 5.5: The eect of  on the detection rate of single-hop (local) attacks in: (a)
6-Module conguration; (b) 12-Module conguration.
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Figure 5.6: The eect of  on the detection rate of multi-hop attacks in: (a) 6-Module
conguration; (b) 12-Module conguration.
5.1.5.4 Average Detection Rates for Dierent Attacks
As mentioned in our attacker model, we consider both single-hop (local) and
multi-hop attacks in WMN. For a given WMN of size n, we simulated 10 n single-
hop attacks and 2n multi-hop attacks of random types (i.e., detectable by random
detection modules as listed in [38]) and measured the detection rates based on the
activated detection modules on the nodes.
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Figure 5.5 shows the average detection rate of all 10  n single-hop attacks ob-
tained from dierent IDS solutions. The results are produced for 100 random WMN
of size n=30. Figure 5.5(a) depicts the average detection rates of single-hop attacks
in all IDS solutions when the 6-module conguration is used. As shown, the larger
the , the higher the detection rate is. This is because a larger memory thresh-
old allows nodes to load and execute more detection modules and detect more local
attacks, since the neighbors cannot help the node in detecting local attacks. As
depicted in Figure 5.5(b), the average detection rate for 12-module conguration is
slightly higher than those of 6-module conguration in all three IDS solutions. It
is worth mentioning that, although the detection rates for both centralized and dis-
tributed RAPID are at most  60%, they are much better than for the monitoring
node solution (i.e., at most  20%) and for PRIDE (i.e., 0% for local attacks).
To evaluate the performance of IDS solutions in detecting multi-hop attacks, we
considered 100 random networks of 30 nodes and 60 random paths. The path length
of each attack is randomly chosen between 2 and 5 hops. Figures 5.6(a) and 5.6(b)
depict the average detection rates of multi-hop attacks in all three solutions for
6-module conguration and 12-module conguration, respectively. As shown, the
detection rates for multi-hop attack in RAPID and Mon.Sol. are much higher than
those for single-hop attacks. This is because as trac packets go through more
IDS nodes, they will be more likely inspected by more distinct detection modules.
Moreover, as previously observed, the larger the , the higher the detection rate will
be. Also, the 12-module conguration again outperforms the 6-module conguration
(at the price of slightly larger time complexity).
Figures 5.7(a) and 5.7(b) show the simulation results for average detection rates
of compromised node attacks in 6-module and 12-module congurations, respectively,
in all IDS solutions. The results are obtained from 100 random networks of 30 nodes
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Figure 5.7: The eect of  on the detection rate of compromised node attacks in:
(a) 6-Module conguration; (b) 12-Module conguration.
where 60 random attacks are considered for each network. The compromised node is
randomly chosen among WMN nodes to run either a single-hop (targeting a neighbor
WMN node) or multi-hop attack. As shown, the results are slightly worse than multi-
hop attacks because the compromised node itself is considered unable to detect the
attack, which results in inspecting attack trac with less detection modules.
The last type of attack we consider for intrusion detection evaluation is unau-
thorized client attack. An unauthorized client is assumed to be physically located
in WMN area but not associated with any of MAPs (i.e., outsider). The attacker
can launch attacks against WMN nodes (e.g., DoS, battery depletion, spoofed de-
authentication, etc.) or WMN links (e.g., jamming, blackhole/grayhole, etc.). We
assume that in the attack against a WMN node, the target is unable to participate
in the intrusion detection process. Figures 5.8(a) and 5.8(b) show the average de-
tection rate of unauthorized client attacks targeting WMN nodes for 6-module and
12-module congurations, respectively. The results are obtained from 100 random
networks of 30 nodes where 300 random attacker locations and targets are considered.
The results show that these attacks are highly detectable by RAPID algorithms as
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Figure 5.8: The eect of  on the detection rate of unauthorized client (outsider)
attacks: (a) against nodes in 6-Module conguration; (b) against nodes in 12-Module
conguration; (c) against links in 6-Module conguration; (d) against links in 12-
Module conguration.
opposed to Mon.Sol. solution that can achieve at most  60% detection rate. We
note here that PRIDE cannot detect such attacks since the attack trac is not
routed through WMN nodes. Figures 5.8(c) and 5.8(d) show the average detection
rate of unauthorized client attacks targeting WMN links, when using 6-module and
12-module congurations, respectively. As depicted, the results are slightly better
than those targeting WMN nodes because more nodes participate in monitoring the
target WMN link.
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Figure 5.9: The eect of  and network density on the average link coverage in:
(a) 6-Module conguration of distributed RAPID; (b) 12-Module conguration of
distributed RAPID; (c) 6-Module conguration of centralized RAPID; (d) 12-Module
conguration of centralized RAPID.
5.1.5.5 The Eect of Network Density on RAPID Performance
In order to show the eect of network density on performance of RAPID, we
repeated all previous simulations (i.e., network density was 8 nodes per radio range)
for two more network densities, 4 and 13 nodes per radio range. Intuitively, the
higher the network density should result in participating more neighbors in trac
monitoring that would increase the average link coverage ratio and consequently the
intrusion detection rate. In this section, we show the simulation results for average
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LCR and average detection rates of dierent attacks as functions of  and network
density.
Figures 5.9(a) and 5.9(b) show the average LCR obtained from distributed RAPID
for 6-module and 12-modules congurations, respectively. The results conrm that
the average LCR increases as or network density increase. Figures 5.9(c) and 5.9(d)
depict the average LCR obtained from centralized RAPID for 6-module and 12-
modules congurations, respectively. The results obtained from centralized RAPID
are better than those obtained from distributed RAPID, at the price of some commu-
nication and computation overheads. We note here that the network density has no
eect on the average LCR of PRIDE (because of using node-coverage instead of link-
coverage approach) and Mon.Sol (because it only aects the number of monitoring
nodes and not the number of detection modules they perform).
Figures 5.10(a) and 5.10(b) show the eect of  and network density on the
detection rate of multi-hop attacks in the distributed RAPID for 6-module and 12-
modules congurations, respectively. Surprisingly, the multi-hop attacks are almost
always detectable for   70% and network density larger than 8 nodes per radio
range in both 6-and-12-module congurations. Figures 5.10(c) and 5.10(d) show the
results for the centralized RAPID which are above 90% even for the lowest network
density and memory threshold. We note here that network density has no eect
on single-hop attack detection as only one node (the local router) is responsible
for intrusion detection and other WMN nodes do not participate in the intrusion
detection process.
Figures 5.11(a) and 5.11(b) show the eect of  and network density on the de-
tection rate of compromised node attacks in the distributed RAPID for 6-module
and 12-modules congurations, respectively. As depicted, the detection rate in-
creases as network density and  increase which means more nodes with more detec-
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Figure 5.10: The eect of  and network density on the detection rate of multi-hop
attacks in: (a) 6-Module conguration of distributed RAPID; (b) 12-Module cong-
uration of distributed RAPID; (c) 6-Module conguration of centralized RAPID; (d)
12-Module conguration of centralized RAPID.
tion modules inspect the attack trac generated by the compromised nodes. Fig-
ures 5.11(c) and 5.11(d) show the same results for the centralized RAPID when
using 6-module and 12-modules congurations, respectively. The results show that
centralized RAPID outperforms distributed RAPID, however, at the price of higher
computation and communication overheads.
The eect of  and network density on the detection rate of unauthorized client
(outsider) attacks against WMN nodes in the distributed RAPID are shown in Fig-
ures 5.12(a) and 5.12(b) for 6-module and 12-modules congurations, respectively.
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Figure 5.11: The eect of  and network density on the detection rate of com-
promised node attacks in: (a) 6-Module conguration of distributed RAPID; (b)
12-Module conguration of distributed RAPID; (c) 6-Module conguration of cen-
tralized RAPID; (d) 12-Module conguration of centralized RAPID.
Also, Figures 5.12(c) and 5.12(d) show the same results for the centralized RAPID
when using 6-module and 12-modules congurations, respectively. The results con-
rm that the larger the  and network density, the higher the detection rate will be.
Moreover, centralized approach works better than distributed approach as 12-module
conguration also works better than 6 module conguration.
Finally, we show the eect of  and network density on the detection rate of unau-
thorized client (outsider) attacks against WMN links in both distributed and central-
ized RAPID. Figures 5.13(a) and 5.13(b) show the detection rates in the distributed
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Figure 5.12: The eect of  and network density on the detection rate of unauthorized
client (outsider) attacks against nodes in: (a) 6-Module conguration of distributed
approach; (b) 12-Module conguration of distributed approach; (c) 6-Module cong-
uration of centralized approach; (d) 12-Module conguration of centralized approach.
RAPID for 6-module and 12-module congurations, respectively. The results are
slightly better than those obtained from attacks against WMN nodes since more
nodes participate in trac monitoring. Figures 5.13(c) and 5.13(d) show the same
results for centralized RAPID when using 6-module and 12-module congurations,
respectively.
93
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 60  65  70  75  80  85  90
D
e t
e c
t i o
n  
R
a t
e  
( %
)
λ (%)
4 Node/Radio
8 Node/Radio
13 Node/Radio
(a)
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 60  65  70  75  80  85  90
D
e t
e c
t i o
n  
R
a t
e  
( %
)
λ (%)
4 Node/Radio
8 Node/Radio
13 Node/Radio
(b)
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 60  65  70  75  80  85  90
D
e t
e c
t i o
n  
R
a t
e  
( %
)
λ (%)
4 Node/Radio
8 Node/Radio
13 Node/Radio
(c)
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 60  65  70  75  80  85  90
D
e t
e c
t i o
n  
R
a t
e  
( %
)
λ (%)
4 Node/Radio
8 Node/Radio
13 Node/Radio
(d)
Figure 5.13: The eect of  and network density on the detection rate of unauthorized
client (outsider) attacks against links in: (a) 6-Module conguration of distributed
approach; (b) 12-Module conguration of distributed approach; (c) 6-Module cong-
uration of centralized approach; (d) 12-Module conguration of centralized approach.
5.2 Cooperative IDS
Another approach to conserve resources and manage the intrusion detection mech-
anism for resource-constrained WMN is to use cooperative IDS solutions. In cooper-
ative IDS, the network topology used for communicating intrusion detection reports
has an important eect on network performance and resource consumption. Find-
ing the optimum network topology for nodes that execute cooperative IDS has been
shown to be an NP-hard problem [75,83]. Previous research investigated distributed
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solutions in which nodes, using information about their neighbors, elect a local can-
didate for executing cooperative IDS functions [46, 79]. These solutions, however,
are suboptimal and incur high communication overhead. In this section, we pro-
pose a solution in which a base station which has knowledge about network (e.g.,
node resources, locations, etc.) and security requirements (e.g., maximum permissi-
ble delay in reporting an event, minimum network coverage), computes the optimal
distribution of roles specic to cooperative IDS. Our proposed solution allows execu-
tion of sophisticated algorithms that optimize multiple objectives related to network
performance and security eectiveness.
5.2.1 Cooperative IDS Architecture and Problem Formulation
Our target system is a battery-powered WMN [28] consisting of resource con-
strained wireless networks (i.e., battery powered wireless mesh and sensor networks)
with a single base station (e.g., a Command & Control Center). The network is
loosely time synchronized and all nodes know their locations. The base station, with
extensive computational capabilities, periodically collects network information and
uses this information to decide which IDS functions to run, and where to run them.
This decision is done periodically, or when network conditions change, e.g., when
nodes' residual energy is below a threshold.
The decision of how to distribute IDS functions, results in a network organized
as a set of cluster trees, each running a distributed cooperative IDS. Figure 5.14(a)
depicts an example of a network cooperative IDS, which consists of a cluster tree
with 5 nodes and one additional node, not associated with the cluster tree. The
dotted lines in the gure 5.14(a) represent network connections while the arrow lines
show the cooperation direction. Figure 5.14(b) shows a generic node architecture
in a cooperative IDS. The Data Collection module, executed by all nodes, collects
95
cf
b
Leader
Aggregator
Joined
Orphan
e
a d
(a) (b)
Figure 5.14: (a) Example of a network with a cooperative IDS (nodes responsibilities
vary). (b) A generic architecture for nodes in a cooperative IDS.
local system and network data, for intrusion detection purposes. Nodes also have a
Local IDS module that evaluates a set of intrusion detection rules. The remaining
two modules, \Cooperation" and \Data Aggregation" are explained below within
the context of Aggregator and Leader roles for a node.
Inspired by previous intrusion detection research [49, 54, 81, 84] we identify four
distinct roles for the nodes in our distributed IDS:
 Joined nodes are leaves in a cluster tree. They monitor local activity (e.g.,
communication, processes running, data produced) and run a local IDS, as
depicted in Figure 5.14(b). Results are reported to the parent, which can be
an Aggregator or a Leader.
 Aggregator nodes also monitor local activity, as a joined node does, receive
reports from children, either joined or other aggregator nodes, and aggregate
this data with their information, using the Data Aggregation module in Fig-
ure 5.14(b). The aggregated data is reported to a parent, i.e., either an aggre-
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gator or a leader.
 Leader is the root of a cluster tree. A leader receives reports from its children,
either joined or aggregator nodes, and executes sophisticated IDS functions,
e.g., alert correlation, as part of a Cooperation module (Figure 5.14(b)). The
results are reported to the base station. Leaders of all cluster trees form a
connected graph, which contains the base station. As shown in Figure 5.14(a)
there is a single-cluster tree, with node c as its leader.
 Orphan nodes are not part of a cluster tree. They run local IDS and do not
forward their observations to their neighbors.
The nodes with the aforementioned roles can largely be described as: 1) Tasked
nodes if they are either Joined, Aggregator, or Leader; 2) Untasked nodes - the
Orphan nodes. Similarly we will refer to all children of a node as its Followers.
Individual nodes, organized in cluster trees, communicate and aggregate data for
the purpose of detecting intruders, in a collaborative manner. The proposed cluster
tree organization impacts energy consumption (hence, network lifetime), event re-
porting delay, network coverage, and quality of data collected. Each of these proper-
ties represents an individual optimization objective in a multi-objective optimization
problem, formally described in Section 5.2.1.1.
The proposed system architecture, based on cooperative IDS, is the main focus
of our research. For the intrusion detection system we employ existing IDS engines,
e.g., Snort [78], which is based on rulesets. For our approach, it is critical to ob-
serve that more complex actions performed by the detection engine (e.g., number of
rules evaluated, processing stages involved) will pose a higher demand on available
resources (e.g., computation, communication). Consequently, the conguration of
the IDS engine presents opportunities to tradeo intrusion detection accuracy for
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resource availability. Thus, we consider three types of intrusion detection engines:
lightweight (LW-DS), employed by joined and orphan nodes; medium (RE-DS), em-
ployed by aggregators; and heavy (HW-DS), employed by leaders. The types of
attacks we consider in this research are the following:
 Flooding: the purpose of this attack is to exhaust both network and host
resources by sending a rapid succession of many request-type packets. As
examples for this attack, we consider the SYN and ICMP ood attacks. For
detecting these attacks an LW-DS is sucient.
 Port scanning: this is a generic attack that probes a target node for open
ports. As an example, we consider TCP port scanning employing TCP SYN
and FIN packets. For detecting a port scanning attack, an RE-DS or HW-DS
is required.
 Web exploits: for this, the attacker hosts an HTTP server and executes HTML
exploits (e.g., information disclosure), against clients. Due to the complexity
of this attack, only a HW-DS is capable of detecting it.
5.2.1.1 Problem Formulation
Given a set N = fn1; n2; :::; nk; bg of k + 1 nodes, which includes base station
b, and the roles of nodes identied at the beginning of the section, let L be the
set of leader nodes, A the set of aggregator nodes, J the set of joined nodes and
O the set of orphan nodes in the network. We denote by bni , the residual battery
charge of node ni. Each node ni in the network is assigned a single responsibility.
Using the proposed cooperative IDS architecture, nodes are organized in cluster
trees. Let G = fT1; :::; Tqg be the set of q cluster trees formed in the network. Each
cluster tree Ti has only one leader (jLTij = 1), and one or more aggregators ATi
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and joint nodes JTi : Ti = LTi [ ATi [ JTi . As mentioned, the set of leader nodes
forms a connected graph. All nodes communicate with radio range R. Leaders can
communicate over greater distances using radio range R0 = R. More formally, we
dene GL(L [ fbg; L  L) as the graph formed by leaders Li 2 L such that Li is
connected to Lj i dist(Li; Lj)  R0;8i 6= j.
Dierent cluster tree topologies exhibit dierent characteristics for energy con-
sumption, event reporting delay, network coverage, and data accuracy. Some of these
properties need to be minimized (e.g., energy consumption and delay), while others
need to be maximized (e.g., network coverage and data accuracy). Individually, each
of these properties can be treated naively as a single objective optimization problem.
However, a more complex, but more commonly sought goal in a cooperative IDS for a
set of cluster trees, is to nd the lowest aggregate energy consumption and delay with
the highest aggregate data accuracy and network coverage. It is obvious that single
objective optimizations may negatively impact the performance of other objectives
in a multi-objective environment. Therefore, for any set of cluster trees, we dene
the network performance F (G) = f (PG; HG; DG; CG), as a multi-variate objective
function, where PG, HG, DG and CG are functions for Power, Information, Delay and
Coverage, respectively, in network G. This multi-variate objective function trades
o Power and Delay, two minimization objectives, in order to improve Information
and Coverage, two maximization objectives. In addition, since the objective values
of these functions are in dierent scales, they are normalized using Cp, Cd, Ch and
Cc:
F (G) = f

1  PG
Cp

;
HG
Ch
;

1  DG
Cd

;
CG
Cc

Consequently, our Multi-objective Optimization (MOO) problem is:
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maximize

1  PG
Cp

;
HG
Ch
;

1  DG
Cd

;
CG
Cc

(5.4)
subject to: jLTij = 1; 8i = 1; :::; q (5.5)
if nj 2 ATi ; JTi then
parent (nj) 2 ATi [ LTi ; 8i = 1; :::; q (5.6)
jJTij  1; 8i = 1; :::; q (5.7)
GL is a connected graph (5.8)
bLi  bthL ;8Li (5.9)
jTij  jT jth;8i = 1; :::; q (5.10)
where (5.4) is a vector of all objective functions; constraint (5.5) indicates that a
single leader node is in each cluster tree; constraint (5.6) enforces the construction of
the cluster tree (to conform with our cooperative IDS architecture); constraint (5.7)
indicates that at least one joined node must be in each cluster tree; constraint (5.8)
enforces the leaders to be connected to the graph GL formed by leaders including base
station; and constraint (5.9) says that the residual battery charge of the leader has
to be greater than a dened threshold value bthL . Finally, constraint (5.10) enforces
the size of cluster trees to be smaller than a dened threshold jT jth, to prohibit the
creation of large cluster trees. This constraint seeks solutions that are sets of trees
instead of one large tree (a typical single point of failure).
For investigating solutions for MOO, we need normalizing constants Cp, Cd, Ch
and Cc. These upper bound values are obtained by solving the corresponding Single
Objective Optimization (SOO) problems. As an example, for maximizing Informa-
tion in the network and nding Ch, the corresponding SOO is:
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maximize
qX
i=1
jTijX
j=1
hij (5.11)
subject to: same constraints as MOO (5.12)
where hij represents the information available to node j in cluster tree i. Similarly
we can formulate single optimization problems that minimize Delay and Power, and
that maximize Coverage.
5.2.2 Models for Single Objectives
In this section we develop mathematical models for PG, HG, DG, CG, the Power,
Information, Delay, and Coverage functions, respectively, i.e., individual objectives
that compose the multi-objective optimization problem.
5.2.2.1 Power Model
Nodes in the network, depending on their roles, consume dierent amounts of
energy for communication and computation. Leader and aggregator nodes perform
functions that consume more power (i.e., cooperation module in leaders and aggre-
gation module in aggregators). Similarly, cluster trees may vary in the number of
tasked and untasked nodes and in the number and distribution of followers for each
leader and aggregator. This means that the total power consumption of any set of
cluster trees will vary from other possible sets. Thus, one single objective optimiza-
tion problem is to minimize total power consumed by all nodes in a set of cluster
trees G formed in the network, as given by:
PG =
kX
i=1
pi =
jLjX
i=1
pLi +
jAjX
i=1
pAi +
jJ jX
i=1
pJi +
jOjX
i=1
pOi (5.13)
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where pi is the power consumption of node i for both communication and computa-
tion activities, which will depend on the role assigned to it (i.e., leader, aggregator,
joint or orphan). In the remaining part of the section, we present the power con-
sumption models for leader nodes pLi , aggregator nodes pAi , joined nodes pJi , and
orphan nodes pOi .
For our power consumption model, we extend the one proposed in [26]. We
consider the power consumed for radio communication or processing (computation).
We denote by PTX and PRX the power consumed for transmitting and for receiv-
ing a report, respectively. We denote by PRep and PRecv the power consumed for
transmitting and for receiving an intrusion detection alarm, respectively. The power
consumed for processing/computation, denoted by PProc, depends on the role as-
signed to a node. The following notations are with reference to the proposed system
architecture, shown in Figure 5.14(b) - the \Cooperation" and \Data Aggregation"
modules. For an aggregator node, which has the \Data Aggregation" module active,
PProc = PModA + PCodA where PModA is a xed power consumed for maintaining the
module active and PCodA is a variable power, consumed for coding/aggregating data
from follower nodes. For a leader node, which has the \Cooperation" module active,
PProc = PModC + PCodC where PModC is a xed power consumed for maintaining the
module active and PCodC is a variable power, consumed for coding/cooperating data
from follower nodes.
We denote by Ei an event vector, which is a set of observed security parameters
reported by node i. We denote by lEi its length (lEi = jEij). We remark here that
lEi is the same for all joined nodes (since they do not have followers) and that it
increases with the number of descendants. Considering our system architecture for
cooperative IDS, each tasked node i, except for leaders, sends Ei in each time slot,
at a rate  packets per second. We assume that  is equal for all nodes. We use Fi
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as the set of followers of node i. Considering the tasks mentioned in Section 5.2.1,
the power consumed by a leader node becomes:
pLi = PRXi + PProci + PRepi + PRecvi
= prx
jFijX
j=1
lEij + PCodC
24lEi + jFijX
j=1
lEij
35
+ PModC + lA(ptx + p
0
tx + p
0
rx)
where ptx and prx are the power consumptions required to transmit and receive
one bit, respectively, and p0tx and p
0
rx are the power consumptions required for trans-
mitting one bit over a long distance between leaders. Similarly, pAi = pLi + PTXi =
pLi + ptxlEi .
Reporting activity consumes PRep = lAp
0
tx, depending on the attack frequency
 in the network (0    1) where lA is the size of alarm. Leaders need to
communicate with each other, using long distance communication, to exchange alerts
in case of attack detection as well as sending alert to the followers, using regular
radio range communication. Since aggregators forward alerts to their children, they
consume PRep and PRecv for transmitting/receiving alarms, respectively.
In contrast to leaders and aggregators, the only tasks of joined nodes are to trans-
mit their event vector to their parents and to receive alarms from them. Therefore,
the power consumption of a joined node is pJi = PTXi + PRepi = ptxlEi + lAprx.
Since orphan nodes do not execute any cooperative IDS processes, their power con-
sumption is 0 (pOi = 0).
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5.2.2.2 Information Model
For IDS cooperation, in which each node has a local IDS and sends reports to
its parent, the way nodes are organized in cluster trees and cooperate aects the
amount of data collected. An optimal solution for our MOO problem collects as
much data as possible, but, at the same time reduces the amount of useless data
collected. Thus, for dening one additional objective in our MOO, we develop a
model for data collected in a cooperative IDS.
We already mentioned that each node i sends an event vector Ei to its parent.
Here, for simplicity, we assume that each vector contains only one security parameter
which is a random variable xi with a Gaussian distribution (xi  N(; i2)). The
amount of information contained in x is its entropy, H(x). We denote by H(xi) the
data entropy of a reporting parameter of node i, and by H(xi; xj) the joint entropy
of two variables xi and xj, where node i is the parent of node j. So, the data entropy
at an aggregator is the joint entropy of all received data from its followers combined
with its own observations.
For a set of cluster trees, the Information function is dened as summation of all
data entropy at the nodes asHG =
Pk
i=1 hi, where hi = H(xi) for any joined node and
hi = H(xi; :::; xn), as the entropy of all parameters received by aggregator i combined
with its own security parameter. This model guarantees that upper level aggregators
get access to all information reported by their descendants but it does not require
an aggregator node to forward all received packets. Hence, this reporting process
ensures that all cooperators have access to all information in the local cooperating
cluster tree. This data aggregation reduces the total amount of transmitted data
between aggregators. Each observed parameter contains H(x) = 1
2
log(2e2) bits
of information where 2 is the variance of Gaussian random variable x. The joint
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entropy of n Gaussian random variables is H(x1; :::; xn) =
1
2
log[(2e)ndet()], where
 is the covariance matrix of the joint variables [20]. Matrix  contains all i's as
standard deviation of Gaussian random variables, 2i 's as their variances, and ij as
the correlation coecient of any pair of variables i and j as follows:
x1;x2;:::;xn =
0BBBBBBB@
21 1212    1n1n
2121 
2
2    2n2n
...
...
. . .
...
n1n1 n2nn    2n
1CCCCCCCA
In , the correlation coecient ij is a function of nodes i and j locations. For-
mally, ij = f(Xi; Yi; Xj; Yj), where Xi and Yi are the x and y coordinates of node
i. This means that  depends on the location, length and orientation of the line
segment between two nodes. We assume that the location of the attacker has a
random distribution in the network area, so that variable x is a stationary ran-
dom variable and independent of node location. Thus,  = f(dij), which means
that  is only a function of the distance between two communicating nodes regard-
less of their location in the network. In this research, we assume  = 1 consid-
ering security parameter xi as standard Gaussian random variable. Assuming the
same circular radio range for all nodes A = R2, then ij = (Ai
T
Aj)=A; if dij 
2R; and 0; otherwise, where Ai = Aj = A. Overlapping area (Ai \ Aj) is calculated
as Ai \ Aj = 2R2 cos 1

dij
2R

  d
2
q
4R2   d2ij.
5.2.2.3 Delay Model
In the proposed IDS cooperation model, we assume that an aggregator node
processes all received reports during timeslot  and sends the aggregated report to
its parent during timeslot  +1. The delay between a report transmitted by a node,
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until it is received by a leader located at a distance i hops is equal to the number of
hops. Thus, the total event reporting delay in the network becomes DG =
Pk
i=1 i.
5.2.2.4 Network Coverage Model
The nal objective function to be maximized is the coverage of nodes in the
network. A node which is a member of cluster tree Ti, regardless of its role, is
considered covered (cij = 1 i 9Ti where nj 2 Ti). Accordingly, the only nodes in the
network that are not covered are orphan nodes. Thus, the node coverage function in
the network is CG =
Pq
i=1
PjTij
j=1 cij = k   jOj.
5.2.3 Solutions for Optimal Monitoring in Cooperative IDS
The optimization problem described by Equations 5.4-5.10, has properties that
limit the methods that can be used for solving it.
First, the number of possible cooperation topologies grows exponentially with
the number of nodes. Cayley's theorem [77] gives the number of trees and clusters
in a graph: 1) given n labeled nodes, the number of dierent trees is nn 2; 2)
given n labeled nodes, of which k nodes are chosen as root nodes, the number of
forests (clusters) that can be formed is knn k 1. Although, lower network densities
aect trees and clusters formation, the number of possible cooperation topologies
is extremely large, primarily because nodes in our clustering method are assigned
dierent tasks. Any permutation of tasks in a cluster tree results in a new cooperative
IDS solution which we need to consider (as an example, consider 3 nodes connected
in a straight line; each of the nodes can be a leader, while the other two nodes
can be either joined or aggregator nodes). To conclude, the exponential growth in
the number of feasible solutions, i.e., 
(nn), makes the search space of the problem
extremely large and the optimization problem NP-hard.
Second, our multi-objective optimization problem has some non-linear constraints
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(e.g., constraint (3)), which makes the problem impossible to be solved by linear
methods. Moreover, the solutions of our optimization problem are not numeric val-
ues, but complex cluster trees. Thus, the objective functions are discrete functions.
Given the aforementioned challenges, we propose to employ evolutionary algo-
rithms for solving the optimization problem. In the following sections we present
two evolutionary algorithms-based solutions to our MOO, and analyze their time
complexity and the optimality of their solution.
5.2.4 Evolutionary Algorithms for MOO
For solving our MOO, we propose to use a Genetic Algorithm (GA), one popular
type of evolutionary algorithm. A GA starts with a set of random solutions (from here
on we will use the terms \solution", \individual" and \chromosome" interchangeably;
consequently we will use \set of solutions" and \population" interchangeably), and
derives better solutions by combining older solutions using the Darwinian process
of \survival of the ttest" [8, 71]. This \survival of the ttest" process is iterative,
and uses genetic operations, such as Selection, Crossover, and Mutation. Selection
gives the most t solutions chance to survive. Crossover combines solutions in the
previous generation to produce osprings (i.e., new solutions), and mutation is used
to maintain genetic diversity from one generation to the next.
Our optimization problem has multiple objectives. For assessing the goodness
of GA solutions, all objectives must be encapsulated in a single tness function
(which computes solution's tness). Generally, there is no unique solution for a
multi objective optimization problem. Instead, a set of solutions, called the Pareto
set, is sought. Some multi-objective problems, however, can be reformulated such
that some of the objectives act as constraints (also called regularization terms for
objectives). In this research we pursue this latter approach primarily because Pareto
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frontier produces a variety of optimal solutions with respect to dierent objectives. A
security administrator, however, has to choose only one solution. Choosing the most
suitable solution among all in the Pareto set, is an administrative decision which
depends on the network situations, e.g., average battery level and attack frequency
in the network. In our approach, i.e., the Penalized method, some objectives act as
secondary constraints and are specied by administrator, based on the characteristics
of the optimization problem. The question that remains, and will be addressed
shortly, is which constraints to use as secondary, and why these constraints.
The cooperative intrusion detection techniques proposed [41, 49, 81] aim to ex-
change security information among intrusion detectors distributed throughout the
network. In the optimal monitoring problem that we formulated, every node has
a certain amount of information (obtained from its local observation) that can be
exchanged with neighbors, to improve the intrusion detection rate. On one hand, the
model enforces the nodes to participate in clusters, to achieve higher Information and
Coverage values (i.e., we prefer to not have orphan nodes in the network). Hence,
as clustering occurs in the network (to maximize Information objective, the main
objective of the system), Power and Delay objectives suer. To conclude, Informa-
tion model is a primary optimization function while the other objective functions are
considered secondary.
108
Algorithm 5 Genetic Algorithm
1: nSol S
2: Collect Network Info()
3: Create Adjacency Matrix()
4: First Population (nSol)
5: Fitness Values(nSol, )
6: for NumGen = 1 to g do
7: Find Elite (nSol)
8: Selection(nSol, 1)
9: Crossover(nSol, 2, !)
10: Mutation(nSol, 3, ')
11: Replace Elite(Elite)
12: Fitness Values(nSol, )
13: end for
In the following subsections we present our GA, with pseudocode shown in Al-
gorithm 5. Our algorithm, based on the Penalized function method for solving the
MOO, uses Power, Delay, and Coverage objectives as regularization terms (or sec-
ondary constraints) for the Information objective.
5.2.4.1 Problem Encoding
First, GA solutions are encoded as bitstrings (i.e., chromosomes) of specic
length, and tested for tness. The goodness of a solution is evaluated by its tness
value. Second, a solution to our problem is a set of cluster trees G = fT1; T2; :::; Tqg.
The set of cluster trees G can be conveniently represented as an adjacency matrix
(e.g., our GA collects necessary information in Algorithm 5 Lines 2-3). Consequently,
an immediate way to encode a solution (feasible or not) as a chromosome, is to con-
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catenate the rows of G's adjacency matrix in a single bitstring. The chromosome
is thus composed of multiple segments, where each segment is a row from G's adja-
cency matrix. In the example depicted in Figure 5.15, the chromosome titled \Instant
Chromosome" is the encoding for the cluster tree presented in Figure 5.14(a). Based
on our proposed architecture (i.e., a set of cluster trees) a chromosome must have a
single bit set to 1 in each segment. Figure 5.15 also depicts two infeasible solutions
(non-chromosomes) in the bitstrings titled \Infeasible Solution". In one infeasible
solution, two bits in the same segment are set to 1, while in the second a node has an
invalid parent. Through our proposed encoding, it is easy to observe that the length
of a chromosome is k2.
5.2.4.2 Initial Population
The initial population, consisting of S individual chromosomes -each representing
a single solution- is randomly generated. A population of large size S allows the
GA to start with a large set of feasible solutions. A chromosome is obtained from a
randomly generated bitstring, if it abides by constraints (5.5-5.9) of our optimization
problem. If the bitstring conforms, then the GA considers it a solution (Algorithm 5,
Line 4).
5.2.4.3 Computation of Fitness
The tness of a chromosome (i.e., a solution) represents its ability to keep genetic
properties for next generations. As mentioned earlier, our proposed GA computes
the tness value of a solution G through a Penalized function technique (Algorithm 5
Line 5). Since any objective function can be considered as an optimizing objective,
we discriminate among objectives through parameter .
In our proposed solution, Information is considered as primary objective function,
while the other objectives are secondary constraints and regularization terms. As the
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Instant 
Chromosome
Set of all feasible solutions
Node “c” cannot have two parents in tree 
Infeasible 
Solution
A typical solution (representation of Figure 1(a))
Node “c” cannot be connected to node “a” 
according to graph connectivity
Infeasible 
Solution
Node
Figure 5.15: The connectivity graph is encoded as a string suitable for GA. All
feasible solutions can be derived from graph connectivity string.
Power and Delay values of a solution increase, or the Coverage becomes less than
100%, the function penalizes the Information value to a smaller value, so that the
corresponding solution has less chance to survive. The penalized function for MOO
approach is f(G) = [2   (PG=CP )   (DG=CD)]  ((1 + bCG=kc)=2)  HG, where a
set of constraints penalizes the tness value for each solution: the penalty method
maximizes data entropy (HG), while normalized values of power (PG) and delay (DG)
operate as inverse coecients of the tness value. We use coverage (CG) as a penalty
parameter as well. To nd the constants CP and CD (i.e., the maximum delay and
power consumption), we solve the corresponding two single objective optimization
problems. The maximum outcomes of several iterations of these SOO problems are
assigned as constants CP and CD.
Once the tness of the initial population is computed, our GA attempts to nd
better solutions in an iterative manner (Algorithm 5 Line 6), by applying genetic
operations, further described below.
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5.2.4.4 Elitism
The purpose of Line 7 in Algorithm 5 is to ensure that the best solution of each
generation will not be lost during crossover and mutation. After computing the
tness values, the best solution among all individuals is passed on directly to the
next generation.
5.2.4.5 Selection
This step chooses the best individuals whose descendants will form the next
generation. Chromosomes in the current population are selected using either \tour-
nament" or \roulette wheel" mechanisms, and are weighted with the chromosome's
tness value. In the tournament method, two random individuals are selected from
the current population and the individual with the highest tness value is selected
for mating. The process is repeated S times. If the selection method is set to roulette
wheel, S random chromosomes are chosen. Selection probability for each chromo-
some G is f(G)=S1 f(G). Our algorithm invokes this function in Line 8, and it uses
1 = 1 for tournament, and 1 = 2 for roulette wheel.
5.2.4.6 Crossover
New solutions, or osprings, are formed by mating, which is handled as an ex-
change in our algorithm on Line 9. Three dierent recombination schemes are avail-
able: block exchange (B) (where a block is a contiguous sequence of segments),
segment exchange (S), and multi-segment exchange (M). Block exchange selects a
random node (segment) of each chromosome and replaces all subsequent segments
with the same segments of another parent. Segment exchange trades one segment
from each parent with each other, while multi-segment exchanges more than one seg-
ment. Algorithm 5 Line 9 uses 2 to specify the crossover method (i.e., 2 = 1; 2; 3).
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Crossover induces change. In order to control the rate of change, the crossover prob-
ability (!) must be set to a conservative value.
5.2.4.7 Mutation
Considering the specic requirements of our problem (e.g., cluster tree formation
for cooperative IDS), our GA employs two mutation methods. Composition (C) is a
mutation method useful for maximization problems while decomposition (D) is useful
for minimization problems. Both methods, specied by 3 in Line 10 of Algorithm 5,
randomly mutate the parent of a random node in a valid solution (3 = 1 means
compositions and 3 = 2 means decomposition). This may result in merging of
cluster trees to form a single, larger, tree (composition), or the splitting of one tree
into two (decomposition). An important observation is that mutation may also cause
the loss of ttest solutions. Because of such possibility, the mutation probability (')
must be very low.
Finally, before computing the next generation, our GA replaces the worst solution
obtained from the three aforementioned processes, with the elite solution from the
previous generation.
5.2.4.8 Genetic Algorithm Analysis
It is well known that the optimality of a solution obtained by GA is strongly
correlated to the size of the population under consideration, and the number of
generations. A large population prevents the GA from falling into a local minima
and a large number of generations allows the GA to generate near-optimal solutions.
As mentioned at the beginning of Section 5.2.3, the search space of our optimization
problem is extremely large, especially for very large networks (e.g., hundreds to
thousands of nodes). If optimality of the obtained solution is of primary concern,
the execution time of our GA could still be very large (e.g., a large population and
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a large number of generations are required).
Additionally, the GA does not control the distribution of leaders and their cor-
responding followers in the network. For example, the followers are not necessarily
located evenly around their leader. It is possible to have a follower node connected
to a more distant leader, then to one leader nearby. Also, the size of cluster trees is
not necessarily the same. It is possible to have cluster trees varying from very small,
to very large.
Motivated by the aforementioned observations, we propose a Hybrid Algorithm
(HA) which, primarily, trades o solution optimality for speed of obtaining a solution.
As a consequence, for very large networks, the HA algorithm might be able to obtain
a better solution than GA, in a limited, short, amount of time. The proposed HA
executes in two phases. In the rst phase the algorithm, building on state of art
solutions in leader selection [54,85], selects a set of leader nodes that exhibit higher
connectivity with follower nodes and higher residual battery charge. The selected
leaders must also abide by the connectivity constraint of our MOO (e.g., the leaders
and base station form a backbone communication, a connected graph). In the second
phase, the HA algorithm nds the optimal role assignment for the followers of each
leader, employing our proposed GA technique. We provide more details about HA
in the following section.
5.2.4.9 Two-phase Hybrid Algorithm for MOO
As already mentioned, our proposed HA consists of two major phases. In the
rst phase, called the r-hop leader selection, our HA selects a set of suitable nodes
as leaders (i.e., the leaders will form clusters in a cluster tree organization), while
the second phase assigns roles to each leader's r-hop neighbors. Algorithm 6 shows
the HA pseudocode.
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Algorithm 6 Hybrid Algorithm
1: nd Fi for 8i
2: L = fg
3: while O 6= ; do
4: Li = maxi2NnbfjFij  big
5: L = L [ fLig
6: O = O   FLi
7: update-followers()
8: end while
9: Modify-Clusters()
10: for i = 1 to jLj do
11: run GA on Li [ Fi
12: end for
Constraints 5.9 and 5.10 of our MOO problem require the set of leaders and base
station to form a connected graph, and the residual battery charge of leaders to
exceed a threshold. In addition, each leader will have followers in at most r-hops.
Since a larger r imposes a larger event reporting delay, our algorithm will select as
leaders, nodes with more r-hop neighbors and with sucient battery charge.
Initially, the algorithm computes Fi, the set of followers-to-be in at most r-hops,
for every node i in the network (Algorithm 6 Line 1). Next, the algorithm iteratively
selects leaders based on their residual battery charge and number of r-hop neighbors,
if and only if they meet the connectivity requirement for leaders (Algorithm 6 Line 4).
Upon selecting a node as leader, the node is added to the set of leaders L (Algorithm 6
Line 5) and all of its r-hop neighbors are removed from the set of Orphan nodes,
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i.e., O = N n fbg (Algorithm 6 Line 6). Since adding/removing nodes changes the
number of r-hop neighbors for the remaining nodes, the algorithms updates Fi for all
unselected nodes (Algorithm 6 Line 7). The algorithm repeats the leader selection
until no more orphan nodes exist.
At the end of the rst phase, a set of leaders and their corresponding sets of
followers are selected. We remark here that it is possible to have a few single-node
clusters (i.e., Orphan nodes) at the end of the rst phase, and that these orphan nodes
may have many neighbors (the leader election algorithm prevented these orphan
nodes/clusters from joining adjacent clusters because the xed r). To address this
issue, we add one step to the rst phase of the algorithm. In this step, a single-node
cluster is merged with the smallest cluster it is connected to (Algorithm 6 Line 9).
This step guarantees full coverage with clusters and aims to balance cluster size.
The clusters obtained as the results of executing the rst phase can now be
considered as individual networks of smaller size. The nodes in these clusters can
now be assigned roles for cooperative IDS. In the second phase, our proposed HA
(Algorithm 6 Lines 10-12) executes the proposed GA in each cluster.
5.2.5 Simulation Results
In this section we present the performance evaluation of our proposed GA and
HA. We also compare the time complexity of GA and HA and the optimality of their
solutions. Finally, we evaluate the intrusion detection delay against random attack
locations for both SOO and MOO (as solved using GA and HA).
5.2.5.1 Performance Evaluation of GA
We implemented the proposed GA in Matlab for SOO (for each objective) and
MOO. We investigate SOO for two reasons: to obtain the scaling factors CP and
CD of the penalized MOO, and to compare SOO solutions with those obtained from
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penalized MOO. For comparison we use GA convergence and the balance in cluster
formation. Before comparing SOO and MOO solutions, we are interested in the
eects various algorithm parameters (e.g., genetic operations, population size, num-
ber of generations, etc.) have on SOO/MOO solution optimality. To nd the best
combination of genetic operations for our problem, we investigate all combinations
of selection, crossover, and mutation operations. The probability of crossover and
mutation are set to 65% and 10%, respectively. Other GA parameters are listed
in Table 5.1. These values are chosen after several evaluations of GA convergence
history and nal tness values.
As mentioned in Section 5.2.4.8, the population size must be chosen based on
the network size, to ensure GA does not fall into a local minima in the search space.
The papulation size in our simulation is set to Maxf50; 2  kg. The number of
generations, i.e., 200 k, also varies with the network size and is set large enough so
that crossover and mutation operations get sucient chance to generate variety of
osprings. We perform simulations for dierent network deployments and network
sizes: uniform deployment in a grid topology of 9, 16, 25, 36, and 49 nodes; and
random deployment of 10, 20, 30, 40, and 49 nodes.
Eects of Genetic Operations on Performance: As presented in Section 5.2.4,
our GA employs dierent methods for selection, crossover and mutation. We solve
the penalized MOO problem starting from the same initial population and applying
all twelve combinations for genetic operations. We use a 3-digit number, called com-
bination ID, to indicate each combination where the rst digit species the selection
method and two next digits determine crossover and mutation methods, respectively
(i.e., Cmb. ID = 123). For example, combination ID 121 uses the \tourna-
ment" selection method, \segment exchange" crossover method, and \composition"
mutation method.
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Table 5.1: GA Parameters
Selection Meth.(1) Tournament, Roulette wheel
Crossover Meth.(2) Block, Segment, Multi Seg.
Mutation Meth.(3) Composition, Decomposition
Crossover Prob.(!) 65%
Mutation Prob.(') 10%
Population Size(S) Max f50, 2  Network Sizeg
# of Generations (g) 200  Network Size
Table 5.2 depicts the nal tness values of penalized function for both random
and grid networks. To nd the best genetic operations combination, we compare the
average objective value for each combination, over all network sizes. Since the objec-
tive value varies with the network size, the objective values for dierent networks are
normalized using the maximum value achieved for the corresponding network size.
The average normalized values are shown in the rightmost column of Table 5.2.
As shown, combination 211 has the highest average objective value among all of
the combinations. It is worth mentioning that the objective value for combinations
that use the decomposition method for mutation, is always less than the objective
value obtained by composition. One explanation for this is that the decomposition
method tends to split cluster trees into smaller ones, an undesired goal in maximiza-
tion problems in which larger cluster trees are desired.
Table 5.2 also depicts the standard deviation (STD) of the objective values. We
use this metric to show how much variation there is in the objective values, due
to dierent combinations. As we mentioned earlier, the values in columns are in
dierent ranges, because of dierent network sizes. It is interesting to observe that
the tness value for two equal size networks can also be in dierent ranges, due
to the deployment type (e.g., 49-node grid or random network). This is because for
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Table 5.2: Optimal objective value of penalized function achieved by dierent genetic
operations
Random Grid
Cmb. 10 20 30 40 49 9 16 25 36 49 Norm.
111 27.72 61.40 99.01 151.69 197.53 25.47 47.00 80.39 141.45 208.20 0.992
112 27.21 58.65 94.73 143.25 185.16 24.49 45.83 76.18 137.07 199.87 0.951
121 27.72 61.40 99.21 151.44 198.45 25.47 46.60 80.32 141.82 207.61 0.992
122 26.73 59.44 95.28 146.66 187.88 24.49 45.69 75.76 134.90 199.82 0.953
131 27.72 61.40 97.87 150.81 197.32 25.47 46.48 80.64 142.00 207.33 0.989
132 26.76 58.93 94.85 148.02 187.01 24.37 45.68 76.78 137.26 197.74 0.953
211 27.82 61.58 99.47 152.10 200.34 25.47 47.14 80.61 142.46 210.25 0.997
212 26.76 58.18 95.11 142.83 186.38 24.81 45.85 77.44 134.97 198.09 0.950
221 28.06 61.76 99.80 150.34 199.83 25.47 47.03 80.96 142.24 208.75 0.996
222 26.27 59.60 96.83 144.79 189.20 24.81 45.82 76.64 135.60 199.96 0.955
231 27.82 61.76 99.55 151.08 199.47 25.47 47.03 80.61 143.19 207.12 0.995
232 26.67 59.19 95.14 144.60 186.39 24.72 45.68 76.63 134.31 198.77 0.951
Avg. 27.27 60.27 97.24 148.13 192.91 25.04 46.32 78.58 138.94 203.63
STD 0.60 1.38 2.11 3.53 6.29 0.46 0.61 2.13 3.52 4.89
CV 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Information as objective, the value is a function of the distance between nodes, which
varies in a random deployment, and is constant in a grid network. Consequently,
to compare objective values, we use the coecient of variation (CV), dened as
the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean value. Small values of CV (i.e.,
CV << 1) indicate that all genetic operations perform well. We also note here that
larger networks have larger CV values, since the search space is considerably larger
(this imposes a higher variation in the nal tness value).
Figures 5.16(a) and 5.16(b) show the convergence history for the objective value
in 49-node random and grid networks, respectively, when only composition is con-
sidered. First, the methods that use \tournament" selection (i.e., 111, 121, and 131)
help GA remove solutions with very low objective value (i.e., bad solutions) from
the population, during early generations. Removing those solutions, however, pre-
vents the algorithm to create near-optimal solutions from bad solutions by genetic
operations (e.g., mutation). Thus, such approaches achieve high objective values in
the early generations, which do not improve in subsequent generations because the
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Figure 5.16: Convergence of penalized objective value using dierent combinations
of genetic operations for: (a) 49-node Random network; (b) 49-node Grid network.
algorithm falls in a local minimum. These approaches are useful when optimally
is not as important as algorithm execution time. For fast solutions, the number of
generations can be small, with GA obtaining a near-optimal solution. Second, the
\roulette wheel" selection, can usually pass a few undesired solutions to the next
generations where a mutation process may produce a desired solution. From here
on, all simulations use genetic combination 211, i.e., \roulette wheel" for selection,
\block exchange" for crossover, and \composition" for mutation.
Eects of Initial Population on Performance: Evolutionary algorithms start
with a random initial population as a set of sample solutions from the entire search
space. Hence, they may lack robustness in producing optimal solutions, owing to
their probabilistic nature (i.e., the genetic operations and the initial population).
To show the robustness of our algorithm, we run simulations on dierent network
sizes using the best combination (211) found in the previous experiment. This ex-
periment is repeated 10 times for each network size, starting with dierent initial
populations for each run. We reduce the number of generations to 6,000 generations
(i.e., minf6000; 200  kg) because the major improvements in tness value for the
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larger networks occurred before 6,000 iterations.
Table 5.3: Optimal objective value of penalized function when combination 211 is
applied on dierent initial populations
Random Grid
Run ID 10 20 30 40 49 9 16 25 36 49
1 27.58 61.80 99.09 151.91 199.25 25.47 47.16 80.49 143.65 203.00
2 27.78 61.32 98.24 150.97 198.24 25.47 47.53 81.10 142.37 209.79
3 27.58 61.75 98.41 151.96 194.41 25.47 47.77 80.81 142.94 209.35
4 27.72 61.76 99.50 151.81 193.76 25.47 47.03 80.55 143.13 207.39
5 27.58 61.76 99.38 150.38 196.57 25.47 47.77 81.01 141.71 208.63
6 27.58 61.58 99.39 152.97 198.93 25.47 47.53 81.11 142.08 209.61
7 27.58 61.80 99.45 152.93 196.28 25.47 47.15 81.30 143.00 204.69
8 27.58 61.58 99.01 150.84 195.75 25.47 47.53 80.62 142.37 207.12
9 27.58 61.75 99.55 151.56 197.27 25.47 47.16 81.52 143.48 209.81
10 27.58 61.75 99.02 151.46 199.89 25.47 47.15 81.06 142.14 208.58
Average 27.61 61.69 99.11 151.68 197.04 25.47 47.38 80.96 142.69 207.80
STD 0.07 0.15 0.45 0.83 2.06 0.00 0.27 0.33 0.64 2.31
CV 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.01 0 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.01
Table 5.3 shows the average tness values for the penalized function over all
experiments. As shown, the CV values are extremely small (i.e., CV << 0:1), thus
the dispersion in the nal values is negligible. Considering the smaller number of
generations in this experiment and comparing the CV values with Table 5.2, the
proposed algorithm is robust in achieving near-optimal solutions regardless of the
initial population.
Figures 5.17(a) and 5.17(b) depict convergence history for 49-node random and
grid networks, respectively. Although we show only seven instances in each gure,
due to space limit, the graphs contain the whole distribution of nal values. It is also
worth mentioning that the convergence is smoother, when compared with the results
presented in Figures 5.16(a) and 5.16(b), where dierent genetic combinations were
used.
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Figure 5.17: Convergence of penalized objective value using dierent initial popula-
tion and same genetic operations. (a) 49-node Random network. (b) 49-node Grid
network
Cluster Count RMSE: As mentioned, the larger the clusters are, the higher
their Information objective value is. Thus, it is obvious that the maximum Informa-
tion is achieved in a single large cluster. However, other objectives, namely Power
and Delay, are minimal when nodes are individual clusters without followers. The
Power and Delay minimization objectives prevent formations of large clusters, thus
trading o high Information for low Power/Delay.
Considering the importance of the Information objective in our cooperative IDS,
one may be tempted to consider only the SOO problem that maximizes Informa-
tion and Coverage, and to disregard minimizing the Power and Delay. This SOO
formulation will seek as solution a single large cluster tree. This solution presents a
single point of failure and will incur high energy consumption near the leader. Addi-
tionally, the delay in intrusion detection and power consumption will likely be very
high. Instead, we prefer that GA produces a set of clusters, as indicated by con-
straint 5.10 in our problem formulation. By tuning the parameter jT jth, we tradeo
fault-tolerance (i.e., number of cluster trees) with compromised node-tolerance (i.e.,
maximum number of nodes that must be compromised before a system fails).
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Table 5.4: RMSE value for number of cluster trees
Random Grid
10 20 30 40 49 9 16 25 36 49
RMSE - SOO 0 0 0.04 0.07 0.02 0 0 0 0.01 0.02
RMSE - MOO 0.25 0.44 0.57 1.2 0.72 0 0.11 0.1 0.17 0.32
In this section, we investigate how the parameter jT jth aects the number of
cluster trees. We chose dierent values, depending on the network size: 5 for 10-
node network and 7 for 20-node network. By changing jT jth we expect that solutions
to the SOO and MOO problems will have dierent numbers of cluster trees. We
use the root mean square error (RMSE) in the cluster count, to show the bias and
variance of number of cluster trees obtained by the GA. We normalize the expected
number of cluster trees, for dierent network sizes to 1 and then calculate RMSE for
each network size. Tables 5.4 depicts the RMSE of our estimator's expected value
(number of clusters) for both SOO and MOO approaches in dierent deployments
(i.e., random and uniform) and network sizes.
As shown, the cluster count RMSE for the SOO formulation, is very close to zero
and it is smaller than that for the MOO formulation. The explanation for this is
that SOO, in which Information is the objective function, tends to create as large
clusters as possible. Consequently, the number of clusters we expect (as specied by
jT jth) is achieved. MOO formulation, however, avoids solutions with large clusters
because of high Power and Delay costs. The cluster count RMSE for both SOO
and MOO approaches increases with the network size. The increasing RMSE can be
explained by the fact that for larger size networks the search space is much larger,
thus preventing the GA from reaching the optimal value in a limited amount of time.
Finally, very small RMSE (i.e., close to zero) throughout this experiment, indicates
that solutions produced by our GA, in terms of number of cluster trees, approach an
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intuitively optimal value.
SOO Solutions vs. MOO Solutions: In this section, we compare the conver-
gence and cluster tree formation for SOO and MOO, given a xed amount of time
and a set of random initial populations. We investigate the convergence to the best
tness values, of the GA for both random and grid networks to compare their speed
and monotony. We also show how considering more objectives in the optimization
problem aects clustering, preventing GA from producing long linear cluster trees.
Figures 5.18(a) and 5.18(b) show the convergence of the objective value for 49-
node random and grid networks, respectively. The gures show that the objective
value for SOO converges faster than for MOO, which uctuates. The explanation for
this is as follows. Starting with an initial population, SOO selects better solutions
in terms of Information objective value. These solutions are passed to the next
generation without restrictions (e.g., high Power value), causing the GA to converge
very fast. A good solution for MOO, however, is a solution that meets all objectives.
Thus, it is possible to have a solution with a lower value of Information, passed to the
next generation, instead of a solution with higher Information value, simply because
the penalized value of the former is better. This happens because maximization and
minimization objectives are not independent.
Figures 5.19(a) and 5.19(c) depict cluster tree solutions obtained by the GA, when
the objective to maximize is Information, without considering Power or Delay. The
obtained topologies are largely linear and, while producing solutions that maximize
Information, incur high Power and Delay costs. To assess the eect of the penalized
tness function on these solutions, we ran our GA on the same networks, using
Power and Delay as penalties to the tness function. Figures 5.19(b) and 5.19(d)
show that smaller cluster trees, which achieve a balance between all objectives, are
obtained. It is also shown how SOO achieves less number of cluster trees of larger
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Figure 5.18: Convergence of SOO and MOO objective values in 49-node networks:
(a) Random; (b) Grid.
sizes while MOO benets from more cluster trees of smaller sizes, a tradeo among
all objectives.
Pareto Curve: A Pareto curve shows the non-dominated solution space of one
objective, i.e., Power, Information or Delay, in terms of two other objectives. It
presents the optimal front and the diversity across objectives along this front. We
performed simulations using a penalized MOO on a 49-node random network. The
Pareto curve of the Penalized Function is shown in Figure 5.20. As shown, the
Pareto curve contains solutions with dierent objective values for Information, but
the average penalized value of them is denitely the maximum possible values that
GA could achieve during generations. The Pareto curve also shows that Power,
Information and Delay are highly correlated, giving one other explanation for the
observed uctuations in the convergence graph of the multi-objective tness value.
It is worth mentioning that in all other experiments, we chose a solution with a max-
imum penalized value. This allows us to compare nal objective values of multiple
approaches (i.e., combination of dierent GA operations, initial solution set, etc.)
for convergence and cluster formation results.
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Figure 5.19: Eects of constraints on the output of the optimization problem: (a)
SOO of Information in 49-node Random. (b) Penalized MOO of Information in 49-
node Random. (c) SOO of Information in 49-node Grid. (d) Penalized MOO of
Information in 49-node Grid.
Given the Pareto curve, we can identify the maximum possible value for In-
formation in a given network, while the other objectives are constrained. For ex-
ample, maximization of Information may be used as the objective function while
Power, Delay and Coverage objectives are constrained to threshold values P th, Dth,
jN n fbgj = k, asPqi=1PjTijj=1 pij  P th,Pqi=1PjTijj=1 dij  Dth andPqi=1PjTijj=1 cij = k.
This set of solutions can help a network administrator choose the optimal one at
any time, based on the importance of objectives. For example, in a newly deployed
network, which benets from fully charged nodes, an optimal solution can be chosen
from those with higher Information, even if more power is consumed. The same
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Figure 5.20: A Pareto diagram emphasizes the relationship among objective func-
tions. The high degree of correlation is evidenced by the narrow surface displayed.
reasoning can be applied to scenarios where the network might be under attack and
intrusion detection delay is important.
5.2.5.2 Performance Evaluation of HA
In this section we compare GA and HA. We implemented HA in Matlab for both
SOO and MOO. Considering our analysis in Section 5.2.4.8 we are interested in the
execution time and solution optimality. We show how HA provides solutions consist-
ing of well-formed cluster trees considerably faster than GA, while the optimality of
the SOO solution is still close to that of GA (for small networks). We will remark
that HA may provide more optimal solutions than GA, especially for larger networks.
We will also investigate HA solutions for our MOO problem.
First, we investigate how HA forms clusters for both SOO and MOO. The clus-
ter trees for grid and random topologies shown in Figure 5.19 are depicted in Fig-
ure 5.21. As shown in Figures 5.21(a) and 5.21(c), the cluster trees produced for
SOO formulation (i.e., Information) have similar characteristics: long linear topolo-
gies with many aggregator nodes. The HA solution does not contain single-node or
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Figure 5.21: Cluster trees obtained by HA from the same networks as Figure 5.19:
(a) SOO of Information in a 49-node Random. (b) Penalized MOO of Information
in a 49-node Random. (c) SOO of Information in 49-node Grid. (d) Penalized MOO
of Information in 49-node Grid.
2-node cluster trees (e.g., Figure 5.19(a) vs. Figure 5.21(a)). Moreover, as depicted
in Figures 5.21(b) and 5.21(d), the produced cluster trees for MOO problem for-
mulation are completely separated from each other (i.e., there is no overlap and no
link crossing between clusters). As presented before, the number of cluster trees is a
metric indicating the robustness of our algorithm. It is worth mentioning that HA
has stronger control over this metric, as we can see in the results depicted in Fig-
ure 5.21(b) where we obtain 5 clusters (as expected in a 50-node network). We will
show, however, that this balanced clustering incurs higher Power and Delay costs in
the MOO formulation, where HA has less control over the minimization objectives.
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Next, we investigate execution time and SOO solution optimality. As we men-
tioned in Section 5.2.4.8, the execution time of GA and optimality of solutions are
highly correlated with the network size, number of initial solutions and number of
generations. From extensive simulations we observed that for larger networks, we
need more initial solutions and generations for reaching the optimal solution. Hence,
to have a fair comparison for execution time and optimality of GA and HA, we ex-
perimentally dene a relation between network size and number of initial solutions
and generations: the number of initial solutions is twice the network size, and the
number of generations is minf6000; 2  kg. Figures 5.22(a) and 5.22(c) depict the
execution times of GA and HA for solving SOO, i.e., Information objective, for dif-
ferent network sizes and deployments. As shown, GA obtains a solution for 49-node
random network in more than 400 minutes (using the values we specied for number
of solutions and generations). HA splits the network into ve smaller clusters, and
runs GA on each cluster. The execution time for HA is the summation of execution
time of GA on smaller clusters, 35 minutes in total.
We note here that the execution times for both GA and HA are obtained from
running the simulation on Dell PC with 3 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo CPU and 4 GB RAM.
The proposed algorithms (GA and HA) are not parallelized and are run only on one
core. However, considering the currently powerful PCs (using 8-core CPU) that can
be used as the base station in our system model, and the possibility of parallelized
implementation of GA and HA, the execution time would be much smaller.
Finally, we compare solutions optimality for GA and HA when Information is
considered as the only maximization objective. Considering the Information model
discussed in Section 5.2.2.2, HG = 
q
i=1
jTij
j=1hij is a function of the distance between
communicating pair of tasked nodes. The maximum possible Information in a highly
dense network (given a number of nodes) is much smaller when compared with a low
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Figure 5.22: Comparison between the execution time and optimality of the solutions
both GA and Hybrid solutions for dierent network sizes. (a)(b) Random Network.
(c)(d) Grid Network.
density deployment of the same number of nodes. Hence, the nal value for SOO
can only be compared when the same deployment topology is used. As a result,
the optimal objective values for the 49-node random deployment can not be directly
compared with the 49-node grid deployment.
Figures 5.22(b) and 5.22(d) depict the objective value of Information model for
dierent networks sizes. For a given network, we performed simulations for both GA
and HA with dierent random seeds. We assigned random residual battery levels to
nodes and started simulations with dierent initial solutions. We then compared the
solutions' optimality. As we can observe from results, for a given population size and
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number of generations, there is not much dierence between the optimality of the
solutions produced by GA and HA for small network sizes. However, HA produces
better solutions for larger networks. We remark here again that the scale for the
objective value is not relevant since network sizes and deployments are dierent.
Considering the rst phase of HA, i.e., a heuristic approach, a solution produced
by HA is expected to have large cluster trees of equal size and, possibly a few smaller
ones, depending on r and node density. This means the HA solutions potentially have
larger Information objective values, because of the large clusters. GA, on the other
hand, may not reach near-optimal objective values in the specied number of gen-
erations. Thus, HA has better performance than GA, when maximum Information
is needed. Considering the high correlation between Information, Delay, and Power,
however, HA cannot produce optimal solutions for MOO. Since the potential clusters
are formed in the rst phase of HA, there will be a relatively high lower bound for
Power and Delay, which HA can not lower signicantly.
5.2.5.3 Intrusion Detection Delay
In this section, we investigate the intrusion detection delay for insider and outsider
(randomly distributed in the network) attackers. The cooperative IDS solutions we
focus on are those obtained in Section 5.1.5 where the proposed GA and HA were
used for solving SOO and MOO problems. The results are depicted in Figure 5.19(a)
and Figure 5.19(b) for GA and Figure 5.21(a) and Figure 5.21(b) for HA, respectively.
For this investigation, we considered the most sophisticated attack reported in this
research, namely Web exploits. In our scenario, a leader node within the radio range
of an outsider attacker, can detect the attack with a delay of 0 time units (i.e.,
timeslots employed by our TDMA protocol), since a HW-DS intrusion detection
engine is employed by a leader.
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In our simulations, we considered 105 random locations for the outsider attacker.
For the insider attacker case, we randomly chose non-leader nodes as attackers. We
estimated the detection delay as the shortest hop count between a node within
attacker's radio range, and node's leader. Our simulation results for an outsider
attacker scenario against GA solution are presented in Figure 5.23(a), where two
topologies are analyzed (i.e., Figures 5.19(a) and 5.19(b)). Our results indicate that
most attacks will be detected in 0 or 1 hops, if the solution is obtained by solving
the MOO (Figure 5.19(b)). If the solution used is the one obtained from solving the
SOO (Figure 5.19(a)), then the detection delay is much larger. More precisely, the
mean detection delay for the SOO solution is 2.28, and for the MOO solution it is
0.58.
The results for the same attack scenarios against HA solutions (i.e., Figures 5.21(a)
and 5.21(b)) are shown in Figure 5.23(b). The mean detection delay for the SOO
solution is 2.37, and for the MOO solution it is 0.87, slightly larger than the GA so-
lutions. Simulation results for the insider attacker scenario, for GA and HA solutions
are presented in Figures 5.23(c) and 5.23(d), respectively. Similar with the outsider
attacker scenario, a GA solution for the MOO problem is able to detect an insider
attacker much quicker than the case when the solution is only for the SOO problem
formulation. For the insider attacker scenario against GA solutions, the mean detec-
tion delay for the SOO solution is 2.3, and for the MOO solution it is 0.25. However,
these values are respectively 2.12 and 0.58 in SOO and MOO solutions produced by
HA, which means the SOO solution of HA is better than GA, but its MOO still has
larger delay compared with GA solution.
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Figure 5.23: Probability mass function for delay in reporting attacks to the nearest
leader for dierent cluster trees of a 50-node network produced by GA and HA.
5.2.6 System Evaluation
As a proof of concept of our proposed architecture for cooperative IDS, we de-
veloped an adhoc network, consisting of six laptops, and deployed it in an indoor
area. The two laptop congurations were: 1.8 GHz Intel processor with 2 MB cache
and 1 GB RAM running Linux (Ubuntu 6.10); and Intel Core 2 Duo 2 GHz, 2 MB
cache, 4 GB RAM running Windows 7. These hardware congurations were used by
both attacker and target nodes, to mainly show that our proposed solution is not OS
dependent and that any detection engine and operating system could be used. For
the intrusion detection engine we used Snort [78] in NIDS mode, the most complex
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Figure 5.24: (a) Connectivity graph of adhoc network and random attacker locations.
(b) Random solution. (c) SOO solution. (d) MOO solution.
and congurable mode, that analyzes captured network trac to nd any matches
between them and activated rule sets [78].
To have dierent congurations of Snort with diverse power, memory and CPU
consumption and detection power (i.e., LW-DS, RE-DS,and HW-DS), we disabled
portions of rulesets. We disabled 2/3 of detection rules (excluding bad-trac and
icmp) in the LW-DS conguration (run by either orphan or joined nodes). Thus,
nodes that had LW-DS version only detected ooding attacks. For aggregator nodes
that used the RE-DS conguration, only 1/3 of rules (excluding bad-trac icmp and
scan), were disabled, so that ooding and port scanning attacks could be detected.
Leader nodes ran the HW-DS version of Snort which used all rulesets for detecting
any possible attack, among the three we consider in this research. Although we did
not consider event reporting among nodes, the dierent types of detection engines
we used (i.e, LW-DS, RE-DS and HW-DS) emulated such costs, if we had reporting
capabilities available. The locations of the 6 adhoc nodes were randomly chosen,
and are shown in Figure 5.24(a). We selected 5 random positions for the outsider
attacker. Attackers were enabled to run the 3 types of attacks considered in this
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research. Adhoc nodes had dierent congurations of Snort depending on their
assigned role by our proposed cooperative IDS architecture.
To evaluate the eectiveness of our collaborative IDS, we evaluated 5 dierent
cluster tree topologies. Two were obtained from the proposed GA for SOO and
MOO problems. These solutions are depicted in Figure 5.24(c) and (d), respectively.
A third solution we considered was a \Random" solution, shown in Figure 5.24(b),
which assigns detection responsibilities in a random manner. The nal two solutions
we considered (not presented in a gure) were: \All LW", in which all 5 nodes execute
the LW-DS; and \All HW", in which all 5 nodes execute the HW-DS detection engine.
The results show that the \All HW" scenario achieves a detection rate (DR) of
100%. In this solution, however, all nodes execute the most sophisticated IDS, and
thus exhaust resources the fastest. At the other extreme, when all nodes execute
the lightest IDS, the detection rate suers - it was only 33%. The solution obtained
by the proposed GA that solves both SOO and MOO achieve high detection rates
of 73% and 93%, respectively, superior to a random assignment of roles to nodes,
which achieves only a 60% detection rate. Consequently, the MOO solution achieves
a higher intrusion detection rate, when compared with a random role assignment [41]
and with the SOO solution (i.e., an indicator of state of art solutions [46, 47] that
consider only one objective), while ensuring maximum Information. Both MOO and
SOO solutions would achieve 100% detection rate if an event reporting/correlation
mechanism is used. MOO, however, would still provide lower detection delay and
lower power consumption.
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5.2.7 Discussion
5.2.7.1 Cluster Reformation: Conditions and Solutions
In this research we consider static resource constrained wireless networks, e.g.,
static mesh or sensor networks or a combination of them. We assume that some
nodes might be relocated for administrative reasons, that nodes may run out of
power, become faulty or become compromised by attackers. Also, leader's residual
energy might fall below a threshold. Despite all these network condition changes, the
network topology does not change often (or not as often as in mobile adhoc networks).
We remark that it is still necessary for the base station to periodically collect the
network information in order to decide whether cluster reformation is required or not.
Considering the expected infrequent nature of network topology (i.e., the information
collected by base station most likely reects the most recent network situation), the
cluster reformation interval will be much longer than for mobile adhoc networks.
We learned from our performance evaluation results that the execution time of
GA for large networks is very high, i.e., the algorithm execution time increases expo-
nentially with the network size. Dividing a large network into smaller subnetworks,
as HA does, helps the algorithm execute faster. Once a change in the network trig-
gers cluster-reformation, it is desired to re-execute the GA or HA algorithms only in
the subnetwork in which the change has occurred, instead of the whole network. For
example, once a leader can no longer hold the leadership role, an ecient solution is
to upgrade one of its children to leader role, if feasible (e.g., upgrading a child node
to a leader role might be forbidden by a constraint in our problem formulation). We
also note that some network changes may cause a cluster to be disconnected from
neighboring clusters, which will require a rearrangement in clusters. In this case, for
sake of eciency, we can re-run the algorithm for a subset of neighboring clusters,
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instead of the entire network.
5.2.7.2 Intrusion Detection Engine
From intrusion detection engine perspective, systems can be categorized in three
classes; a) anomaly-based intrusion detection, b) misuse-based intrusion detection,
and c) hybrid intrusion detection, which is a combination of the former two. One
may argue that our proposed system can only detect known attacks since Snort is a
signature-based detection engine. However, unknown attacks would also be detected
if the intrusion detection engine would employ anomaly-based inspection (as claimed
in Snort Website ). An another example of an anomaly-based engine employed
by an o-the-shelf IDS, is Bro [65], which is able to discern trac anomalies and
to detect unknown attacks. Thus, our proposed cooperative IDS is not limited to
detecting only known attacks, but also stealth attack with appropriate Local IDS and
Cooperation modules substitutions. The problem of dealing with unknown attacks
through anomaly-based intrusion detection has received some attention from research
community [12,32,51,91].
5.2.7.3 Scalability of HA
The idea behind a hybrid algorithm (HA) is to divide the optimization problem
such that the algorithm execution time for larger networks is reduced considerably.
When partitioning a large network into smaller subnetworks, the size of each sub-
network is an important parameter to be considered. On one hand, the size of a
subnetwork/cluster is limited by a predened threshold, as constraint jTij  jT jth
shows. The reasons for considering an upper bound for cluster size are: 1) to avoid
a single point of failure in large clusters; 2) to limit the maximum Delay and Power;
2) to avoid scenarios where HA needs to handle large subnetworks, because of, po-
tentially, high execution time. On the other hand, dividing the network into many
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smaller subnetworks is not desired since a higher objective value for Information (i.e.,
primary objective in cooperative IDS - as we discussed in Section 5.2.4) is obtained
from larger clusters. Consequently, the parameter r in HA has to be carefully cho-
sen, so that a high objective value for Information can still be obtained, while cluster
sizes are smaller than jT jth. Considering the network sizes we used for performance
evaluation in this research, r = 2 is the best choice for HA; as r = 1 produces less
optimal solutions and r  3 leads to infeasible solutions (because of large subnet-
works/clusters). For larger networks, which we have not considered in this research
(e.g., 100 nodes or larger), jT jth and consequently r might need to be set to larger
values.
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6. RESOURCEFUL AND TRAFFIC-AGNOSTIC IDS
This section focuses on battery-powered WMN consisting of resourceful nodes
that are able to run full IDS. We assume that the complexity of network topology
and user trac does not allow the security administrator to have up-to-date and ac-
curate information about trac paths and he/she has to monitor the entire network
trac on all communication links. Our motivating application is DistressNet [18,28],
a system, developed for situation management in disaster response. In DistressNet,
WMN are used for providing an infrastructure in triage areas for collecting physiolog-
ical data from victims and in the disaster area for communication among emergency
responders. Since in disaster areas electric power is almost always unavailable (see
earthquake and tsunami disaster in Japan 2011, with energy blackouts going as far
as 200+ miles away from the aected area), DistressNet needs to operate predomi-
nantly on batteries. Battery powered WMN pose major challenges given the typical
high power consumption of mesh nodes. Despite the attention energy ecient oper-
ation in WMN has received [7, 24, 57], there is no provision in the 802.11s standard
for power saving mode operation. This led to the absence of mesh node hardware
that operates in a power saving mode. Given the urgent need for deploying Distress-
Net, we are proposing, as a rst step for energy ecient operation, to allow mesh
nodes, when feasible, to duty-cycle by turning on-o their wireless interfaces. As we
uncover experimentally, the duty-cycling has an interesting eect, in that it allows
the battery to recover some of its capacity, thus allowing for a longer total operation
time.
Parts of this section are reprinted with permission from \Energy ecient monitoring for intru-
sion detection in battery-powered wireless mesh networks" by Amin Hassanzadeh, Radu Stoleru,
and Basem Shihada, In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Ad Hoc Networks and
Wireless (ADHOC-NOW), pages 44-57, Paderborn, Germany, 2011., Copyright 2011 by Springer.
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Duty-cycling, however, has adverse eects on the operation of intrusion detection
systems, which are required to be on/awake at all times, to monitor network trac.
As proposed in the literature, in wireless networks, some nodes can be selected as
\monitoring" nodes. It is obvious that duty-cycling mesh nodes are not suitable
to be monitoring nodes, since they are not awake all the time. Consequently, the
research challenge/problem we address in this section is how to reconcile energy
ecient operation, which requires nodes to be asleep as much as possible, with an
eective intrusion detection, which requires nodes to be awake, to monitor trac.
We dene this problem as an optimization problem and propose centralized and
distributed algorithms for solving it, algorithms that trade o communication and
computation overhead for optimality of the solution.
6.1 Validation of Duty-Cycled Operation in WMN
DistressNet, being deployed in an environment where electric power is very limited
(if at all available), needs to aggressively pursue energy ecient operation, including
in the WMN. Unfortunately, no native procedure is included in IEEE 802.11s to
allow mesh routers to work in power saving mode. Moreover, a power saving mode
is not supported by current wireless routers available on the market. Consequently,
we propose to use an application-layer controlled duty-cycling, as a means for saving
energy on mesh routers.
We ran experiments involving Linksys WRT54GL wireless routers (we tested
dierent OpenWrt rmware versions as well) powered by 12V-7Ah Power Sonic
rechargeable lead acid batteries (as illustrated in Figure 6.1(a)) to investigate if
duty-cycling aects connectivity between mesh routers and their clients and esti-
mate an expected increase in the mesh router lifetime. A wireless client establishes
an ssh session when the mesh router is initially turned on and starts a terminal appli-
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cation. Then, the duty-cycling operation is initiated by turning the wireless interface
of a mesh router on and o using \iwcong eth1 txpower on/o ", at dierent time
intervals. When using duty-cycling the power consumption of a mesh router was re-
duced by 840mW (the current consumption drops from 250mA, to 180mA when the
wireless interface is turned o). We have validated experimentally that the proposed
duty-cycling does not close the ssh session - our terminal application continues to
work despite the duty-cycled operation of the router.
 
(a)
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30
V o
l t a
g e
 ( V
)
Time (hours)
Always On
30S On/Off
60S On/Off
(b)
Figure 6.1: (a) Experimental setup. (b) Battery consumption for dierent on/o
intervals.
Figure 6.1(b) depicts the battery lifetime when the mesh router has the wireless
interface constantly on, and when it operates at a 50% duty-cycle, with dierent
on/o periods (e.g., 30s on/o and 60s on/o). As expected, we observe that when
the router operates in duty-cycle mode, its lifetime is extended. Surprisingly, dier-
ent on/o periods (30s vs 60s) extend the lifetime of the router dierently, despite
operating at the same 50% duty-cycle. As shown in Figure 6.1(b) the router lifetime
is prolonged by 5h when using the 60s on/o duty-cycling, and by 3h when using
the 30s on/o interval. This experiment validated battery recovery eects [66], that
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have been mentioned briey in the context of WMN [57]. We used the data col-
lected during these experiments to enhance a simulator we have developed so that it
accounts for the new source of energy eciency, namely battery recovery.
The proposed energy ecient operation based on duty-cycling, however, has ad-
verse eects on solutions for monitoring network security in wireless networks. If
a mesh router is assigned an intrusion detection/monitoring task or if it helps in
relaying high network trac, then the router has to be awake all the time. This im-
plies that routers with higher available energy and with higher network trac load
should be better suited candidates for becoming monitoring nodes. Deciding which
routers should be selected as monitoring nodes, for reducing total energy consump-
tion, while not aecting intrusion detection functions is a challenging problem. In
the sections that follow, we introduce our systems and security models and formulate
mathematically our problem.
6.2 Problem Formulation and its NP-Hardness
We model a WMN as a graph G = (V;E), in which V is the set of mesh nodes
fv1; v2;    ; vng, and E = fe1; e2;    ; emg, is the set of links between them. We
denote the residual energy and the network load of a mesh node vi by bi and li,
respectively. Let w : V  ! [0; 1] be a cost function that assigns a weight wi to a
node vi based on li and bi (wi = w(li; bi)), such that higher normalized li and bi
values result in lower weight being assigned to vi.
Denition 8 The Covering Set Ci = feij : j = 1::cg, Ci  E, for a monitoring
node vi, contains any edge eij where either eij is incident to vi or vi is connected to
the two end points of eij. (Figure 6.2).
Considering our link coverage (as opposed to node coverage) and the desired
eect of selecting mesh routers with higher residual energy and higher network load
142
21
e1
2
1
e1
3
e2
e3
2
1
e1
3
C1 = C2 = {e1, e2, e3}
C3 = {e1, e2, e3, e4} , C4 = {e1} 
--------------------------------------
       M = {m3} as C3 = E
e2
e3
4
e4
C1 = C2 = C3 = {e1, e2, e3}
---------------------------------
     M = {m2} as C2 = E
C1 = C2  = {e1}
-------------------------
M = {m2} as C2 = E
Figure 6.2: Examples of monitor nodes M and corresponding covering sets C.
as monitoring nodes, we dene the Weighted Monitor Coverage (WMC) Problem as
follows:
Denition 9 Weighted Monitor Coverage (WMC) Problem
Given G = (V;E) with a set of vertices in V and a set of edges in E, let wi be
the weight of vi, nd the set of monitors M = fm1;m2;    ;mkg with the minimum
cost i2Mwi, such that
S
i2M Ci = E, i.e., the monitors cover all edges in G and
bi  bth;8i 2 M , i.e., the residual energy of each monitor node exceeds a threshold
bth.
We set bth based on real battery prole; however, if it is not possible to cover all the
links by monitor nodes with residual energy higher than the threshold, the threshold
value is reduced by b until there exists a feasible solution. It is important to observe
that our problem is dierent than the Maximum Coverage and 1-hop Dominating Set
problems as proposed in earlier research. Similarly, it may seem that our problem is
the same as the Weighted Vertex Cover problem, since both problems aim to cover
all the network links, while minimizing the total weight assigned to the selected mesh
nodes. It is key to observe that in the Vertex Cover problem when we pick a vertex,
incident edges to the vertex are considered covered. In our problem, however, all
edges in the communication range of the node are considered to be covered. As an
143
illustration of these key observations, consider Figure 6.2, which depicts the covering
sets and monitoring set of dierent networks. As shown, only one node is enough to
monitor all the edges of a 3-node network.
Theorem 1 WMC is NP-hard even for wi = 1.
Proof 1 First we assume that each node has a unit weight, so that the problem is to
nd minimum number of nodes to cover all the edges, i.e., Monitor Coverage (MC)
problem. We show that even with this assumption MC is NP-hard, thus same proof
is valid for WMC. To prove this, we reduce the Set-Cover to MC in polynomial time.
Given a universe U = fx1; x2;    ; xng, subsets Si  U , and a positive integer k,
the Set-Cover is to determine if 9 a collection C of at most k such subsets such
that union of the k subsets cover all of U , i.e., 9C  f1; 2;    ;mg s.t. jCj  k
and
S
i2C Si = U . Given the instance of the Set-Cover, we attempt to construct the
instance of MC. We let E = U , and for each vi 2 V , dene the subset Ci  E such
that Ci = feje is within communication range of vi; e 2 Eg.
Next we show that our construction is correct, i.e., we prove the claim, \Set-Cover
has a valid instance if and only if MC has a valid instance." Suppose Set-Cover has
a valid instance. By our construction, each Si corresponds to Ci. Since jSij = k,
we have at most k monitors. Furthermore, since
S
i=1; ;k Si = U , and we dened
E = U , the k monitors cover all the edges in G. Therefore, MC has a valid instance.
Next suppose that MC has a valid instance. This implies that there exists at most k
monitors in G. By our construction, each subset Ci of covered links by monitor mi
corresponds to the subset Si, so jSij is k. And since the monitors cover all edges in
G, and E = U , it is trivial to see that
S
i=1; ;k Si = U , thus proving the claim. This
proof is also valid for the case that weights are more than one unit. 
144
One other problem to consider is how to optimally choose duty-cycle values for
non-monitoring nodes, to extend WMN lifetime, but to also ensure WMN availability
to clients. Obviously, the longer a mesh router sleeps, higher the lifetime extension
will be. WMN availability, however, limits the maximum time interval a mesh router
can sleep. Therefore, the actual duty-cycle a non-monitoring mesh router will use
trades o network availability for WMN lifetime. In this research, we assign the
duty-cycle value for a non-monitoring nodes inversely proportional its network load.
We leave the computation of an optimal duty-cycle value for a mesh router, for future
work.
6.3 Proposed Solutions
In this section, we present centralized and distributed solutions for our WMC
problem. As centralized solutions, we propose a greedy algorithm and an integer
linear programming (ILP) algorithm. These algorithms are executed on the WMN
gateway (i.e., base station). The base station collects information from WMN nodes
(i.e., connectivity, communicating load, and residual energy), executes the moni-
toring node selection algorithm (either greedy or ILP) and distributes back in the
network the decisions. The distributed algorithm, however, is executed by individ-
ual nodes using 1-hop neighbor information. It is notable that these algorithms have
dierent time complexity, message complexity, and approximation ratios.
6.3.1 Greedy Algorithm
We propose a greedy algorithm, shown in Algorithm 7. The algorithm selects
monitor nodes based on the number of links per unit weight a node covers and based
on the remaining energy level bi which needs to be above a threshold bth. When a
node vi is selected, all the links in Ci are covered. Hence, they are removed from the
uncovered set E 0. This selection is repeated until all the links become covered. The
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Algorithm 7 Greedy Monitor Coverage
1: M = fg
2: E0 = E , V 0 = V
3: while E0 6= ; do
4: if (fmg = maxi2V 0fjCi \ E0j=wig) 6= ; then
5: M =M [m
6: V 0 = V 0  m
7: E0 = E0   Ci
8: else
9: bth = bth  b
10: end if
11: end while
proposed algorithm runs in time polynomial of jEj and jV j. Similar to the Set Cover
problem, the approximation ratio of our greedy algorithm is H(maxi2V jCij), where
H(n) = nj=1(
1
j
)  lnn+ 1.
6.3.2 Integer Linear Programming
The second solution we propose is based on Integer Linear Programming (ILP).
Let Sj be a set of selected monitor nodes out of all possible nodes that can monitor
link j. The proposed WMC can be formulated as follows:
minimize
X
i2V
wimi (6.1)
subject to: jSjj  1; 8j 2 E (6.2)
bi  bth; 8mi 2M (6.3)
mi 2 f0; 1g (6.4)
where constraint (6.2) indicates that every link has to be covered, constraint (6.3)
enforces the algorithm to select the nodes with residual energy greater than a thresh-
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old. We reduce bth by b and run the ILP again if there is no feasible solution for
the given bth.
6.3.3 Distributed Algorithm
We propose a distributed algorithm, shown in Algorithm 8. In our protocol
each node periodically broadcasts a HELLO message containing its residual energy,
network trac it handles and the number of links it covers, and sets a local timer TBC .
When TBC res, every node builds an adjacency table AdjTbl using the collected
HELLO packets. Then each nodes computes the weight per link for each neighbor and
for itself. Based on this computed value, a node vi will broadcast an IS-MONITOR
message to announce itself as monitor or it will set another timer TMon, waiting
to receive an IS-MONITOR message from a neighbor. If node vi receives an IS-
MONITOR message before TMon expires, it checks all its links to see whether the
elected monitor(s) can monitor all of them. If there are still uncovered links, then vi
will also broadcast IS-MONITOR to its neighbors, indicating it will be a monitor.
To avoid redundancy, the higher the weight (wi) of a node, the longer timer TMon
will be.
6.3.4 Solution Analysis
The proposed algorithms have dierent time complexities, message complexities,
and approximation ratios. The Set Cover problem has a relatively high approxi-
mation ratio (i.e., O(ln jCijmax)). Improving this ratio has not been addressed by
research. Our greedy algorithm has the same approximation ratio as Set Cover,
while the ILP solution is considered near optimal. The distributed algorithm, how-
ever, has worse approximation ratio because the solution is locally optimal. On
the other hand, the time complexity of the distributed algorithm is O(jV j), which is
smaller than that of the centralized algorithms; greedy algorithm has time complexity
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Algorithm 8 Distributed Monitor Coverage
1: Broadcast (HELLO)
2: delay (TBC)
3: create (AdjTbli)
4: if bi  bth and wijCij >
wj
jCj j for all j 6= i then
5: mi = 1
6: Broadcast (IS-MONITOR)
7: else
8: delay (TMon) //should receive IS-MONITOR
9: if (felg = uncover-link(i)) 6= ; and bi  bj ; 8vj that can cover el then
10: Broadcast (IS-MONITOR)
11: else
12: duty-cycle(li)
13: end if
14: end if
of order O(jV jjEjmin(jV j; jEj)) and the time complexity of ILP algorithm depends
on the solver. The message complexity of the distributed algorithm is less than
that of the centralized algorithms, since the distributed algorithm requires jV j+ jM j
network-wide packet exchanges. The message complexity of centralized algorithms
is O(jV jlogjV j).
Considering the above analysis, we expect that centralized algorithms produce
a smaller set of monitors than the distributed algorithm. On the other hand, the
distributed algorithm, with lower time and message complexities, produces larger
set of monitors with higher average weight. Therefore, we expect that centralized
algorithms will save more energy than the distributed one. The distributed algorithm,
however, will select more monitoring nodes, improving the intrusion detection rate.
6.4 Performance Evaluation
All algorithms presented in this section are implemented in MATLAB except
for ILP solver which is already implemented in bintprog function of MATLAB. We
consider networks ranging in size from 10 to 90 nodes for all of our simulations while
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maintaining the network density constant at 3 neighbors per radio range. The radio
range is xed at 50m.
6.4.1 Link Coverage vs. Node Coverage
We rst evaluate the network coverage and resource consumption of link coverage
and node coverage approaches. We show that a solution for node coverage problem
which guarantees 100% node coverage, does not necessarily guarantee 100% link
coverage. Motivated by the fact that traditional node coverage approaches are not
suitable for detecting attacks against wireless communication links, we are curious
to investigate what percentage of network links are usually left uncovered by the
node coverage approach. It is also important to know how many extra monitoring
nodes a link coverage imposes to the monitoring mechanism when comparing to node
coverage approaches.
To compare with node coverage solutions, we implemented a greedy Maximum
Coverage algorithm [75, 83] (called \MAX Coverage" for the remainder of the sec-
tion). To fairly compare the results, we ran MAX Coverage for several upper bounds
(maximum number of monitors), and found the minimum upper bound (called k)
that guarantees 100% node coverage in a 50-node network. As depicted in Fig-
ure 6.3(a), roughly 35% of nodes have to be selected for guaranteeing 100% node
coverage. We use this upper bound in all of our simulations.
Figure 6.3(b) shows that the number of uncovered links increases as network
size grows. In contrast, link coverage approach always guarantee full link coverage.
Hence, using traditional node coverage approaches has the risk of not monitoring all
communication links (i.e., false negative rate in intrusion detection systems) and this
risk increases to more than 10 % of the links forN = 90. However, one may argue that
link coverage approach requires more monitoring nodes to cover all communication
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Figure 6.3: (a) Average number of monitor and uncovered nodes for dierent K
values in Max Coverage of 50-node network. (b) Link coverage percent. (c) Average
number of monitors in dierent algorithms. (d) Percentage of nodes selected as
monitor in link coverage and node coverage approaches.
links. Figure 6.3(c) shows the average number of nodes selected as monitoring nodes
in dierent EEMON algorithms and also in MAX Coverage algorithm. These results
were obtained from 500 random networks for each given network size. As expected,
Distributed EEMON has the worst results among other algorithms and requires a
large number of monitoring nodes. However, the centralized algorithms of EEMON
select only few monitoring nodes to cover all communication links.
To have a better comparison between Greedy EEMON and ILP EEMON with
traditional node coverage approaches, Figure 6.3(d) depicts the percentage of the
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nodes selected as monitoring nodes in dierent network sizes. As shown, for 10-
node WMN, ILP EEMON achieves 100% link coverage with less monitoring nodes
than Max Coverage algorithm. For mid-size networks (e.g., 20 to 50 nodes as the
most common sizes in WMN [87]), ILP EEMON requires 13% extra monitoring
nodes than Max Coverage to achieve 100% link coverage (5s9% greater than Max
Coverage). Finally, for larger WMN, 60 to 90 nodes, ILP EEMON requires less
than 5% extra monitoring nodes than Max Coverage to cover all communication
links (i.e., 10% improvements in link coverage rate). Figure 6.3(d) also shows that
Greedy EEMON requires less than 10% extra monitoring nodes than MAX Cover-
age to achieve 100% link coverage. Hence, it is quite reasonable to have few more
monitoring nodes than traditional solutions for covering all communication links and
consequently increasing the intrusion detection rate.
6.4.2 Comparison of Dierent EEMON Algorithms
In this section, we evaluate the performance of all EEMON algorithms used for
link coverage and show how dierent algorithms select optimal sets of monitoring
nodes with maximum residual battery charge and communication load (i.e., to keep
the average cost per monitoring nodes as low as possible). All experiments in this
section are performed for 500 random networks for each given network size. The
average residual charge and communication load among all nodes in each network
is always 50%. The metrics we evaluate for each algorithm are the average residual
charge among monitoring and non-monitoring nodes, the average communication
load among monitoring and non-monitoring nodes, the threshold reduction in Bth
required for covering all communication links, and nally, the time complexity of
monitoring node selection algorithms. According to the WMC formulation, we ex-
pect EEMON algorithms to select nodes with higher residual charge and also higher
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communication load as monitors. It is also worth mentioning that traditional node
coverage solutions [46,47,75,83,98] do not necessarily consider both residual charge
and communication load together in their optimal monitoring formulation, as we do
for Max Coverage.
Figures 6.4(a) and 6.4(b) depict the average residual charge among selected nodes,
i.e.,(1=jM j)vj2Mbj, and unselected nodes, i.e., (1=N  jM j)vj =2Mbj, respectively, in
all EEMON algorithms and the Max Coverage algorithm. Considering that the
average residual charge among all nodes is always 50%, the results shown in these
two gures conrm that the proposed algorithms always select monitoring nodes
among those with higher residual charge. As depicted in Figure 6.4(b), the set of
non-monitor nodes includes nodes with low residual charge.
Greedy EEMON and Distributed EEMON select nodes with minimum weight
per links rst (higher residual energy and communication load). Therefore, selected
nodes in the last iterations are most likely among low-battery nodes since we may
have to select nodes that cover a single wireless link; simply because all the links must
be covered. When considering Figures 6.4(a) and 6.4(b) together, one can observe
that distributed EEMON has the lowest average residual charge among selected nodes
because 1) distributed solution is locally optimal, and 2) as network size increases
more monitoring nodes are required (see Figure 6.3(c)). This increase in monitoring
nodes results in selecting more monitors among low-battery nodes. In contrast, Max
Coverage algorithm has the highest average among all since it does not need to
cover all links, and thus, fewer monitoring nodes are always required. In conclusion,
the more nodes selected as monitors by an algorithm, the higher is the chance of
selecting low-battery nodes. It is worth mentioning that the higher residual charge
of monitors in Greedy EEMON, compared to the ILP EEMON, forces the selection
of more monitoring nodes as previously shown in Figure 6.3(c).
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Figure 6.4: Average residual battery charge of (a) Nodes selected as monitoring
nodes. (b) Nodes NOT selected as monitoring nodes. Average communication load
of (c) nodes selected as monitoring nodes. (d) Nodes NOT selected as monitoring
nodes.
Figures 6.4(c) and 6.4(d) depict the average communication load of monitoring
nodes, i.e., (1=jM j)vj2M lj, and non-monitoring nodes, i.e., (1=N   jM j)vj =2M lj,
respectively, an evidence that the proposed algorithms select monitors with higher
values of communication load. As one can observe, the average communication
load among selected nodes is always above 50% (the average among all) while it is
below 50% for non-monitoring nodes. However, the results average communication
load, especially for Distributed EEMON, are much better than those for average
residual charge. This is because there is no exception in selecting nodes with lower
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Figure 6.5: (a) Bth Minimum Charge among selected nodes. (b) Average Execution
Time.
communication loads, as is the case for residual charge (i.e., b).
Next, we show how dierent EEMON Algorithms require dierent b for selecting
monitor nodes. Using the battery proling data, we set a threshold of bth =60%,
slightly higher than the average among all nodes, for the residual energy of a node
to be a monitoring node candidate. The reduction in the residual energy threshold
is considered as penalty by EEMON algorithms since monitoring nodes with low
residual energy most likely die in a short time. The reduction in the residual energy
threshold (i.e., b) is shown in Figure 6.5(a). Negative values for b mean that the
minimum residual energy among selected nodes is larger than bth and no threshold
reduction is required. As shown, larger networks are penalized more than smaller
ones because more nodes are required to be selected as monitors. This increases
the probability of choosing low-battery nodes and increasing the b. We can also
see that Distributed EEMON is penalized more than Greedy and ILP EEMON. As
expected, Max Coverage solution (that was shown to leave a considerable percentage
of links uncovered) causes lower b than EEMON.
Finally, we compare the execution time of Greedy EEMON, ILP EEMON, and
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Figure 6.6: The distribution of ILP EEMON execution time.
Max Coverage. Figure 6.5(b) shows the average execution time of these algorithms
for 500 random networks of each given network size. As depicted, Greedy EEMON
and Max Coverage produce results in a few milliseconds while the execution time for
ILP EEMON is in the order of a few seconds (e.g., 35 seconds for 90-node networks).
We plot the distribution of the ILP execution time as a function of network size
for all 500 random networks in Figure 6.6. As depicted, the higher average for ILP
execution time is because of few outliers (e.g., one topology among 500 random 70-
node networks) that rarely occur. Hence, considering the optimal solutions that ILP
EEMON produces, an ecient approach for security administrators might be to set
a time threshold for ILP solver and choose the greedy solution if the ILP exceeds the
threshold.
6.4.3 Impact of Duty-Cycling on WMN Lifetime
We investigate the impact of duty-cycling on WMN lifetime through a system im-
plementation on ve Linksys WRT54GL routers. One router acts as an AC powered
gateway. The other mesh routers are battery powered. We assigned a xed random
network load to each router as 62%, 49%, 33%, 67% of the maximum network load
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Figure 6.7: Five-node mesh network topology and dierent monitoring solutions.
a mesh router can handle. As depicted in Figure 6.4.2, we created a linear network
topology to ensure that centralized and distributed algorithms produce dierent set
of monitoring nodes. The Centralized algorithms (Greedy WMC and ILP WMC)
selected nodes 3 and 5 as monitoring nodes, while the distributed algorithm selected
nodes 3, 4 and 5 as monitoring nodes. We used 12V-3.4Ah Power Sonic rechargeable
batteries for powering the mesh routers. We observed that the centralized solution
prolonged the network lifetime (dened as the time when the rst battery dies) by
8%, while the distributed solution did not increase it. The explanation for this is
that battery attached to the router 4, that was the rst one died, was not monitor in
centralized solution, however, in the distributed solution it was selected as monitor.
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7. RESOURCEFUL AND TRAFFIC-AWARE IDS
This section investigates the eect of trac-awareness on the performance of in-
trusion detection systems proposed for battery-powered resourceful WMN. In fact,
we will show how trac-awareness, as an administrative assumption for some WMN
applications, will reduce the amount of resources (e.g., energy) consumed by perform-
ing IDS on WMN nodes. We introduce TRAIN, as a resourceful and trac-aware
IDS that uses link-coverage mechanism as used in EEMON. Because of the similar-
ities between EEMON and TRAIN detection systems, the performance of TRAIN
will be compared to EEMON.
7.1 Problem Formulation
We model a WMN backbone (i.e., only WMN nodes and backbone links) as a
graph G = (V;E), in which V is the set of mesh nodes fv1; v2;    ; vNg, and E =
fe1; e2;    ; eQg is the set of links between them. Considering the information about
active trac paths in the WMN, we denote the number of nodes and links actively
participating in WMN routing paths by n (n  N) and q (q  Q), respectively.
Thus, the set of active nodes and links in WMN, after removing idle nodes/links,
is modeled as a reduced graph G0 = fV 0; E 0g, where V 0 is the set of n active nodes
(V 0  V ), and E 0 is the set of q active links (E 0  E). The set of selected monitoring
nodes are denoted by M = fmj jmj is a monitoring nodeg. We also denote the
set of routing paths for the network trac by P = fp1; p2;    ; plg, where P vi =
fvj j vj is located on pig and P vi  V 0. We also use P ei = fer j er is a link in pig for
P ei  E 0 to show the set of edges (links) on each path.
Additionally, we denote the residual energy and the communication load of a
mesh node by bj and lj, respectively. Based on the maximum residual charge and
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communication load a node can have, both bj and lj are considered normalized values
in range [0; 1]. Let w : V  ! [0; 1] be a cost function that assigns a weight wj to a
node vj based on lj and bj (wi = w(lj; bj) = 1=(lj bj)), such that higher normalized
lj and bj values result in lower weight being assigned to vj. Finally, we use vectors
 = [1; 2;    ; N ] (i.e., Battery Threshold) to represent the minimum energy
charge required for being selected as monitoring node. This threshold is important
parameters and typically set by a network administrator based on energy resources.
7.1.1 Optimal Monitoring Problem
In this section, inspired by EEMON's problem formulation, we present optimal
monitoring problem statement in resourceful and trac-aware IDS class.
Denition 10 The Path Covering Set is a set of paths in WMN that a node
can monitor, i.e., at least one link on the path is in the Covering Set of that node
(PCj = fpi j 9er 2 P ei such that er 2 Cjg).
This denition shows the dierence between PRIDE (node coverage approach)
and TRAIN (link coverage approach) in their trac monitoring mechanisms. TRAIN
uses monitoring coverage to benet from every possible node in the network that can
contribute in monitoring a path (as opposed to PRIDE that only uses those located
on the path).
Denition 11 Path Monitoring Problem (PMP) Given G = (V;E 0) with a
set of vertices in V and a set of edges in E 0 and a set of paths P in WMN, let wj be
the weight of vj, nd the set of monitors M = fm1;m2;    ;mkg with the minimum
cost j2Mwj, such that
S
j2M PCj = P , i.e., the monitors cover all paths in G, and
bj  j;8j 2 M , i.e., the residual energy of each monitoring node exceeds a battery
threshold.
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In order to formulate PMP as an ILP, very similar to WMC, let S 0i be a set
of selected monitor nodes out of all possible nodes that can monitor path pi. We
formulate PMP Problem as follows:
minimize
X
vj2V
wjmj (7.1)
subject to: jS 0ij  1 ;8pi 2 P (7.2)
bj  j (or bth) ;8mj 2M (7.3)
mj 2 f0; 1g (7.4)
where constraint (7.2) indicates that every path has to be covered; constraint (7.3)
enforces the algorithm to select the nodes with residual energy greater than a thresh-
old.
EEMON/TRAIN and PRIDE formulations are compared in Table 7.1. Let con-
sider these pseudo-formulations as representatives for optimal monitoring problem
in intrusion detection systems of infrastructureless wireless networks. Such a con-
sideration is because a variety of system and security assumptions (generally placed
in two resourceful and resourceless categories) are already encompassed in these two
examples: 1) the amount of resources (i.e., processing, storage) and the energy avail-
able for monitoring activity; 2) the network component (i.e., link, node, path) that
has to be monitored.
As shown in Table 7.1 for EEMON and TRAIN, when nodes can fully monitor
a network component with all IDS functions (i.e., monitoring nodes), the objective
functions is to minimize the number of them. This considers wireless device as a
resourceful hardware, e.g., Meshlium [53], that can act as an IDS node detecting
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Table 7.1: Objective functions and constraints in all formulations.
PRIDE EEMON/TRAIN
Objective
cover paths with maximum cover links/paths with minimum
detecting modules monitoring nodes
Constraints
every path has to be covered every link/path has to be covered
one detecting module per path one monitoring node per link/path
Resource Awareness: available memory/processing/energy resources for IDS is limited
every possible attack. On the other hand, the objective function in PRIDE, that
assumes resourceless wireless devices, is to maximize the number of IDS functions
activated for monitoring a network component. Other than the dierence in the
objective function of resourceless and resourceful IDS classes, all of the constraints
in the optimal monitoring problem are similar, as shown in Table 7.1.
7.2 TRAIN Protocol
TRAIN uses a centralized approach in which, similar to EEMON, the base station
can either apply an ILP solver or use a greedy algorithm to solve PMP. The base
station collects information from WMN nodes (i.e., connectivity, trac information,
communication load, and residual energy), executes the monitoring node selection
algorithm (either greedy or ILP solver) and distributes the monitoring roles to the
network.
Lessons learned from PRIDE show that a centralized approach can impose very
large time complexity when dealing with large networks. Thus, inspired by PRIDE
protocol, we consider a time-ecient approach for the centralized algorithms. In
order to reduce the execution time, after collecting the local information from the
nodes, the base station removes idle nodes from the network, i.e., those not con-
tributing in the trac routing, and optimally selects monitoring nodes that can
cover all trac paths. If the reduced graph is disconnected, each graph component
is considered as a sub-problem and solved separately. Algorithm 9 presents TRAIN
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Algorithm 9 TRAIN Protocol
1: Data Collection(V;E;N;Q)
2: Relaxation(V 0; E0; n; q)
3: Path Extract(V 0; E0; P )
4: P = P
5: g = 0
6: while 9 pi 2 P do
7: g ++
8: Ug = fpig
9: P = Pnfpig
10: while 9 pj 2 P and
11:
S
pk2Ug
(P ej \ P ek ) 6= ? do
12: Ug = Ug [ fpjg
13: P = Pnfpjg
14: end while
15: end while
16: for 8Ug do
17: Vg = fvj jvj 2 P vi and pi 2 Ugg
18: Eg = ferjer 2 P ei and pi 2 Ugg
19: for 8 g do Solve-PMP(Vg; Eg; P )
20: M =
Sg
1Mg
protocol.
Given the set of nodes, the algorithm rst collects information from nodes and
then produces the reduced sets V 0 and E 0 by removing idle nodes and links (Lines
1, 2). Next, the set of active routing paths P is extracted in Line 3. Given P ,
Algorithm 9 creates the set P of unvisited paths (Line 4) and then denes variable g
as the number of sub-problems (Line 5). For every unvisited path pi in set P (Line
6), Algorithm 9 rst creates a new sub-problem Ug (Lines 7, 8) and marks it as a
visited path (Line 9). Algorithm 9 then searches P to nd any unvisited path pj
which is connected (two paths are connected if they have links in common) to at
least one path in the current Ug (Lines 10, 11). If so, the corresponding path pj will
be added to the current sub-problem Ug and removed from P (Line 12, 13). When
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no more paths in P can be added to the current Ug, Algorithm 9 increases g and
creates a new sub-problem. This process repeats until there is no unvisited path in
P . Next, for every sub-problem Ug, the Algorithm creates the corresponding sets Vg
and Eg as the set of nodes located on the paths and the set of links on the paths
of component Ug, respectively (Lines 16, 17, 18). Finally, Algorithm 9 solves PMP
(running either an ILP solver or the greedy algorithm on the nodes, links, and paths
of each sub-problem Ug) in Line 19. The set of monitoring nodesM will be the union
of all set of monitoring nodes selected for each graph component, i.e., Mg (Line 20).
Greedy TRAIN is shown in Algorithm 10. This Algorithm rst creates an empty
set of monitoring nodes for the corresponding graph components (Line 1) and then
puts the set of all paths of that component in Pg (Line 2). Next, Algorithm 10 selects
monitoring nodes based on the number of paths per unit weight which a node covers
and based on the remaining energy level bi that must be above threshold bth (Lines
3, 4). When a node vj is selected as a monitoring node (Lines 5, 6), all the paths in
PCj are covered. Hence, they are removed from the uncovered set of paths Pg (Line
7). This selection is repeated until all paths become covered. Similar to Greedy
EEMON, Algorithm 10 may reduce the threshold by b to ensure that all paths are
covered (Line 9). The proposed Algorithm runs in time polynomial of jPgj and jVgj.
The approximation ratio of Greedy TRAIN is H(maxvj2Vg jPCjj).
7.3 Simulation Results
We performed a thorough set of simulations to evaluate the performance of
TRAIN in selecting monitoring nodes with respect to the network energy consump-
tion and intrusion detection rates. The simulation results are presented in four sec-
tions: 1) evaluation of dierent TRAIN algorithms for complexity versus optimality;
2) comparison between the energy consumption of EEMON and TRAIN solutions;
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Algorithm 10 Greedy TRAIN
1: Mg = fg
2: Pg = fpi j 8er 2 P ei ; er 2 Egg
3: while Pg 6= ? do
4: if (fmg = maxvj2VgfjPCj \ Pgj=wjg) 6= ? then
5: Mg =Mg [m
6: Vg = Vgnm
7: Pg = Pg   PCj
8: else
9: bth = bth  b
10: end if
11: end while
and 3) evaluation of intrusion detection rates for all EEMON and TRAIN solutions
and the traditional node coverage mechanisms. Similar to EEMON, TRAIN is also
implemented in MATLAB.
7.3.1 Performance Evaluation of TRAIN Algorithms
In this section, we evaluate the performance of Greedy TRAIN and ILP TRAIN
for solving the PMP problem. Given a random network topology (repeated for sizes
of 10 to 90 nodes), we produce random communication paths and show how dierent
TRAIN algorithms solve PMP and select monitoring nodes. Since the number of
trac paths can aect the number of required monitors, we consider three dierent
settings for jP j in this section: 1) jP j = 0:1  N (i.e., 10% of network size); 2)
jP j = 0:3  N ; and 3) jP j = 0:5  N . The path length for each given network size
is set to bpNc and is constant for all dierent values of jP j.
Figure 7.1(a) shows the number of selected nodes as monitoring nodes for dierent
number of paths in each given network size. These results are obtained from applying
both Greedy and ILP TRAIN algorithms to 500 random networks (the same case
studies used for evaluating EEMON solution). As depicted, the number of monitoring
nodes increases as the network size or number of paths increase. However, the number
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Figure 7.1: (a) Average number of monitors. (b) Percentage of nodes selected as
monitors. (c) Average link coverage in the entire network. (d) Average battery
charge of selected nodes.
of monitors in TRAIN (a trac-aware solution) is considerably less than in EEMON
(as EEMON has to cover all communication links). For example, given 90-node
networks, Greedy TRAIN selects about 5 monitoring nodes on average to cover 45
paths (i.e., jP j = 0:590) while ILP and Greedy EEMON select about 50 monitoring
nodes. We emphasize here the smaller number of monitoring nodes selected by ILP
TRAIN when compared to Greedy TRAIN.
Figure 7.1(b) shows the percentage of nodes selected as monitoring nodes for each
network size and number of paths. As depicted, the number of monitoring nodes
is usually less than 10% of the nodes in all of our considered settings. It is worth
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Figure 7.2: (a) Bth Minimum Charge among selected nodes. (b) Average Execution
Time.
mentioning that unlike EEMON solution, the percentage of selected nodes in TRAIN
decreases as network size increases because of the number of paths we considered for
each network size. This also has a negative eect on the link coverage percentage
as shown in Figure 7.1(c). We note here that TRAIN, as proposed for trac-aware
networks, does not aim at covering every single network link but every path with
trac. Hence, when comparing TRAIN with EEMON, TRAIN is expected to have
fewer nodes selected as monitoring nodes and more uncovered links. Figure 7.1(d)
shows the average residual charge among selected nodes in TRAIN. As depicted,
the average charge among monitoring nodes in TRAIN is slightly above those in
EEMON because TRAIN requires less monitoring nodes and thtey are selected from
those with very high residual charge.
The last two metrics we evaluate for TRAIN in this section are the threshold
reduction in residual charge and the execution time. Figure 7.2(a) shows the thresh-
old reduction in all TRAIN settings. As shown, b is always negative, which means
Greedy and ILP TRAIN do not select nodes with the residual charge below bth. For
the same reason explained for Figure 7.1(d), the negative value of b in TRAIN
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Figure 7.3: The distribution of ILP TRAIN execution time for jP j = 0:5N .
is because it requires fewer monitoring nodes than EEMON to cover trac paths.
Hence, the probability of choosing a low-battery node as a path monitor is very low.
Figure 7.2(b) shows the average execution time of dierent TRAIN algorithms
for dierent path settings and network sizes. As depicted, the results are always
produced in less than 0.1 second, which is very fast. Similar to the execution time
for ILP EEMON, we also plot the distribution of the execution time for ILP TRAIN
(jP j = 0:5N) as a function of network size. As shown in Figure 7.3, the execution
time is always less than 3 seconds and that means ILP TRAIN, unlike ILP EEMON, is
a practical approach to obtain the optimal set of monitoring node for large networks.
We observe that even the execution time of the outliers is less than 3 seconds.
7.3.2 Energy Consumption of EEMON vs. TRAIN
In this section, we evaluate the energy consumption of EEMON and TRAIN when
using duty-cycling for non-monitoring nodes. As we explained earlier, the network
lifetime of a battery-powered WMN can be extended through duty-cycling. Thus,
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Figure 7.4: Duty cycling at ratios of 50% and 80% uptime in a 40s period.
considering the power that each monitoring node consumes and also the number of
monitoring nodes selected for each given network, we evaluate the average energy
consumption of our proposed algorithms during network lifetime.
The current consumption of Linksys routers is 250mA, which means each router
consumes 3 Watts (12V250mA). Thus, the regular energy consumed by each device
during one minute working time (i.e., an epoch in our experiment) is 180 Joule. Given
two dierent duty-cycling settings shown in Figure 7.4, the energy consumption in
an epoch can be reduced to 154.8 J and 169.92 J for 50% and 80% duty-cycling
settings, respectively. However, other duty-cycling intervals can also be considered
by network administrator. If all nodes are selected as monitoring nodes and have to
stay ON for an epoch, the average energy consumption of the nodes in that epoch
is 180 J, i.e., the maximum energy consumption and consequently the minimum
network lifetime. On the other hand, if there is no network trac to be monitored
(no monitor is required) and node can perform duty-cycling, e.g., 50%, the average
energy consumption reduces, e.g., by 25.2 J for 50% duty-cycling, and the network
lifetime is extended. Considering the two aforementioned intervals and the hardware
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Figure 7.5: EEMON Energy Consumption (a) duty cycle 50%. (b) duty cycle 80%.
TRAIN Energy Consumption (c) duty cycle 50%. (d) duty cycle 80%.
specications, the average energy consumption in an epoch for a given network and
given monitoring node mechanism (e.g., EEMON or TRAIN) varies between 154.8 J
and 180 J. The larger the number of monitoring nodes, the larger the average energy
consumption is.
Figure 7.5 shows the average energy consumption per node during an epoch (one
minute working time) as a function of the network size. Figures 7.5(a), 7.5(b),
show the average energy consumption of dierent EEMON algorithms for 50% and
80% duty-cycles, respectively. Figures 7.5(c), and 7.5(d), show the average energy
consumption of dierent TRAIN algorithms and paths for 50% and 80% duty-cycles,
respectively. The results show that those monitoring mechanisms and network set-
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tings that select more monitoring nodes (e.g., Distributed EEMON) have higher
energy consumption rates. Obviously, 80% duty-cycling consumes more energy than
50% duty-cycling when applying to the same networks and monitoring mechanisms.
We also emphasize here the possibility of having a small error in the amount of
energy calculated for the given epoch. This is because the current consumption, as
shown in Figure 7.4, slightly uctuates, especially when the wireless interface is ON
(i.e., the 250mA level). Thus, calculating the energy consumption for a longer period
of time or even predicting the networks lifetime (based on the energy consumption
measured for a small epoch) is less accurate than that for the epoch and also depends
on the behavior of the batteries. Therefore, we do not evaluate the network lifetime
through simulation.
7.3.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the intrusion detection rates of all aforementioned
monitoring mechanisms for the attack scenarios discussed in system and security
models. We also consider some unexpected scenarios, e.g., single-hop attacks for
TRAIN, to see if they can be detected even though they are not initially considered
by the proposed mechanisms.
Let Pathij be the path between routers vi and vj. Also let E
0
i = fe0irje0ir connecting
node i to its client rg be a set of all local links between a router and its clients.
Table 7.2 summarizes the paths for a client/host p (connected to router vi) launching
an attack against a single-hop or multi-hop target (either a router or a host). Let
vj be a multi-hop router and q be a client/host connected to router vj. We will use
this notation to explain and evaluate attacks we consider in this section.
Since in EEMON and TRAIN every trac path is covered by at least one monitor-
ing node, they ensure full coverage for any path that includes Pathij, e.g., multi-hop
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Table 7.2: Dierent attack scenarios and the corresponding attack paths.
Attack Target Path
Single-hop
router fe0pig
client/host fe0pig [ fe0iqg
Multi-hop
router fe0pig [ Pathij
client/host fe0pig [ Pathij [ fe0jqg
attacks in Table 7.2. We note here that Pathij in TRAIN has to be a path in the
reduced graph G0. On the other hand, local links e0ir for any client r, are only mon-
itored by router vi. Thus, detectability of the attacks on such local links depends
on the role of the local router (monitor or non-monitor). For example, single-hop
attacks in Table 7.2 are detectable if router vi is a monitoring node.
To evaluate the intrusion detection rates of EEMON and TRAIN and compare
them with Max Coverage, we simulated several attack scenarios. In order to evaluate
each specic attack scenario, we launch 10N random attacks for each given network
size N . The attack scenarios we consider in this section include insider and outsider
attackers, single-hop and multi-hop targets, severe and normal attacks, and also
link-based and host-based attacks.
7.3.3.1 Normal Attacks
Normal attacks include any attack considered in the low severity group of attacks
by the security administrator. Since the IDS running on every router (monitor and
non-monitor) is able to detect attacks in this category, the administrator may put
the most frequent attacks (e.g., port scan) reported in the WMN network in this
category. This increases the chance of detecting most of the attacks launched by the
attacker who is not aware of the attack categorization performed by the administra-
tor. Moreover, there is no need to consider the attacks against unavailable services in
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Figure 7.6: EEMON average Detection rate for (a) Severe Single-hop attacks. (b)
All combinations of Normal/Severe and Single-hop/Multi-hop attacks. (c) EEMON-
Aware attacks. (d) Jamming attack
the WMN as normal attacks. Hence, the detection rate of all monitoring mechanisms
(i.e., TRAIN, EEMON, and Max Coverage) for Normal attacks, either single-hop or
multi-hop, is 100% as the attack trac is certainly monitored by a WMN router
running at least LW-DS conguration. We note here that this detection rate is for
those attackers either connected to the WMN network (insider) or communicating
with a WMN host through the gateway (authenticated outsiders). Those attackers
who are not connected to the WMN (unauthorized outsiders) are assumed to only
threat communication links and will be evaluated at the end of this section.
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Figure 7.7: TRAIN average Detection rate for (a) Severe Single-hop attacks, (b) All
combinations of Normal/Severe and Single-hop/Multi-hop attacks.
7.3.3.2 Severe Attacks
Severe attacks include those that are only detectable by monitoring nodes run-
ning CP-DS. Similar to the Normal attacks, Severe attacks are dened by security
administrator. Since multi-hop attacks are always detectable by both EEMON and
TRAIN, as they monitor all Pathij, the administrator must congure network such
that Severe attacks can only occur in a multi-hop manner. For example, the at-
tacks against WMN le servers can be dened as Severe attacks since the location
of le servers are always known (e.g., in DMZ) and the attacker has to run multi-
hop attacks against them. Hence, Severe Multi-hop attacks are also considered to
be always detected (100% detection rate) if they are properly dened by the ad-
ministrator. However, there is always a possibility for considering some attacks as
Severe while the attacker can launch them in a single-hop mode, e.g., an unknown
vulnerability on the operating system of local router or local clients/hosts. Single-
hop attacks are detectable if local router vi is a monitoring node and monitors all
e0ir by CP-DS. Thus, the monitoring solutions that select fewer nodes as monitoring
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nodes (e.g., ILP EEMON) are much more vulnerable to Severe Single-hop attacks.
We evaluate the detection rate of all monitoring solutions for 10N of each network
size for Severe Single-hop attacks.
Figures 7.6(a) and 7.7(a) show the average detection rate for Severe Single-hop
attacks in EEMON and Max Coverage algorithms and TRAIN algorithms, respec-
tively. As depicted, the detection rates are very low since the number of monitoring
nodes are minimal in all these mechanisms. These results emphasize the trade o
between resource consumption and detection rate in WMN, although this type of
attacks are supposed to occur rarely. We repeated this experiment for previously
discussed attacks: 10N Normal Single-hop, 10N Normal Multi-hop, and 10N
Severe Multi-hop, although the probability of having these attacks in the network
is not necessarily equal in real WMN. We then measured the average detection rate
over all these 40 N dierent attacks for the aforementioned attacks. The average
detection rate of these attacks are shown in Figures 7.6(b) and 7.7(b). As depicted,
the average detection rates are much higher than those for Severe Single-hop attacks
because the other attacks (e.g., all Normal attacks) are always detected.
7.3.3.3 EEMON and TRAIN Aware Attacker
EEMON and TRAIN aware attacker are those type of attacks where attacker
knows which monitoring solutions is used by the administrator (e.g., trac-agnostic
or trac-aware, link coverage or node coverage, etc.) but do not know which attack
is considered to be Severe or Normal. It is worth mentioning that the attacker might
be able to obtain more information about all other security settings through IDS
localization and IDS module localization attacks. However, these types of attacks
are out of the scope of this research and we assume that attacker only knows about
the monitoring solution. For example, if the attacker knows that EEMON is used by
173
 56
 58
 60
 62
 64
 66
 10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90
D
e t
e c
t i o
n  
R
a t
e  
( %
)
Network Size
Greedy TRAIN 10%
Greedy TRAIN 30%
Greedy TRAIN 50%
ILP TRAIN 10%
ILP TRAIN 30%
ILP TRAIN 50%
(a)
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90
D
e t
e c
t i o
n  
R
a t
e  
( %
)
Network Size
Greedy TRAIN 10%
Greedy TRAIN 30%
Greedy TRAIN 50%
ILP TRAIN 10%
ILP TRAIN 30%
ILP TRAIN 50%
(b)
Figure 7.8: TRAIN average Detection rate for (a) TRAIN-Aware attacks, (b) Jam-
ming attack.
the administrator, it only runs single-hop attacks, although he/she does not know
which attack is considered as Severe or Normal. Similarly, if the attacker knows that
TRAIN is used by the administrator, he/she tries to run attacks against intermediate
nodes on WMN paths to avoid monitoring node on the route.
As shown in Figure 7.6(c) for 10N attacks per each network size, an attacker
who is aware of EEMON has yet a very low chance of success (more than 95%
detection rates) since the only undetectable attacks are Severe Single-hop attacks
and the severity of the attacks are considered to be unknown to the attackers. The
detection rate for Max Coverage algorithm is slightly below EEMON algorithms as
it leaves some links uncovered. Figure 7.8(a) shows the average detection rate for
all TRAIN algorithms where the TRAIN-aware attacker may launch attack against
some intermediate nodes. As depicted, TRAIN-aware attacks are harder to detect as
there is only one monitoring node per path and if happen to be near the destination,
it cannot detect the attacks against intermediate nodes.
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7.3.3.4 Link-Based Attacks
Link-Based attacks are those that an unauthorized node (not connected to the
WMN but physically located in WMN area) can launch against WMN communi-
cation links, e.g., Jamming attacks. We consider this attack as a Severe attack
detectable by monitoring nodes. Depending on the total link coverage provided by
a monitoring mechanism, these single-hop link-based attacks may or may not be
detected. Figures 7.6(d) and 7.8(b) show the average detection rates for Jamming
attacks launched at random locations in WMN. The results are obtained from 10N
attacks on 500 random networks for each given network size. As depicted, the mon-
itoring node selected by all EEMON algorithms can detect all link-based attacks
as they aim at monitoring all communication links. However, Max Coverage and
TRAIN mechanisms may miss up to 10% and 40% of the link-based attacks, respec-
tively. The high false negative rate in TRAIN is because it is a trac-aware solution
and is not designed for single-hop attacks.
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8. ATTACK AND FAULT TOLERANT WIRELESS IDS
Although intrusion detection mechanism in WMN have received considerable
focus, little attention has been paid to attacks-and-failures against/of IDS nodes.
Undoubtedly, when an IDS node is compromised or faulty, it is unable to par-
ticipate in intrusion detection process, thus, the intrusion detection rate will de-
crease and some malicious activities will remain undetected (i.e., high false negative
rates). This research, inspired by similar eorts in other computer networking ar-
eas [11, 55, 56, 61, 96], investigates the attack-and-fault tolerance of IDS solutions
presented in this research. In order to develop AFT mechanisms for the proposed
IDS solutions, we rst survey related works proposed for attack or fault tolerance
in all networking areas (e.g., wired, ad hoc and sensor networks). Some of the pro-
posed solutions use redundant/backup nodes [55] to increase the network/service
availability after node compromise/failure while others concentrate on camouaging
mechanisms [61,96] to make monitoring/IDS nodes localization [11] very hard for the
attacker. Furthermore, few other solutions propose fast and ecient fault detection
mechanisms to detect compromised or faulty nodes [56] and recover the network from
that situation [55,61].
This research thrust proposes a classication for all AFT mechanisms and then
concentrates on preventive solutions that use redundant IDS nodes to maintain high
IDS availability ratio after IDS compromise/failure times. We will show that these
mechanisms, at the price of higher resource consumption, increase the attack/fault
tolerance level by: 1) increasing IDS availability; 2) reducing IDS compromise/failure
detection time; and 3) eliminating the need for recovery actions (i.e., adopting backup
nodes) [55, 61]. Taking into consideration the optimal monitoring mechanism em-
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ployed by IDS solutions, we reformulate the optimal monitoring problem for intru-
sion detection in each class of IDS such that the solution becomes an AFT IDS. The
performance (e.g., intrusion detection rate) and eciency (e.g., resource consump-
tion) of redesigned and preventive monitoring mechanisms proposed for each class
of IDS are evaluated and compared to those of the original solutions. The results
show how AFT design trades o attack-and-fault tolerance levels for the amount of
resources consumed by intrusion detection systems.
8.1 AFT Mechanisms Diagram
The IDS mechanism presented in this research are not AFT (except for some spe-
cial cases of the RAPID protocol, which we will explain in next sections). Therefore,
if an IDS node fails (e.g., runs out of memory and crashes or its battery dies) or
become compromised, part of the network will remain uncovered. This means that
some WMN nodes/links become vulnerable against network attacks and that false
negative rates will increase. Inspired by research in AFT design [11, 55, 56, 61, 96]
we propose a classication which, to the best of our knowledge, is the rst for AFT
intrusion detection. Our proposed classication is based on the time of the action
taken for AFT purposes. As shown in Figure 8.1, the actions are either taken before
IDS attack or fault time (i.e., resulting in IDS compromise/failure) or after that.
8.1.1 Prevention Phase
As shown in Figure 8.1, prevention phase refers to the time while the IDS com-
promise/failure has not occurred yet. For example, a preventive AFT mechanism [61]
may aim at increasing the risk of IDS node attack for the attacker (e.g., by using
redundant monitoring node per link) or reducing the chance of node failure (e.g.,
by using high capacity storage or energy sources). Therefore, preventive solutions
pay the AFT prices (i.e., redundant resources) at the design and implementation
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Figure 8.1: A multi-phase process for designing an AFT IDS mechanism.
phase so that the IDS availability (detection coverage ratio) will not be aected after
IDS compromise/failure. This research focuses on preventive mechanisms and eval-
uates the performance of preventive AFT designs and their costs. It is important to
mention that there exists solutions focusing on IDS node camouaging, so that IDS
localization (as shown in Figure 8.1) becomes very hard for the attacker [11,96].
8.1.2 Detection Phase
If preventive mechanisms are not used, the monitoring system must be able to
detect IDS compromise/failure immediately, so the security administrator can re-
cover the IDS mechanism quickly. The time between IDS compromise/failure and
its detection by security administrator is called detection time. A fast and accu-
rate detection mechanism can remarkably reduce the detection time and increase the
IDS availability time. Detection mechanisms [55,56] can be either proactive or reac-
tive. It is worth mentioning that a preventive AFT mechanism that uses redundant
monitoring nodes is already a real-time detection system since every IDS node is
monitored by at least another IDS node.
8.1.3 Response Phase
When the IDS compromise/failure occurs and it is detected, an appropriate ac-
tion is to recover the node(s) from the compromise/fault. The time between the IDS
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compromise/failure detection and its recovery is called response time. An optimal
recovery mechanism minimizes the response time [55, 61]. Recovery mechanism and
response time usually depend on the network topology, application, and IDS solution
used in the network. We note here that although preventive solutions do not need
detection and response mechanisms, it is very benecial to consider these two mech-
anisms particularly for highly vulnerable WMN. This is because a preventive mecha-
nism ultimately becomes non-preventive after a few IDS node compromises/failures.
8.2 AFT-Design for WMN IDS
We model a mesh network as a graph G = (V;E), in which V is the set of
WMN nodes fv1; v2;    ; vNg, and E = fe1; e2;    ; eQg is the set of links between
them. For the trac-aware solutions, we denote the number of nodes and links
located on trac routes by n (n  N) and q (q  Q), respectively. Therefore,
the reduced graph G0 = fV 0; E 0g represents the set of active nodes and links in
trac-aware WMN, where V 0 is the set of n active nodes (V 0  V ), and E 0 is
the set of q active links (E 0  E). The set of selected monitoring (IDS) nodes in
the resourceful classes are denoted by M = fmj jmj is a monitoring node g. We
also denote the set of routing paths for the network trac by P = fp1; p2;    ; plg,
where P vi = fvj j vj is located on pig and P vi  V 0. We denote by matrix GQN the
mapping between nodes and links, i.e., ghj = 1 i node vj can monitor link eh. We
also denote by matrix Tln the mapping between nodes and paths, i.e., tij = 1 i
node j is located on path i.
We denote the residual energy and the communication load of a WMN node by
bj and cj, respectively. Based on the maximum residual charge and communication
load a node can have, both bj and cj are considered normalized values in range
[0; 1]. Let w : V  ! [0; 1] be a cost function that assigns a weight wj to a node
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vj based on cj and bj (wi = w(cj; bj) = 1=(cj  bj)), such that higher normalized
cj and bj values result in lower weight being assigned to vj. We also denote the
set of IDS functions by F = ffr j fr is a set of detection rules g with size R (i.e.,
jFj = R). Let wf : fFg  ! [0; 1] be a cost function that assigns memory load
wfr to IDS function fr (as used in resourceless IDS solutions). Consequently, vector
W f = [wf1 ; w
f
2 ;    ; wfR] represents memory loads for the IDS functions in F , i.e., the
amount of memory load each function imposes to the IDS node when activated on
that IDS node. We use matrix X to show whether node vj performs IDS function fr
(i.e., xjr = 1) or not. Finally, vectors  = [1; 2;    ; N ] (i.e., Battery Threshold)
and  = [1; 2;    ; N ] (i.e., Memory Threshold) represent the minimum energy
charge required for being selected as monitor and maximum allowable memory load
by IDS functions, respectively.
8.2.1 Resourceful IDS
EEMON aims at covering all communication links while TRAIN aims at covering
all trac paths, both with minimum average cost per monitoring nodes. Let Sh
(Sh M) be the set of selected monitoring nodes out of all possible nodes that can
monitor link eh, and similarly S
0
i be the set of selected monitoring nodes out of all
possible nodes that can monitor path pi.
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minimize
X
vj2V
wjmj (8.1)
subject to: jShj  1(EEMON) ; 8eh 2 E (8.2)
jS 0ij  1 (TRAIN) ; 8pi 2 P
bj  j (or bth) ;8mj 2M (8.3)
mj 2 f0; 1g (8.4)
Therefore, the optimal monitoring problem in a battery-powered resourceful WMN
(both EEMON and TRAIN) can be formulated as an integer linear program (ILP),
where Constraint (8.2) indicates that every link/path must be covered; Constraint
(8.3) enforces the algorithm to select the nodes with residual energy greater than a
threshold. Constraint (8.4) means a node is either selected as a monitoring node or
not.
8.2.1.1 AFT Resourceful IDS
We dene -AFT design as an AFT IDS mechanism in which each node is moni-
tored by +1 monitoring node(s) and the intrusion detection monitoring mechanism
can tolerate at most  IDS compromise/failures per link/path. Hence, in EEMON
and TRAIN optimal monitoring formulations, -AFT design is achieved by modify-
ing constraint (8.2) to jShj   for EEMON and jS 0ij   for TRAIN. It is worth
mentioning that  is bounded by maximum number of monitoring nodes that can
potentially monitor a link/path, which is a function of network density.
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8.2.2 Resourceless IDS
The main objective of resourceless IDS solutions is to monitor all links/paths with
the maximum allowable number of IDS functions that can be performed on WMN
nodes. A higher number of detection modules executed on node vj means more
attack trac can be detected on the links/paths monitored by that node. Hence,
the optimal monitoring problem in resourceless WMN is formulated as the following
ILP (for both PRIDE and RAPID):
maximize (1=l)(1T  T)(X  1) (PRIDE) (8.5)
(1=q)(1T G)(X  1) (RAPID)
subject to: X W f T  T (8.6)
(T  X)ir  1 (PRIDE) ; 8i; r (8.7)
(G  X)hr  1 (RAPID) ;8h; r
xjr 2 f0; 1g (PRIDE) ;8vj 2 V 0;8fr 2 Fj (8.8)
xjr 2 f0; 1g (RAPID) ; 8vj 2 V; 8fr 2 Fj
where Constraint 8.6 limits the IDS memory load on every node vj to be less than
its memory threshold j. Constraint 8.7 ensures that only one copy of each function
is assigned to the nodes for each link/path. Finally, Constraint 8.8 means a node
either performs an IDS function or not.
8.2.2.1 AFT Resourceless IDS
This class of IDS may not be able to achieve 100% link/path coverage (i.e., every
link/path is monitored by all R IDS functions) due to memory constraint . Suppose
j = 8vj, the smaller the  is, the lower the link/path coverage will be. Therefore,
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if the memory threshold is very low that does not allow us to achieve 100% coverage,
our IDS is always 0-AFT. When the memory threshold  increases, it is most likely
possible to achieve -AFT design for  > 0 in resourceless IDS. Hence, in PRIDE and
RAPID, achieving higher link/path coverage rate is more important than achieving
-AFT design.
In order to achieve -AFT design in this class of IDS, we have to remove Con-
straint 8.7 to ensure that more than one IDS function can be assigned to a link/path.
In this case, since redundant IDS functions do not count for coverage ratio (ILP objec-
tive) [36], we need to modify the ILP objective function so that it accurately measures
the link/path coverage ratio. Thus, we dene function BN : fYg  ! f0; 1g that
converts yij to a binary value, i.e., if yij = 0, BN(yij) = 0, otherwise BN(yij) = 1.
We reformulate the optimal monitoring problem for -AFT design of resourceless
IDS classes as follows:
maximize (1=q)(1T  BN(T  X)  1) (PRIDE) (8.9)
(1=q)(1T  BN(G  X)  1) (RAPID)
subject to: X W f T  T (8.10)
xjr 2 f0; 1g ; 8vj; fr (8.11)
The new objective function is no longer linear [36] and cannot be solved with ILP
solvers. Therefore, we use Genetic Algorithm (GA), a popular and eective type
of evolutionary algorithms, as used in RAPID [36] to solve the optimal monitoring
problem proposed for -AFT design in resourceless WMN.
183
8.2.3 Solutions for AFT-Design of IDS
Although some of the solutions proposed for the optimal monitoring in our IDS
solutions are implemented in both centralized and distributed manners, here, we only
consider their centralized algorithms to compare with their centralized AFT designs.
The system and attacker models considered in this research (for AFT-designs) are
exactly the same as those in their original designs. Similar to the original centralized
solutions, the AFT-design solutions consider a WMN including mesh routers (i.e.,
battery powered in EEMON and TRAIN and AC-powered in RAPID and PRIDE)
and a computationally powerful base station. Each router in the WMN has some local
information (e.g., its communication load and its residual energy, processing/memory
loads and trac information) and periodically sends it, via a middleware and secure
communication links, to the base station. Based on the collected information and the
 and  values chosen by the security administrator for resourceful and resourceless
IDS, respectively, the base station then solves the optimization problem and assigns
intrusion detection tasks to the nodes.
8.2.3.1 AFT-Design Resourceful IDS
Similar to original EEMON, upon collecting nodes' information, the base station
uses an ILP solver (i.e., bintprog function of MATLAB) to nd the optimal set of
monitoring nodes that can monitor all WMN links with +1 monitors. AFT-design
TRAIN, as a trac-aware solution, rst removes idle nodes from the network, i.e.,
those not contributing in the trac routing, and then optimally selects monitoring
nodes (using bintprog) to monitor all trac paths with +1 monitors. If the reduced
WMN graph after removing idle nodes is disconnected, each graph component is
considered as a sub-problem (to reduce the execution time) and solved separately.
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8.2.3.2 AFT-Design Resourceless IDS
The base station in this classes performs a Genetic Algorithm to nd the optimal
IDS function distribution that provides maximum average link/path coverage ratio.
GA solutions are encoded as bitstrings (i.e., chromosomes) of specic length and
tested for tness. In AFT-design PRIDE and RAPID formulations, matrix X is
a solution that can be encoded as a chromosome of length n  R and the tness
(objective) value of each solution is the average link/path coverage in the WMN.
The genetic operations used in redesigned PRIDE/RAPID are based on operations
explained in [34] that their details are omitted here.
8.3 Performance Evaluation
This section presents simulation results of the proposed AFT design solutions for
both resourceful and resourceless classes.
8.3.1 Resourceful IDS
This section presents simulation results for AFT designs of two resourceful IDS
solutions, EEMON and TRAIN. As shown in EEMON and TRAIN and by consid-
ering their problem formulations presented in Section 8.2, the metrics we evaluate
in this section are: 1) average number of nodes selected as monitoring nodes; 2) av-
erage communication load and average residual energy charge among selected nodes
as monitoring nodes, in addition to the battery threshold reduction; 3) average link
coverage and intrusion detection rates; 4) time complexity and average energy con-
sumption; and 5) a new metric called expected  for a given -AFT design as we will
explain it later in this section. The results are obtained from 100 random networks
for each network size. We note here that 0-AFT design in simulation results means
the original unmodied IDS design.
185
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90
A v
g .
 N
u m
b e
r  o
f  M
o n
i t o
r s
Network Size
EEMON 0-AFT
EEMON 1-AFT
EEMON 2-AFT
EEMON 3-AFT
EEMON 4-AFT
(a)
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90
A v
g .
 N
u m
b e
r  o
f  M
o n
i t o
r s
Network Size
TRAIN50% 0-AFT
TRAIN50% 1-AFT
TRAIN50% 2-AFT
TRAIN50% 3-AFT
TRAIN50% 4-AFT
(b)
Figure 8.2: Average number of monitoring nodes for dierent  in: (a) EEMON; (b)
TRAIN 50%
8.3.1.1 Number of Monitors
The main objective in resourceful IDS solutions is to cover the entire network
links/paths with minimum number of monitoring nodes and minimum total cost.
Therefore, in a -AFT design, as  increases, the number of nodes that must be
selected as monitoring nodes will also increase (redundant monitoring nodes provide
higher degree of attack and fault tolerance). Figures 8.2(a) and 8.2(b) show the
average number of monitoring nodes for dierent  and network sizes in EEMON
and TRAIN, respectively. We note here that although TRAIN evaluates this metric
for dierent number of paths (e.g., number of paths equals to 10%, 30%, and 50% of
network size), we only consider the maximum case which is number of paths equals
to 0:5N and omit the other results due to space limitations. As shown, the number
of monitoring nodes linearly increases (i.e., constant percentage of nodes are selected
for dierent N) as  increases in both trac-agnostic and trac-aware solutions to
provide higher levels of attack and fault tolerance. For example, more than 80% of
the nodes in EEMON are selected as monitoring nodes in 4-AFT design (i.e., higher
costs to achieve larger ).
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Figure 8.3: [Bth - Minimum Charge] among selected nodes for dierent  in: (a)
EEMON; (b) TRAIN 50%.
8.3.1.2 Properties of Monitoring Nodes
In EEMON and TRAIN, the cost per monitoring node is dened as a function of
residual energy charge and the communication load. Therefore, the residual energy
charge and the average communication load among selected node is expected to be
higher than of those of non-monitoring nodes. In addition, it is possible that out
of all possible nodes that can monitor a link/path, none of them has residual charge
greater than threshold bth. In this case, as mentioned in EEMON and TRAIN, the
threshold decreases until at least one of the nodes is selected. Such a threshold
reduction has to be as low as possible meaning that most of the selected nodes have
residual energy charge above the threshold bth resulting in longer network life time.
Figures 8.3(a) and 8.3(b) show the average value of [Bth - Minimum Charge] for
dierent  and network sizes in EEMON (TG-RF) and TRAIN (TW-RF), respec-
tively. Negative values mean that the minimum residual energy charge among all
selected nodes is larger than the threshold and no threshold reduction has occurred.
As shown, the greater the  is, the larger the threshold reduction will be. This is
because selecting more monitoring nodes (required by large ) increases the proba-
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Figure 8.4: Average residual energy charge of selected nodes for dierent  in: (a)
EEMON; (b) TRAIN 50%; Average communication load of selected nodes for dier-
ent  in: (c) EEMON; (d) TRAIN 50%.
bility of selecting low battery nodes, and consequently increases the [Bth - Minimum
Charge].
The next two metrics we consider are average residual charge and average com-
munication load among selected nodes, as evaluated in both EEMON and TRAIN.
Figures 8.4(a) and 8.4(b) depict the average residual energy charge among selected
nodes (as monitoring nodes) for dierent  and network sizes in EEMON and TRAIN,
respectively. As depicted, the larger the  is, the lower the average residual energy
charge of monitoring nodes will be. This is because larger  requires more monitoring
nodes to achieve higher levels of attack and fault tolerance. Hence, the monitoring
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node selection algorithms have to select monitors among low battery nodes that de-
creases the average value. Figures 8.4(c) and 8.4(d) show the average communication
load of selected nodes for dierent  and network sizes in EEMON and TRAIN, re-
spectively. Similar to the average residual charge, the average communication load
decreases as  increases.
8.3.1.3 Intrusion Detection Rates
EEMON and TRAIN aim at covering all network links and paths respectively.
Average link coverage in EEMON is always 100% but TRAIN only covers a subset of
links located on active routing paths. Figure 8.3.1.2 shows the average link coverage
provided by TRAIN 50% when  increases. As shown, although the original TRAIN
leaves some communication links uncovered, the AFT design of TRAIN increases the
average link coverage as it selects more monitoring nodes than original TRAIN.
EEMON considers two types of attacks, Severe (detectable by only monitoring
nodes) and Normal (detectable by monitoring and non-monitoring nodes). These
two attacks can be launched in single-hop and multi-hop modes. The detection
rate of EEMON and TRAIN for Normal attacks, either single-hop or multi-hop, is
100% as the attack trac is certainly monitored by a node (either monitoring or
non-monitoring). In addition, Severe multi-hop attacks are also considered to be
100% detectable as both EEMON and TRAIN have at least one monitoring node
that monitors multi-hop trac. The only attack that is hard to detect is Severe
single-hop attack which is only detectable by monitoring nodes.
We performed 10N random attacks for each of 4 types (i.e., 2 types and 2 modes)
for dierent  in EEMON and TRAIN 50% and measured the detection rates (40N
random attacks for each network size). Figures 8.6(a) and 8.6(b) depict the average
intrusion detection rates for all combinations of Severe/Normal and single-hop/multi-
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Figure 8.5: Average link coverage for dierent  in TRAIN 50%.
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Figure 8.6: Average intrusion detection rate of all 40  N random Normal/Severe
and Single-hop/Multi-hop attacks in: (a) EEMON; (b) TRAIN 50%.
hop attacks in EEMON and TRAIN, respectively. As depicted, larger  increases the
average intrusion detection rate since it results in selecting more monitoring nodes
in the network that can detect Severe single-hop attacks and consequently increases
the average detection rate. The lower detection rate in TRAIN (for similar -AFT
designs as EEMON) is because it aims at only covering few paths (a subset of links)
which results in selecting less monitoring nodes.
The next type of attack we consider is EEMON and TRAIN aware attack where
attacker knows which IDS solutions is used (e.g., trac-agnostic or trac-aware, link
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Figure 8.7: Average intrusion detection rate of EEMON/TRAIN aware attacks for
dierent  in: (a) EEMON; (b) TRAIN 50%. Average execution time of the ILP
solver for dierent  in: (c) EEMON; (d) TRAIN 50%.
coverage or node coverage, etc.) but do not know what type of attack is considered
to be Severe or Normal. For example, if the attacker knows that EEMON is used,
he will only run single-hop attacks and if TRAIN is used, he will try to run attacks
against intermediate nodes on trac paths to avoid monitoring node on the route.
Figures 8.7(a) and 8.7(b) show the average intrusion detection rates of EEMON and
TRAIN aware attacks (10N random attacks for each N) in EEMON and TRAIN
50%, respectively. It is worth mentioning that EEMON, at the price of using more
monitoring nodes, achieves higher detection rates than TRAIN for a given network
size. Also, as  increases, the detection rate increases too because of selecting more
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Figure 8.8: Average energy consumption of 50% duty cycling for dierent  in: (a)
EEMON; (b) TRAIN 50%. The ratio of number of selected monitors to the expected
number of monitors for dierent  in: (c) EEMON; (d) TRAIN 50%.
monitoring nodes in the network.
8.3.1.4 Time Complexity and Energy Consumption
Figures 8.7(c) and 8.7(d) show the execution time of the ILP solver when solving
the optimization problem in EEMON and TRAIN, respectively. The results show
the average execution time of dierent  and network sizes. Generally, the execution
time increases as network size (number of links/paths to be covered) increases. In
addition, smaller  increases the time complexity of the ILP solver since it reduces
the solution space. As the results show, the execution time in TRAIN is always less
than 0.1 seconds since it only considers trac paths, however, the execution time in
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EEMON is in the order of few seconds (as it considers all communication links). We
note here that higher execution times for large networks in EEMON are also because
of some outliers among 100 random networks.
In both EEMON and TRAIN, non-monitoring nodes work in duty-cycling mode
to save energy. Thus, the set of monitoring nodes changes periodically (based on the
problem formulation) to extend the network life time. The current consumption of
devices used in EEMON and TRAIN (i.e., Linksys mesh routers) is 250mA, which
means each device consumes 3 Watts (12V250mA). Thus, the energy consumed by
each device during one minute working time (i.e., an epoch in our experiment) is
180 Joule. When duty-cycling, the energy consumption decreases depending on the
duty-cycle interval. Figures 8.8(a) and 8.8(b) show the average energy consumption
per node during an epoch for dierent  in EEMON and TRAIN, respectively. As
shown, the larger the  is, the higher the average energy consumption will be. This
is because larger  means more nodes will work in monitoring mode and less nodes
can save energy through duty-cycling.
8.3.1.5 Success Rate of -AFT Design
The last metric we evaluate in resourceful IDS class is the success rate of -
AFT design in assigning +1 monitoring node(s) to each communication link/path.
Since the number of monitoring nodes assigned to each link/path is limited by the
maximum number of nodes that can cover the link/path, it is sometimes impossible
to achieve -AFT for a given  and network topology. In fact, the success rate
of -AFT design in assigning  + 1 monitoring node(s) to a link depends on the
network topology. We performed simulations for 100 random networks of each given
network size and dierent  and measured the average number of monitoring nodes
per links/paths divided by . Figures 8.8(c) and 8.8(d) depict the success rates of -
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AFT design for dierent  in EEMON and TRAIN, respectively. As one can observe,
the success rate is always near 100% specially for TRAIN as it monitors less links
than EEMON.
8.3.2 Resourceless IDS
This section evaluates the performance of resourceless IDS solutions for AFT de-
sign. As we discussed in Section 8.2, the main parameter in designing resourceless
IDS for trac-agnostic and trac-aware networks is memory threshold (). The
larger the  is, the higher the link/path coverage will be. This is because larger 
allows nodes to execute more IDS functions which also increases the IDS function
redundancy (i.e., higher levels of attack and fault tolerance). Consequently, it in-
creases intrusion detection rates and average memory load on the nodes. Hence, in
resourceless IDS, unlike resourceful IDS, we cannot change  as a tuning parameter
for AFT design, however,  is a function of  and network density. In other words,
the security administrator gives a higher priority to link/path coverage than AFT
design because for example, having two identical (redundant) IDS functions on a
path is not as useful as executing two dierent IDS functions on the nodes along the
paths. Obviously, the later provides higher path coverage (and consequently higher
detection rates) than the former (i.e., lower path coverage but higher level of attack
and fault tolerance).
Figures 8.9(a) and 8.9(b) show the average number of IDS functions per links
in RAPID for 6-module and 12-module congurations, respectively. As shown, this
metric is a function of memory threshold () and network density. The larger the
 and network density are, the more IDS function per link (i.e., the level of attack
and fault tolerance) will be. Similarly, Figures 8.9(c) and 8.9(d) depict the average
number of IDS functions per paths in PRIDE for 6-module and 12-module congu-
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Figure 8.9: The average IDS functions per link for dierent memory threshold ()
and network densities in: (a) 6-Module Conguration; (b) 12-Module Conguration
RAPID. The average IDS functions per path for dierent memory threshold ()
and path lengths (PL) in: (c) 6-Module Conguration; (d) 12-Module Conguration
PRIDE.
rations, respectively. In PRIDE, since only the nodes located on the path participate
in path monitoring, the level of attack and fault tolerance is a function of path length
(PL) and . The higher the  and PL are, the higher the attack and fault tolerance
level will be. We note here that other metrics such as intrusion detection rates and
average memory loads (omitted here) in RAPID and PRIDE are exactly the same
as those shown in [36,39].
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this section, we summarize the research, review the contributions, and discuss
the future work.
This research investigates the problem of intrusion detection in wireless mesh
networks (WMN). When compared to traditional intrusion detection systems (IDS)
proposed for wired networks, intrusion detection in WMN is more challenging due
to the limited resources (e.g., memory, CPU, and energy) available on WMN nodes
and also lack of single vantage points where trac can be analyzed (e.g., gateways
and routers in wired networks). Inspired by thorough research on intrusion detec-
tion in wireless ad hoc and sensor networks, researchers have proposed decentralized
monitoring mechanisms for intrusion detection in WMN. Decentralized solutions pro-
pose to distribute IDS responsibility to all nodes such that the entire WMN trac is
inspected. However, the major challenges that hinder the performance of these mech-
anisms are resources (e.g., energy, processing, and storage capabilities) accompanied
by the adhoc-dynamic communication ows.
In light of these challenges, we proposed a taxonomy for dierent monitoring
mechanisms proposed for intrusion detection in WMN. In fact, our objective in this
research is not to propose a new intrusion detection rule, but to propose optimal
approaches of applying proposed intrusion detection rules and engines to dierent
WMN applications. In order to do that, we investigated the feasibility of applying
state-of-the-art decentralized IDS solutions to dierent WMN applications. Our
proposed classication is based WMN nodes' characteristics in dierent applications,
types of services that the WMN provides, and also the administrative knowledge
about network trac. For each class of IDS, we propose optimal IDS role assignment
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that aims at providing maximum intrusion detection rates with respect to all network
characteristics and constraints. We also investigate the problem of IDS attack/failure
for all of the proposed IDS solutions in this research.
9.1 Contributions
We proposed ve intrusion detection systems categorized in four classes where
each class of IDS is suitable for specic type of WMN. The rst class of IDS solutions
considers resource-constrained WMN where network administrator has knowledge
about network trac. We proposed PRIDE, a practical and trac-aware intrusion
detection mechanism, for this class of IDS that optimally distributes IDS functions
along WMN nodes located on the trac paths. We presented this problem as an
integer linear program (ILP) and used ILP solver to solve it. We evaluated the
performance of PRIDE solutions in a real-world department-wide testbed. Our ex-
perimental results show that PRIDE can achieve high detection rates in multi-hop
attack scenarios even for small path lengths and low memory thresholds.
The second class of intrusion detection we studied in this research focuses on
trac-agnostic and resourceless WMN. This research thrust is motivated by the fact
that trac-awareness is a strong assumption in many WMN application in which
trac paths change very often. We proposed RAPID to monitors all communication
links, instead of only few paths. It was shown that the complexity of this prob-
lem, i.e., monitoring all WMN links with resource-constrained nodes, is more than
trac-aware solutions that only consider few WMN link. Each node in RAPID,
depending on its available resources, is assigned a subset of IDS functions and inves-
tigates the entire network trac on the set of communication links it can monitor
(i.e., in its coverage area). We proposed two algorithms to solve optimal IDS function
distribution problem; an optimization algorithm based on evolutionary algorithms
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and a random distributed mechanism. The results surprisingly showed that RAPID
can achieve high detection rates in memory-constrained WMN. We also considered
WMN application with extremely resource-constrained nodes where RAPID cannot
provide reasonable intrusion detection rates. In this case, we use cooperative IDS
where nodes optimally create cooperative intrusion detection groups with respect to
multiple characteristics and constraints. The problem of creating optimal coopera-
tive IDS clusters formulated as a multi-objective optimization problem and then an
evolutionary algorithm was proposed to solve it.
The other two IDS solutions we proposed in this research consider battery-
powered WMN consisting of resourceful nodes. The research challenge/problem we
addressed by these IDS solutions was how to reconcile energy ecient operation,
which requires nodes to save energy as much as possible, with an eective intrusion
detection, which requires nodes to perform intrusion detection tasks resulting in ex-
tra energy consumption. The problem of energy-ecient monitoring was studied in
these two classes of IDS while EEMON focuses on trac-agnostic application and
TRAIN studies the eect of trac-awareness on such IDS solutions.
The last contribution in this research is to investigate the problem of attack and
fault tolerance of the proposed IDS solutions. We rst surveyed a series of admin-
istrative mechanisms for attack-and-fault tolerant (AFT) IDS design and proposes
a classication for all AFT mechanisms and then concentrated on preventive solu-
tions. We proposed redesigned IDS solutions that were attack and fault tolerant and
then showed that AFT mechanisms, at the price of higher resource consumption, can
increase the attack/fault tolerance level of IDS solutions in WMN.
198
9.2 Future Work
Taking into consideration that intrusion detection in resource-constrained wireless
networks is a new promising research area and only few research eorts have been
devoted to it, we envision several interesting future directions:
9.2.1 Intelligent Routing for Trac-Aware IDS
In two research thrusts of this dissertation, we concentrated on trac-aware IDS
mechanisms where the knowledge about routing paths could help security adminis-
trators to optimally assign detection modules to WMN nodes (PRIDE) or optimally
select monitoring nodes (TRAIN). In PRIDE, we showed that for a given memory
constraint, the longer the path was, the higher the detection rates were. In addition,
TRAIN aims at selecting nodes with higher residual energy charge and communi-
cation loads as monitoring nodes. Looking to the future, we also plan to modify
WMN routing protocols (e.g., OLSR) and propose an intelligent routing mechanism
that aims at redirecting WMN trac through longer paths (to increase the num-
ber of nodes participating in trac investigation) when using resource-constrained
mechanisms, or also redirecting WMN trac towards nodes that impose less costs
to the set of monitoring nodes (those that have higher residual charge). This intel-
ligent routing mechanism will tend to increase detection rates and lower monitoring
costs at the price of some routing delays. The tradeo between routing delays and
intrusion detection rates would be an interesting research direction.
9.2.2 Intrusion Detection in Resource-Constrained and Dynamic Networks
This dissertation concentrates on static WMN where network topology does not
change very often. However, recent advances in mobile networks show that these type
of resource-constrained wireless networks are becoming more popular. Consequently
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security of these networks will be of paramount importance. RAPID proposed a
trac-agnostic IDS for resource-constrained WMN, however, its performance in mo-
bile network, where there is no central administrator and network topology changes
very often, has to be evaluated. In such networks, only distributed algorithms can
be considered, but it is possible that some selsh node do not participate in intrusion
detection mechanism to conserve more energy.
9.2.3 Load-Awareness in IDS Role Assignment
PRIDE uses a xed upper bound for number of concurrent network sessions that
the IDS on each node can investigate. Considering the ever increasing networking
services and consequently trac loads, this setting will drastically degrade the IDS
performance. Looking to the future, we also plan to investigate how dynamic memory
allocation, e.g., Stream5 parameters such as \max tcp," can be implemented based
on trac loads on each part of the network. Dynamic memory allocation and IDS
function assignment This way, two nodes with the same memory space available but
dierent trac rates, will dedicate their memory spaces to the static and dynamic
loads dierently.
9.2.4 Intrusion Detection in Resource-Constrained IoT
The new trend in Internet is the network of interconnected wireless physical de-
vices, sensors, and object where they interact through a worldwide communication
infrastructure to provide dierent services. Internet of Things(IoT) has the potential
to be the next evolution in the area of information technology. For such a ubiqui-
tous technology, security is one of the top concerns. In order to provide a strong
security foundation for IoT, several parameters has to be taken into considerations.
Recently, intrusion detection and fault tolerance in IoT have received some attention
from research community. We believe that lessons learned from intrusion detection
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in resource-constrained wireless networks can help researchers in developing IDS
mechanisms for IoT.
9.2.5 Cyber Physical Systems Security
Recently, the boundary between cyber systems and physical systems has been
quite blurring. In fact, the number of cyber devices (e.g., phones) being able to
interact with physical world is increasing. This interaction is done through dierent
sensors (e.g., GPS, accelerometer, gyroscope, etc.) and help people to apply these
systems to dierent applications, e.g., medical, transportation, home-security, and
many other critical services. Taking into account the popularity of CPS application,
their security is among the top concerns. Securing CPS against malicious activities
or physical faults is of utmost importance. As a very new and promising research
area, intrusion and fault detection is considered as another future direction.
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